Kingdom: Security Features
Software security is not security software. Here we're concerned with topics like authentication, access control, confidentiality, cryptography, and privilege management.
Weak Cryptographic Signature: User-Controlled Key Size
Abstract
Cryptographic signature functions that take a key size parameter should not be passed a tainted key size value.
Explanation
Allowing a user-controlled value to determine the key size may enable the attacker to specify an empty key, allowing for the modification of a cryptographic signature that ensures integrity of encrypted data. Even if a non-zero value is required, the attacker could still specify the lowest possible key size value, decreasing the integrity of the encrypted data.
Weak Cryptographic Hash: User-Controlled Key Size issues occur when:
1. Data enters a program through an untrusted source
2. User-controlled data is used as all or part of the key size parameter within a cryptographic signature function
As with many software security vulnerabilities, Weak Cryptographic Hash: User-Controlled Key Size is a means to an end, not an end in and of itself. At its root, the vulnerability is straightforward: an attacker passes malicious data to an application and that data is then used as all or part of the key size value while performing encryption.
Current cryptography guidelines suggest that a key length of at least 2048 bits should be used with the RSA and DSA algorithms. However, continued advancements in computing power and factoring techniques [1] mean that future increases in the recommended key size are inevitable. If user input is even used as a partial key size, it may greatly weaken the security of the signature, and therefore the integrity of the encrypted data.
Example 1: The following code generates a DSA signature key using a user-controlled key size parameter:
There are few use cases where users should be able to determine
Weak Cryptographic Hash: User-Controlled Key Size issues occur when:
1. Data enters a program through an untrusted source
2. User-controlled data is used as all or part of the key size parameter within a cryptographic signature function
As with many software security vulnerabilities, Weak Cryptographic Hash: User-Controlled Key Size is a means to an end, not an end in and of itself. At its root, the vulnerability is straightforward: an attacker passes malicious data to an application and that data is then used as all or part of the key size value while performing encryption.
Current cryptography guidelines suggest that a key length of at least 2048 bits should be used with the RSA and DSA algorithms. However, continued advancements in computing power and factoring techniques [1] mean that future increases in the recommended key size are inevitable. If user input is even used as a partial key size, it may greatly weaken the security of the signature, and therefore the integrity of the encrypted data.
Example 1: The following code generates a DSA signature key using a user-controlled key size parameter:
...
DSA dsa1 = new DSACryptoServiceProvider(Convert.ToInt32(TextBox1.Text));
...
There are few use cases where users should be able to determine
key_len, and even then there should be appropriate protection to verify both that it is a numeric value and that it is within a suitable range of values for a key size. For most use cases, this should be a sufficiently high hardcoded number.References
[1] J. Cheng 307-digit key crack endangers 1024-bit RSA
[2] Elaine Barker and Allen Roginsky NIST Special Publication 800-131A: Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths. NIST
[3] B. Chess and J. West, Secure Programming with Static Analysis. Boston, MA: Addison-Wesley, 2007.
