Kingdom: Input Validation and Representation

Input validation and representation problems ares caused by metacharacters, alternate encodings and numeric representations. Security problems result from trusting input. The issues include: "Buffer Overflows," "Cross-Site Scripting" attacks, "SQL Injection," and many others.

HTTP Parameter Pollution

Abstract
Concatenating unvalidated input into a URL can allow an attacker to override the value of a request parameter. Attacker may be able to override existing parameter values, inject a new parameter or exploit variables out of a direct reach.
Explanation
HTTP Parameter Pollution (HPP) attacks consist of injecting encoded query string delimiters into other existing parameters. If a web application does not properly sanitize the user input, a malicious user may compromise the logic of the application to perform either client-side or server-side attacks. By submitting additional parameters to a web application, and if these parameters have the same name as an existing parameter, the web application may react in one of the following ways:

It may only take the data from the first parameter
It may take the data from the last parameter
It may take the data from all parameters and concatenate them together


For example:
- ASP.NET/IIS uses all occurrences of the parameters
- Apache Tomcat uses only the first occurrence and ignores others
- mod_perl/Apache converts the value into an array of values

Example 1: Depending on the application server and the logic of the application itself, the following request might cause confusion to the authentication system and allow an attacker to impersonate another user.
http://www.server.com/login.aspx?name=alice&name=hacker

Example 2: The following code uses input from an HTTP request to render two hyperlinks.

...
String lang = Request.Form["lang"];
WebClient client = new WebClient();
client.BaseAddress = url;
NameValueCollection myQueryStringCollection = new NameValueCollection();
myQueryStringCollection.Add("q", lang);
client.QueryString = myQueryStringCollection;
Stream data = client.OpenRead(url);
...


URL: http://www.host.com/election.aspx?poll_id=4567
Link1: <a href="http://www.host.com/vote.aspx?poll_id=4567&lang=en">English<a>
Link2: <a href="http://www.host.com/vote.aspx?poll_id=4567&lang=es">Spanish<a>