[4] Standards Mapping - Common Weakness Enumeration CWE ID 326
[5] Standards Mapping - DISA Control Correlation Identifier Version 2 CCI-001188, CCI-002450
[6] Standards Mapping - FIPS200 MP
[7] Standards Mapping - General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) Insufficient Data Protection
[8] Standards Mapping - NIST Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4 AU-10 Non-Repudiation (P2), SC-12 Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management (P1), SC-13 Cryptographic Protection (P1), SC-23 Session Authenticity (P1)
[9] Standards Mapping - NIST Special Publication 800-53 Revision 5 AU-10 Non-Repudiation, SC-12 Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management, SC-13 Cryptographic Protection, SC-23 Session Authenticity
[10] Standards Mapping - OWASP Application Security Verification Standard 4.0 2.6.3 Look-up Secret Verifier Requirements (L2 L3), 2.8.3 Single or Multi Factor One Time Verifier Requirements (L2 L3), 6.2.1 Algorithms (L1 L2 L3), 6.2.3 Algorithms (L2 L3), 6.2.4 Algorithms (L2 L3), 6.2.5 Algorithms (L2 L3), 6.2.6 Algorithms (L2 L3), 6.2.7 Algorithms (L3), 9.1.2 Communications Security Requirements (L1 L2 L3), 9.1.3 Communications Security Requirements (L1 L2 L3)
[11] Standards Mapping - OWASP Mobile 2014 M6 Broken Cryptography
[12] Standards Mapping - OWASP Mobile 2024 M10 Insufficient Cryptography
[13] Standards Mapping - OWASP Mobile Application Security Verification Standard 2.0 MASVS-CRYPTO-1
[14] Standards Mapping - OWASP Top 10 2004 A8 Insecure Storage
[15] Standards Mapping - OWASP Top 10 2007 A8 Insecure Cryptographic Storage
[16] Standards Mapping - OWASP Top 10 2010 A7 Insecure Cryptographic Storage
[17] Standards Mapping - OWASP Top 10 2013 A6 Sensitive Data Exposure
[18] Standards Mapping - OWASP Top 10 2017 A3 Sensitive Data Exposure
[19] Standards Mapping - OWASP Top 10 2021 A02 Cryptographic Failures
[20] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard Version 1.1 Requirement 3.6.1, Requirement 6.5.8
[21] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard Version 1.2 Requirement 3.6.1, Requirement 6.3.1.3, Requirement 6.5.8
[22] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard Version 2.0 Requirement 3.6.1, Requirement 6.5.3
[23] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard Version 3.0 Requirement 3.6.1, Requirement 6.5.3
[24] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard Version 3.1 Requirement 3.6.1, Requirement 6.5.3
[25] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard Version 3.2 Requirement 3.6.1, Requirement 6.5.3
[26] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard Version 3.2.1 Requirement 3.6.1, Requirement 6.5.3
[27] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard Version 4.0 Requirement 3.6.1, Requirement 6.2.4
[28] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard Version 4.0.1 Requirement 3.6.1, Requirement 6.2.4
[29] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Software Security Framework 1.0 Control Objective 7.2 - Use of Cryptography
[30] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Software Security Framework 1.1 Control Objective 7.2 - Use of Cryptography, Control Objective B.2.3 - Terminal Software Design
[31] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Software Security Framework 1.2 Control Objective 7.2 - Use of Cryptography, Control Objective B.2.3 - Terminal Software Design
[32] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 3.1 APP3150.1 CAT II
[33] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 3.4 APP3150.1 CAT II
[34] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 3.5 APP3150.1 CAT II
[35] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 3.6 APP3150.1 CAT II
[36] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 3.7 APP3150.1 CAT II
[37] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 3.9 APP3150.1 CAT II
[38] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 3.10 APP3150.1 CAT II
[39] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.2 APSC-DV-002010 CAT II, APSC-DV-002020 CAT II
[40] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.3 APSC-DV-002010 CAT II, APSC-DV-002020 CAT II
[41] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.4 APSC-DV-002010 CAT II, APSC-DV-002020 CAT II
[42] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.5 APSC-DV-002010 CAT II, APSC-DV-002020 CAT II
[43] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.6 APSC-DV-002010 CAT II, APSC-DV-002020 CAT II
[44] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.7 APSC-DV-002010 CAT II, APSC-DV-002020 CAT II
[45] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.8 APSC-DV-002010 CAT II, APSC-DV-002020 CAT II
[46] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.9 APSC-DV-002010 CAT II, APSC-DV-002020 CAT II
[47] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.10 APSC-DV-002010 CAT II, APSC-DV-002020 CAT II
[48] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.11 APSC-DV-002010 CAT II, APSC-DV-002020 CAT II
[49] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.1 APSC-DV-002010 CAT II, APSC-DV-002020 CAT II
[50] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 5.1 APSC-DV-002010 CAT II, APSC-DV-002020 CAT II
[51] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 5.2 APSC-DV-002010 CAT II, APSC-DV-002020 CAT II
[52] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 5.3 APSC-DV-000590 CAT II, APSC-DV-002010 CAT II, APSC-DV-002020 CAT II, APSC-DV-002290 CAT II
[53] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 6.1 APSC-DV-000590 CAT II, APSC-DV-002010 CAT II, APSC-DV-002020 CAT II, APSC-DV-002290 CAT II
desc.dataflow.dotnet.weak_cryptographic_signature_user_controlled_key_size
Abstract
Cryptographic signature functions that take a key size can receive a tainted key size value.
Explanation
By allowing a user-controlled value to determine the key size, an attacker can specify an empty key, which allows modification of a cryptographic signature that ensures integrity of encrypted data. Even if a non-zero value is required, the attacker could still specify the lowest possible key size value, decreasing the integrity of the encrypted data.
Weak Cryptographic Signature: User-Controlled Key Size issues occur when:
1. Data enters a program through an untrusted source.
2. User-controlled data is used as all or part of the key size parameter within a cryptographic signature function.
As with many software security vulnerabilities, Weak Cryptographic Signature: User-Controlled Key Size is a means to an end, not an end in and of itself. At its root, the vulnerability is straightforward: an attacker passes malicious data to an application and that data is then used as all or part of the key size value to perform encryption.
Current cryptography guidelines suggest that you use a key length of at least 2048 bits with the RSA and DSA algorithms. However, continued advancements in computing power and factoring techniques [1] mean that future increases in the recommended key size are inevitable. If user input is even used as a partial key size, it can weaken the security of the signature, and therefore the integrity of the encrypted data.
Example 1: The following code generates a DSA signature key with a user-controlled key size parameter:
Rarely do users require the ability to specify
Weak Cryptographic Signature: User-Controlled Key Size issues occur when:
1. Data enters a program through an untrusted source.
2. User-controlled data is used as all or part of the key size parameter within a cryptographic signature function.
As with many software security vulnerabilities, Weak Cryptographic Signature: User-Controlled Key Size is a means to an end, not an end in and of itself. At its root, the vulnerability is straightforward: an attacker passes malicious data to an application and that data is then used as all or part of the key size value to perform encryption.
Current cryptography guidelines suggest that you use a key length of at least 2048 bits with the RSA and DSA algorithms. However, continued advancements in computing power and factoring techniques [1] mean that future increases in the recommended key size are inevitable. If user input is even used as a partial key size, it can weaken the security of the signature, and therefore the integrity of the encrypted data.
Example 1: The following code generates a DSA signature key with a user-controlled key size parameter:
...
dsa.GenerateParameters(params, rand.Reader, key_len)
privatekey := new(dsa.PrivateKey)
privatekey.PublicKey.Parameters = *params
dsa.GenerateKey(privatekey, rand.Reader)
...
Rarely do users require the ability to specify
key_len. In these cases, you should verify both that it is a numeric value and that it is within a suitable value range for the key size. For most use cases, select a sufficiently large hardcoded key size.References
[1] J. Cheng 307-digit key crack endangers 1024-bit RSA
[2] Elaine Barker and Allen Roginsky NIST Special Publication 800-131A: Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths. NIST
[3] B. Chess and J. West, Secure Programming with Static Analysis. Boston, MA: Addison-Wesley, 2007.