The programmer has not considered the possibility that an attacker could provide a lang such as en&poll_id=1, and then the attacker may be able to change the poll_id at will.
References
[1] HTTP Parameter Pollution Luca Carettoni, Independent Researcher & Stefano Di Paola, MindedSecurity
[2] HTTP Parameter Pollution Vulnerabilities in Web Applications Marco `embyte’ Balduzzi
[3] Standards Mapping - CIS Azure Kubernetes Service Benchmark 4.0
[4] Standards Mapping - CIS Microsoft Azure Foundations Benchmark partial
[5] Standards Mapping - CIS Amazon Elastic Kubernetes Service Benchmark 2.0
[6] Standards Mapping - CIS Amazon Web Services Foundations Benchmark 3
[7] Standards Mapping - CIS Google Kubernetes Engine Benchmark integrity
[8] Standards Mapping - Common Weakness Enumeration CWE ID 235
[9] Standards Mapping - DISA Control Correlation Identifier Version 2 CCI-002754
[10] Standards Mapping - General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) Indirect Access to Sensitive Data
[11] Standards Mapping - NIST Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4 SI-10 Information Input Validation (P1)
[12] Standards Mapping - NIST Special Publication 800-53 Revision 5 SI-10 Information Input Validation
[13] Standards Mapping - OWASP Top 10 2004 A6 Injection Flaws
[14] Standards Mapping - OWASP Top 10 2007 A2 Injection Flaws
[15] Standards Mapping - OWASP Top 10 2010 A1 Injection
[16] Standards Mapping - OWASP Top 10 2013 A1 Injection
[17] Standards Mapping - OWASP Top 10 2017 A1 Injection
[18] Standards Mapping - OWASP Top 10 2021 A03 Injection
[19] Standards Mapping - OWASP API 2023 API1 Broken Object Level Authorization
[20] Standards Mapping - OWASP Application Security Verification Standard 4.0 5.1.1 Input Validation Requirements (L1 L2 L3), 8.1.3 General Data Protection (L2 L3)
[21] Standards Mapping - OWASP Mobile 2014 M1 Weak Server Side Controls
[22] Standards Mapping - OWASP Mobile 2024 M4 Insufficient Input/Output Validation
[23] Standards Mapping - OWASP Mobile Application Security Verification Standard 2.0 MASVS-CODE-4, MASVS-PLATFORM-2
[24] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard Version 3.0 Requirement 6.5.6
[25] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard Version 3.1 Requirement 6.5.6
[26] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard Version 3.2 Requirement 6.5.6
[27] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard Version 3.2.1 Requirement 6.5.6
[28] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard Version 4.0 Requirement 6.2.4
[29] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Software Security Framework 1.0 Control Objective 4.2 - Critical Asset Protection
[30] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Software Security Framework 1.1 Control Objective 4.2 - Critical Asset Protection, Control Objective B.3.1 - Terminal Software Attack Mitigation, Control Objective B.3.1.1 - Terminal Software Attack Mitigation
[31] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Software Security Framework 1.2 Control Objective 4.2 - Critical Asset Protection, Control Objective B.3.1 - Terminal Software Attack Mitigation, Control Objective B.3.1.1 - Terminal Software Attack Mitigation, Control Objective C.3.2 - Web Software Attack Mitigation
[32] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.1 APSC-DV-002560 CAT I
[33] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.2 APSC-DV-002560 CAT I
[34] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.3 APSC-DV-002560 CAT I
[35] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.4 APSC-DV-002560 CAT I
[36] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.5 APSC-DV-002560 CAT I
[37] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.6 APSC-DV-002560 CAT I
[38] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.7 APSC-DV-002560 CAT I
[39] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.8 APSC-DV-002560 CAT I
[40] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.9 APSC-DV-002560 CAT I
[41] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.10 APSC-DV-002560 CAT I
[42] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.11 APSC-DV-002560 CAT I
[43] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 5.1 APSC-DV-002560 CAT I
[44] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 5.2 APSC-DV-002560 CAT I
[45] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 5.3 APSC-DV-002530 CAT II, APSC-DV-002560 CAT I
[46] Standards Mapping - Web Application Security Consortium Version 2.00 Improper Input Handling (WASC-20)
desc.dataflow.dotnet.http_parameter_pollution
Abstract
Concatenating unvalidated input into a URL can allow an attacker to override the value of a request parameter. Attacker may be able to override existing parameter values, inject a new parameter or exploit variables out of a direct reach.
Explanation
HTTP Parameter Pollution (HPP) attacks consist of injecting encoded query string delimiters into other existing parameters. If a web application does not properly sanitize the user input, a malicious user may compromise the logic of the application to perform either client-side or server-side attacks. By submitting additional parameters to a web application, and if these parameters have the same name as an existing parameter, the web application may react in one of the following ways:

It may only take the data from the first parameter
It may take the data from the last parameter
It may take the data from all parameters and concatenate them together


For example:
- ASP.NET/IIS uses all occurrences of the parameters
- Apache Tomcat uses only the first occurrence and ignores others
- mod_perl/Apache converts the value into an array of values

Example 1: Depending on the application server and the logic of the application itself, the following request might cause confusion to the authentication system and allow an attacker to impersonate another user.
http://www.example.com/login.php?name=alice&name=hacker

Example 2: The following code uses input from an HTTP request to render two hyperlinks.

...
String lang = request.getParameter("lang");
GetMethod get = new GetMethod("http://www.example.com");
get.setQueryString("lang=" + lang + "&poll_id=" + poll_id);
get.execute();
...


URL: http://www.example.com?poll_id=4567
Link1: <a href="http://www.example.com/vote.php?lang=en&poll_id=4567">English<a>
Link2: <a href="http://www.example.com/vote.php?lang=es&poll_id=4567">Spanish<a>

The programmer has not considered the possibility that an attacker could provide a lang such as en&poll_id=1, and then the attacker will be able to change the poll_id at will.
References
[1] HTTP Parameter Pollution Luca Carettoni, Independent Researcher & Stefano Di Paola, MindedSecurity
[2] HTTP Parameter Pollution Vulnerabilities in Web Applications Marco `embyte’ Balduzzi
[3] Standards Mapping - CIS Azure Kubernetes Service Benchmark 4.0
[4] Standards Mapping - CIS Microsoft Azure Foundations Benchmark partial
[5] Standards Mapping - CIS Amazon Elastic Kubernetes Service Benchmark 2.0
[6] Standards Mapping - CIS Amazon Web Services Foundations Benchmark 3
[7] Standards Mapping - CIS Google Kubernetes Engine Benchmark integrity
[8] Standards Mapping - Common Weakness Enumeration CWE ID 235
[9] Standards Mapping - DISA Control Correlation Identifier Version 2 CCI-002754
[10] Standards Mapping - General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) Indirect Access to Sensitive Data
[11] Standards Mapping - NIST Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4 SI-10 Information Input Validation (P1)
[12] Standards Mapping - NIST Special Publication 800-53 Revision 5 SI-10 Information Input Validation
[13] Standards Mapping - OWASP Top 10 2004 A6 Injection Flaws
[14] Standards Mapping - OWASP Top 10 2007 A2 Injection Flaws
[15] Standards Mapping - OWASP Top 10 2010 A1 Injection
[16] Standards Mapping - OWASP Top 10 2013 A1 Injection
[17] Standards Mapping - OWASP Top 10 2017 A1 Injection
[18] Standards Mapping - OWASP Top 10 2021 A03 Injection
[19] Standards Mapping - OWASP API 2023 API1 Broken Object Level Authorization
[20] Standards Mapping - OWASP Application Security Verification Standard 4.0 5.1.1 Input Validation Requirements (L1 L2 L3), 8.1.3 General Data Protection (L2 L3)
[21] Standards Mapping - OWASP Mobile 2014 M1 Weak Server Side Controls
[22] Standards Mapping - OWASP Mobile 2024 M4 Insufficient Input/Output Validation
[23] Standards Mapping - OWASP Mobile Application Security Verification Standard 2.0 MASVS-CODE-4, MASVS-PLATFORM-2
[24] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard Version 3.0 Requirement 6.5.6
[25] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard Version 3.1 Requirement 6.5.6
[26] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard Version 3.2 Requirement 6.5.6
[27] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard Version 3.2.1 Requirement 6.5.6
[28] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard Version 4.0 Requirement 6.2.4
[29] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Software Security Framework 1.0 Control Objective 4.2 - Critical Asset Protection
[30] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Software Security Framework 1.1 Control Objective 4.2 - Critical Asset Protection, Control Objective B.3.1 - Terminal Software Attack Mitigation, Control Objective B.3.1.1 - Terminal Software Attack Mitigation
[31] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Software Security Framework 1.2 Control Objective 4.2 - Critical Asset Protection, Control Objective B.3.1 - Terminal Software Attack Mitigation, Control Objective B.3.1.1 - Terminal Software Attack Mitigation, Control Objective C.3.2 - Web Software Attack Mitigation
[32] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.1 APSC-DV-002560 CAT I
[33] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.2 APSC-DV-002560 CAT I
[34] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.3 APSC-DV-002560 CAT I
[35] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.4 APSC-DV-002560 CAT I
[36] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.5 APSC-DV-002560 CAT I
[37] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.6 APSC-DV-002560 CAT I
[38] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.7 APSC-DV-002560 CAT I
[39] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.8 APSC-DV-002560 CAT I
[40] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.9 APSC-DV-002560 CAT I
[41] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.10 APSC-DV-002560 CAT I
[42] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.11 APSC-DV-002560 CAT I
[43] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 5.1 APSC-DV-002560 CAT I
[44] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 5.2 APSC-DV-002560 CAT I
[45] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 5.3 APSC-DV-002530 CAT II, APSC-DV-002560 CAT I
[46] Standards Mapping - Web Application Security Consortium Version 2.00 Improper Input Handling (WASC-20)
desc.dataflow.java.http_parameter_pollution
Abstract
Concatenating unvalidated input into a URL can allow an attacker to override the value of a request parameter. Attacker may be able to override existing parameter values, inject a new parameter or exploit variables out of a direct reach.
Explanation
HTTP Parameter Pollution (HPP) attacks consist of injecting encoded query string delimiters into other existing parameters. If a web application does not properly sanitize the user input, a malicious user may compromise the logic of the application to perform either client-side or server-side attacks. By submitting additional parameters to a web application, and if these parameters have the same name as an existing parameter, the web application may react in one of the following ways:

It may only take the data from the first parameter
It may take the data from the last parameter
It may take the data from all parameters and concatenate them together


For example:
- ASP.NET/IIS uses all occurrences of the parameters
- Apache Tomcat uses only the first occurrence and ignores others
- mod_perl/Apache converts the value into an array of values

Example 1: Depending on the application server and the logic of the application itself, the following request might cause confusion to the authentication system and allow an attacker to impersonate another user.
http://www.server.com/login.php?name=alice&name=hacker

Example 2: The following code uses input from an HTTP request to render two hyperlinks.


<%
...
$id = $_GET["id"];
header("Location: http://www.host.com/election.php?poll_id=" . $id);
...
%>


URL: http://www.host.com/election.php?poll_id=4567
Link1: <a href="vote.php?poll_id=4567&candidate=white">Vote for Mr. White<a>
Link2: <a href="vote.php?poll_id=4567&candidate=green">Vote for Mrs. Green<a>

The programmer has not considered the possibility that an attacker could provide a poll_id such as "4567&candidate=green", and then the resulting page will contain the following injected links and hence Mrs. Green will always be voted on an application server which picks the first parameter.
<a href="vote.php?poll_id=4567&candidate=green&candidate=white">Vote for Mr. White<a>
<a href="vote.php?poll_id=4567&candidate=green&candidate=green">Vote for Mrs. Green<a>
References
[1] HTTP Parameter Pollution Luca Carettoni, Independent Researcher & Stefano Di Paola, MindedSecurity
[2] HTTP Parameter Pollution Vulnerabilities in Web Applications Marco `embyte’ Balduzzi
[3] Standards Mapping - CIS Azure Kubernetes Service Benchmark 4.0
[4] Standards Mapping - CIS Microsoft Azure Foundations Benchmark partial
[5] Standards Mapping - CIS Amazon Elastic Kubernetes Service Benchmark 2.0
[6] Standards Mapping - CIS Amazon Web Services Foundations Benchmark 3
[7] Standards Mapping - CIS Google Kubernetes Engine Benchmark integrity
[8] Standards Mapping - Common Weakness Enumeration CWE ID 235
[9] Standards Mapping - DISA Control Correlation Identifier Version 2 CCI-002754
[10] Standards Mapping - General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) Indirect Access to Sensitive Data
[11] Standards Mapping - NIST Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4 SI-10 Information Input Validation (P1)
[12] Standards Mapping - NIST Special Publication 800-53 Revision 5 SI-10 Information Input Validation
[13] Standards Mapping - OWASP Top 10 2004 A6 Injection Flaws
[14] Standards Mapping - OWASP Top 10 2007 A2 Injection Flaws
[15] Standards Mapping - OWASP Top 10 2010 A1 Injection
[16] Standards Mapping - OWASP Top 10 2013 A1 Injection
[17] Standards Mapping - OWASP Top 10 2017 A1 Injection
[18] Standards Mapping - OWASP Top 10 2021 A03 Injection
[19] Standards Mapping - OWASP API 2023 API1 Broken Object Level Authorization
[20] Standards Mapping - OWASP Application Security Verification Standard 4.0 5.1.1 Input Validation Requirements (L1 L2 L3), 8.1.3 General Data Protection (L2 L3)
[21] Standards Mapping - OWASP Mobile 2014 M1 Weak Server Side Controls
[22] Standards Mapping - OWASP Mobile 2024 M4 Insufficient Input/Output Validation
[23] Standards Mapping - OWASP Mobile Application Security Verification Standard 2.0 MASVS-CODE-4, MASVS-PLATFORM-2
[24] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard Version 3.0 Requirement 6.5.6
[25] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard Version 3.1 Requirement 6.5.6
[26] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard Version 3.2 Requirement 6.5.6