[4] Standards Mapping - Common Weakness Enumeration CWE ID 326
[5] Standards Mapping - DISA Control Correlation Identifier Version 2 CCI-001188, CCI-002450
[6] Standards Mapping - FIPS200 MP
[7] Standards Mapping - General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) Insufficient Data Protection
[8] Standards Mapping - NIST Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4 AU-10 Non-Repudiation (P2), SC-12 Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management (P1), SC-13 Cryptographic Protection (P1), SC-23 Session Authenticity (P1)
[9] Standards Mapping - NIST Special Publication 800-53 Revision 5 AU-10 Non-Repudiation, SC-12 Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management, SC-13 Cryptographic Protection, SC-23 Session Authenticity
[10] Standards Mapping - OWASP Application Security Verification Standard 4.0 2.6.3 Look-up Secret Verifier Requirements (L2 L3), 2.8.3 Single or Multi Factor One Time Verifier Requirements (L2 L3), 6.2.1 Algorithms (L1 L2 L3), 6.2.3 Algorithms (L2 L3), 6.2.4 Algorithms (L2 L3), 6.2.5 Algorithms (L2 L3), 6.2.6 Algorithms (L2 L3), 6.2.7 Algorithms (L3), 9.1.2 Communications Security Requirements (L1 L2 L3), 9.1.3 Communications Security Requirements (L1 L2 L3)
[11] Standards Mapping - OWASP Mobile 2014 M6 Broken Cryptography
[12] Standards Mapping - OWASP Mobile 2024 M10 Insufficient Cryptography
[13] Standards Mapping - OWASP Mobile Application Security Verification Standard 2.0 MASVS-CRYPTO-1
[14] Standards Mapping - OWASP Top 10 2004 A8 Insecure Storage
[15] Standards Mapping - OWASP Top 10 2007 A8 Insecure Cryptographic Storage
[16] Standards Mapping - OWASP Top 10 2010 A7 Insecure Cryptographic Storage
[17] Standards Mapping - OWASP Top 10 2013 A6 Sensitive Data Exposure
[18] Standards Mapping - OWASP Top 10 2017 A3 Sensitive Data Exposure
[19] Standards Mapping - OWASP Top 10 2021 A02 Cryptographic Failures
[20] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard Version 1.1 Requirement 3.6.1, Requirement 6.5.8
[21] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard Version 1.2 Requirement 3.6.1, Requirement 6.3.1.3, Requirement 6.5.8
[22] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard Version 2.0 Requirement 3.6.1, Requirement 6.5.3
[23] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard Version 3.0 Requirement 3.6.1, Requirement 6.5.3
[24] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard Version 3.1 Requirement 3.6.1, Requirement 6.5.3
[25] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard Version 3.2 Requirement 3.6.1, Requirement 6.5.3
[26] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard Version 3.2.1 Requirement 3.6.1, Requirement 6.5.3
[27] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard Version 4.0 Requirement 3.6.1, Requirement 6.2.4
[28] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard Version 4.0.1 Requirement 3.6.1, Requirement 6.2.4
[29] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Software Security Framework 1.0 Control Objective 7.2 - Use of Cryptography
[30] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Software Security Framework 1.1 Control Objective 7.2 - Use of Cryptography, Control Objective B.2.3 - Terminal Software Design
[31] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Software Security Framework 1.2 Control Objective 7.2 - Use of Cryptography, Control Objective B.2.3 - Terminal Software Design
[32] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 3.1 APP3150.1 CAT II
[33] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 3.4 APP3150.1 CAT II
[34] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 3.5 APP3150.1 CAT II
[35] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 3.6 APP3150.1 CAT II
[36] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 3.7 APP3150.1 CAT II
[37] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 3.9 APP3150.1 CAT II
[38] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 3.10 APP3150.1 CAT II
[39] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.2 APSC-DV-002010 CAT II, APSC-DV-002020 CAT II
[40] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.3 APSC-DV-002010 CAT II, APSC-DV-002020 CAT II
[41] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.4 APSC-DV-002010 CAT II, APSC-DV-002020 CAT II
[42] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.5 APSC-DV-002010 CAT II, APSC-DV-002020 CAT II
[43] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.6 APSC-DV-002010 CAT II, APSC-DV-002020 CAT II
[44] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.7 APSC-DV-002010 CAT II, APSC-DV-002020 CAT II
[45] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.8 APSC-DV-002010 CAT II, APSC-DV-002020 CAT II
[46] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.9 APSC-DV-002010 CAT II, APSC-DV-002020 CAT II
[47] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.10 APSC-DV-002010 CAT II, APSC-DV-002020 CAT II
[48] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.11 APSC-DV-002010 CAT II, APSC-DV-002020 CAT II
[49] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.1 APSC-DV-002010 CAT II, APSC-DV-002020 CAT II
[50] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 5.1 APSC-DV-002010 CAT II, APSC-DV-002020 CAT II
[51] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 5.2 APSC-DV-002010 CAT II, APSC-DV-002020 CAT II
[52] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 5.3 APSC-DV-000590 CAT II, APSC-DV-002010 CAT II, APSC-DV-002020 CAT II, APSC-DV-002290 CAT II
[53] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 6.1 APSC-DV-000590 CAT II, APSC-DV-002010 CAT II, APSC-DV-002020 CAT II, APSC-DV-002290 CAT II
desc.dataflow.golang.weak_cryptographic_signature_user_controlled_key_size
Abstract
Cryptographic signature functions that take a key size parameter should not be passed a tainted key size value.