[27] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard Version 3.2.1 Requirement 6.5.6
[28] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard Version 4.0 Requirement 6.2.4
[29] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Software Security Framework 1.0 Control Objective 4.2 - Critical Asset Protection
[30] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Software Security Framework 1.1 Control Objective 4.2 - Critical Asset Protection, Control Objective B.3.1 - Terminal Software Attack Mitigation, Control Objective B.3.1.1 - Terminal Software Attack Mitigation
[31] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Software Security Framework 1.2 Control Objective 4.2 - Critical Asset Protection, Control Objective B.3.1 - Terminal Software Attack Mitigation, Control Objective B.3.1.1 - Terminal Software Attack Mitigation, Control Objective C.3.2 - Web Software Attack Mitigation
[32] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.1 APSC-DV-002560 CAT I
[33] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.2 APSC-DV-002560 CAT I
[34] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.3 APSC-DV-002560 CAT I
[35] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.4 APSC-DV-002560 CAT I
[36] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.5 APSC-DV-002560 CAT I
[37] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.6 APSC-DV-002560 CAT I
[38] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.7 APSC-DV-002560 CAT I
[39] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.8 APSC-DV-002560 CAT I
[40] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.9 APSC-DV-002560 CAT I
[41] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.10 APSC-DV-002560 CAT I
[42] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.11 APSC-DV-002560 CAT I
[43] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 5.1 APSC-DV-002560 CAT I
[44] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 5.2 APSC-DV-002560 CAT I
[45] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 5.3 APSC-DV-002530 CAT II, APSC-DV-002560 CAT I
[46] Standards Mapping - Web Application Security Consortium Version 2.00 Improper Input Handling (WASC-20)
desc.dataflow.php.http_parameter_pollution
Abstract
Concatenating unvalidated input into a URL can allow an attacker to override the value of a request parameter. Attacker may be able to override existing parameter values, inject a new parameter or exploit variables out of a direct reach.
Explanation
HTTP Parameter Pollution (HPP) attacks consist of injecting encoded query string delimiters into other existing parameters. If a web application does not properly sanitize the user input, a malicious user may compromise the logic of the application to perform either client-side or server-side attacks. By submitting additional parameters to a web application, and if these parameters have the same name as an existing parameter, the web application may react in one of the following ways:

It may only take the data from the first parameter.
It may take the data from the last parameter.
It may take the data from all parameters and concatenate them together.


For example:
- ASP.NET/IIS uses all occurrences of the parameters
- Apache Tomcat uses only the first occurrence and ignores others
- mod_perl/Apache converts the value into an array of values

Example 1: Depending on the application server and the logic of the application itself, the following request might cause confusion to the authentication system and allow an attacker to impersonate another user.
http://www.server.com/login.php?name=alice&name=hacker

As this shows, the attacker already has name=alice specified, but they've added an additional name=alice&, and if this is being used on a server that takes the first occurrence, then this may impersonate alice in order to get further information regarding her account.
References
[1] HTTP Parameter Pollution Luca Carettoni, Independent Researcher & Stefano Di Paola, MindedSecurity
[2] HTTP Parameter Pollution Vulnerabilities in Web Applications Marco `embyte’ Balduzzi
[3] Standards Mapping - CIS Azure Kubernetes Service Benchmark 4.0
[4] Standards Mapping - CIS Microsoft Azure Foundations Benchmark partial
[5] Standards Mapping - CIS Amazon Elastic Kubernetes Service Benchmark 2.0
[6] Standards Mapping - CIS Amazon Web Services Foundations Benchmark 3
[7] Standards Mapping - CIS Google Kubernetes Engine Benchmark integrity
[8] Standards Mapping - Common Weakness Enumeration CWE ID 235
[9] Standards Mapping - DISA Control Correlation Identifier Version 2 CCI-002754
[10] Standards Mapping - General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) Indirect Access to Sensitive Data
[11] Standards Mapping - NIST Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4 SI-10 Information Input Validation (P1)
[12] Standards Mapping - NIST Special Publication 800-53 Revision 5 SI-10 Information Input Validation
[13] Standards Mapping - OWASP Top 10 2004 A6 Injection Flaws
[14] Standards Mapping - OWASP Top 10 2007 A2 Injection Flaws
[15] Standards Mapping - OWASP Top 10 2010 A1 Injection
[16] Standards Mapping - OWASP Top 10 2013 A1 Injection
[17] Standards Mapping - OWASP Top 10 2017 A1 Injection
[18] Standards Mapping - OWASP Top 10 2021 A03 Injection
[19] Standards Mapping - OWASP API 2023 API1 Broken Object Level Authorization
[20] Standards Mapping - OWASP Application Security Verification Standard 4.0 5.1.1 Input Validation Requirements (L1 L2 L3), 8.1.3 General Data Protection (L2 L3)
[21] Standards Mapping - OWASP Mobile 2014 M1 Weak Server Side Controls
[22] Standards Mapping - OWASP Mobile 2024 M4 Insufficient Input/Output Validation
[23] Standards Mapping - OWASP Mobile Application Security Verification Standard 2.0 MASVS-CODE-4, MASVS-PLATFORM-2
[24] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard Version 3.0 Requirement 6.5.6
[25] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard Version 3.1 Requirement 6.5.6
[26] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard Version 3.2 Requirement 6.5.6
[27] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard Version 3.2.1 Requirement 6.5.6
[28] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard Version 4.0 Requirement 6.2.4
[29] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Software Security Framework 1.0 Control Objective 4.2 - Critical Asset Protection
[30] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Software Security Framework 1.1 Control Objective 4.2 - Critical Asset Protection, Control Objective B.3.1 - Terminal Software Attack Mitigation, Control Objective B.3.1.1 - Terminal Software Attack Mitigation
[31] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Software Security Framework 1.2 Control Objective 4.2 - Critical Asset Protection, Control Objective B.3.1 - Terminal Software Attack Mitigation, Control Objective B.3.1.1 - Terminal Software Attack Mitigation, Control Objective C.3.2 - Web Software Attack Mitigation
[32] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.1 APSC-DV-002560 CAT I
[33] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.2 APSC-DV-002560 CAT I
[34] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.3 APSC-DV-002560 CAT I
[35] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.4 APSC-DV-002560 CAT I
[36] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.5 APSC-DV-002560 CAT I
[37] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.6 APSC-DV-002560 CAT I
[38] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.7 APSC-DV-002560 CAT I
[39] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.8 APSC-DV-002560 CAT I
[40] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.9 APSC-DV-002560 CAT I
[41] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.10 APSC-DV-002560 CAT I
[42] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.11 APSC-DV-002560 CAT I
[43] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 5.1 APSC-DV-002560 CAT I
[44] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 5.2 APSC-DV-002560 CAT I
[45] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 5.3 APSC-DV-002530 CAT II, APSC-DV-002560 CAT I
[46] Standards Mapping - Web Application Security Consortium Version 2.00 Improper Input Handling (WASC-20)
desc.dataflow.ruby.http_parameter_pollution