Explanation
Allowing a user-controlled value to determine the key size may enable the attacker to specify an empty key, allowing for the modification of a cryptographic signature that ensures integrity of encrypted data. Even if a non-zero value is required, the attacker could still specify the lowest possible key size value, decreasing the integrity of the encrypted data.
Weak Cryptographic Hash: User-Controlled Key Size issues occur when:
1. Data enters a program through an untrusted source
2. User-controlled data is used as all or part of the key size parameter within a cryptographic signature function
As with many software security vulnerabilities, Weak Cryptographic Hash: User-Controlled Key Size is a means to an end, not an end in and of itself. At its root, the vulnerability is straightforward: an attacker passes malicious data to an application and that data is then used as all or part of the key size value while performing encryption.
Current cryptography guidelines suggest that a key length of at least 2048 bits should be used with the RSA and DSA algorithms. However, continued advancements in computing power and factoring techniques [1] mean that future increases in the recommended key size are inevitable. If user input is even used as a partial key size, it may greatly weaken the security of the signature, and therefore the integrity of the encrypted data.
Example 1: The following code generates a DSA signature key using a user-controlled key size parameter:
There are few use cases where users should be able to determine
Weak Cryptographic Hash: User-Controlled Key Size issues occur when:
1. Data enters a program through an untrusted source
2. User-controlled data is used as all or part of the key size parameter within a cryptographic signature function
As with many software security vulnerabilities, Weak Cryptographic Hash: User-Controlled Key Size is a means to an end, not an end in and of itself. At its root, the vulnerability is straightforward: an attacker passes malicious data to an application and that data is then used as all or part of the key size value while performing encryption.
Current cryptography guidelines suggest that a key length of at least 2048 bits should be used with the RSA and DSA algorithms. However, continued advancements in computing power and factoring techniques [1] mean that future increases in the recommended key size are inevitable. If user input is even used as a partial key size, it may greatly weaken the security of the signature, and therefore the integrity of the encrypted data.
Example 1: The following code generates a DSA signature key using a user-controlled key size parameter:
require 'openssl'
...
key_len = io.read.to_i
key = OpenSSL::PKey::DSA.new(key_len)
...
There are few use cases where users should be able to determine
key_len, and even then there should be appropriate protection to verify both that it is a numeric value and that it is within a suitable range of values for a key size. For most use cases, this should be a sufficiently high hardcoded number.References
[1] J. Cheng 307-digit key crack endangers 1024-bit RSA
[2] Elaine Barker and Allen Roginsky NIST Special Publication 800-131A: Transitions: Recommendation for Transitioning the Use of Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Lengths. NIST
[3] B. Chess and J. West, Secure Programming with Static Analysis. Boston, MA: Addison-Wesley, 2007.
[4] Standards Mapping - Common Weakness Enumeration CWE ID 326
[5] Standards Mapping - DISA Control Correlation Identifier Version 2 CCI-001188, CCI-002450
[6] Standards Mapping - FIPS200 MP
[7] Standards Mapping - General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) Insufficient Data Protection
[8] Standards Mapping - NIST Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4 AU-10 Non-Repudiation (P2), SC-12 Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management (P1), SC-13 Cryptographic Protection (P1), SC-23 Session Authenticity (P1)
[9] Standards Mapping - NIST Special Publication 800-53 Revision 5 AU-10 Non-Repudiation, SC-12 Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management, SC-13 Cryptographic Protection, SC-23 Session Authenticity
[10] Standards Mapping - OWASP Application Security Verification Standard 4.0 2.6.3 Look-up Secret Verifier Requirements (L2 L3), 2.8.3 Single or Multi Factor One Time Verifier Requirements (L2 L3), 6.2.1 Algorithms (L1 L2 L3), 6.2.3 Algorithms (L2 L3), 6.2.4 Algorithms (L2 L3), 6.2.5 Algorithms (L2 L3), 6.2.6 Algorithms (L2 L3), 6.2.7 Algorithms (L3), 9.1.2 Communications Security Requirements (L1 L2 L3), 9.1.3 Communications Security Requirements (L1 L2 L3)
[11] Standards Mapping - OWASP Mobile 2014 M6 Broken Cryptography
[12] Standards Mapping - OWASP Mobile 2024 M10 Insufficient Cryptography
[13] Standards Mapping - OWASP Mobile Application Security Verification Standard 2.0 MASVS-CRYPTO-1
[14] Standards Mapping - OWASP Top 10 2004 A8 Insecure Storage
[15] Standards Mapping - OWASP Top 10 2007 A8 Insecure Cryptographic Storage
[16] Standards Mapping - OWASP Top 10 2010 A7 Insecure Cryptographic Storage
[17] Standards Mapping - OWASP Top 10 2013 A6 Sensitive Data Exposure
[18] Standards Mapping - OWASP Top 10 2017 A3 Sensitive Data Exposure
[19] Standards Mapping - OWASP Top 10 2021 A02 Cryptographic Failures
[20] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard Version 1.1 Requirement 3.6.1, Requirement 6.5.8
[21] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard Version 1.2 Requirement 3.6.1, Requirement 6.3.1.3, Requirement 6.5.8
[22] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard Version 2.0 Requirement 3.6.1, Requirement 6.5.3
[23] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard Version 3.0 Requirement 3.6.1, Requirement 6.5.3
[24] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard Version 3.1 Requirement 3.6.1, Requirement 6.5.3
[25] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard Version 3.2 Requirement 3.6.1, Requirement 6.5.3
[26] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard Version 3.2.1 Requirement 3.6.1, Requirement 6.5.3
[27] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard Version 4.0 Requirement 3.6.1, Requirement 6.2.4
[28] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard Version 4.0.1 Requirement 3.6.1, Requirement 6.2.4
[29] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Software Security Framework 1.0 Control Objective 7.2 - Use of Cryptography
[30] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Software Security Framework 1.1 Control Objective 7.2 - Use of Cryptography, Control Objective B.2.3 - Terminal Software Design
[31] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Software Security Framework 1.2 Control Objective 7.2 - Use of Cryptography, Control Objective B.2.3 - Terminal Software Design
[32] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 3.1 APP3150.1 CAT II
[33] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 3.4 APP3150.1 CAT II
[34] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 3.5 APP3150.1 CAT II
[35] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 3.6 APP3150.1 CAT II
[36] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 3.7 APP3150.1 CAT II
[37] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 3.9 APP3150.1 CAT II
[38] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 3.10 APP3150.1 CAT II
[39] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.2 APSC-DV-002010 CAT II, APSC-DV-002020 CAT II
[40] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.3 APSC-DV-002010 CAT II, APSC-DV-002020 CAT II
[41] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.4 APSC-DV-002010 CAT II, APSC-DV-002020 CAT II
[42] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.5 APSC-DV-002010 CAT II, APSC-DV-002020 CAT II
[43] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.6 APSC-DV-002010 CAT II, APSC-DV-002020 CAT II
[44] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.7 APSC-DV-002010 CAT II, APSC-DV-002020 CAT II
[45] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.8 APSC-DV-002010 CAT II, APSC-DV-002020 CAT II
[46] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.9 APSC-DV-002010 CAT II, APSC-DV-002020 CAT II
[47] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.10 APSC-DV-002010 CAT II, APSC-DV-002020 CAT II
[48] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.11 APSC-DV-002010 CAT II, APSC-DV-002020 CAT II
[49] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.1 APSC-DV-002010 CAT II, APSC-DV-002020 CAT II
[50] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 5.1 APSC-DV-002010 CAT II, APSC-DV-002020 CAT II
[51] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 5.2 APSC-DV-002010 CAT II, APSC-DV-002020 CAT II
[52] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 5.3 APSC-DV-000590 CAT II, APSC-DV-002010 CAT II, APSC-DV-002020 CAT II, APSC-DV-002290 CAT II
[53] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 6.1 APSC-DV-000590 CAT II, APSC-DV-002010 CAT II, APSC-DV-002020 CAT II, APSC-DV-002290 CAT II
desc.dataflow.ruby.weak_cryptographic_signature_user_controlled_key_size