Software security is not security software. Here we're concerned with topics like authentication, access control, confidentiality, cryptography, and privilege management.
response.sendRedirect("j_security_check?j_username="+usr+"&j_password="+pass);
...
var fs:FileStream = new FileStream();
fs.open(new File("config.properties"), FileMode.READ);
var decoder:Base64Decoder = new Base64Decoder();
decoder.decode(fs.readMultiByte(fs.bytesAvailable, File.systemCharset));
var password:String = decoder.toByteArray().toString();
URLRequestDefaults.setLoginCredentialsForHost(hostname, usr, password);
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config.properties can read the value of password and easily determine that the value has been base64 encoded. Any devious employee with access to this information can use it to break into the system.
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string value = regKey.GetValue(passKey).ToString());
byte[] decVal = Convert.FromBase64String(value);
NetworkCredential netCred =
new NetworkCredential(username,decVal.toString(),domain);
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password. Any devious employee with access to this information can use it to break into the system.
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RegQueryValueEx(hkey, TEXT(.SQLPWD.), NULL,
NULL, (LPBYTE)password64, &size64);
Base64Decode(password64, size64, (BYTE*)password, &size);
rc = SQLConnect(*hdbc, server, SQL_NTS, uid,
SQL_NTS, password, SQL_NTS);
...
password64 and easily determine that the value has been base64 encoded. Any devious employee with access to this information can use it to break into the system.
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01 RECORDX.
05 UID PIC X(10).
05 PASSWORD PIC X(10).
05 LEN PIC S9(4) COMP.
...
EXEC CICS
READ
FILE('CFG')
INTO(RECORDX)
RIDFLD(ACCTNO)
...
END-EXEC.
CALL "g_base64_decode_inplace" using
BY REFERENCE PASSWORD
BY REFERENCE LEN
ON EXCEPTION
DISPLAY "Requires GLib library" END-DISPLAY
END-CALL.
EXEC SQL
CONNECT :UID
IDENTIFIED BY :PASSWORD
END-EXEC.
...
CFG can read the value of password and easily determine that the value has been base64 encoded. Any devious employee with access to this information can use it to break into the system.
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file, _ := os.Open("config.json")
decoder := json.NewDecoder(file)
decoder.Decode(&values)
password := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(values.Password)
request.SetBasicAuth(values.Username, password)
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config.json can read the value of password and easily determine that the value has been base64 encoded. Any devious employee with access to this information can use it to break into the system.
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Properties prop = new Properties();
prop.load(new FileInputStream("config.properties"));
String password = Base64.decode(prop.getProperty("password"));
DriverManager.getConnection(url, usr, password);
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config.properties can read the value of password and easily determine that the value has been base64 encoded. Any devious employee with access to this information can use it to break into the system.
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webview.setWebViewClient(new WebViewClient() {
public void onReceivedHttpAuthRequest(WebView view,
HttpAuthHandler handler, String host, String realm) {
String[] credentials = view.getHttpAuthUsernamePassword(host, realm);
String username = new String(Base64.decode(credentials[0], DEFAULT));
String password = new String(Base64.decode(credentials[1], DEFAULT));
handler.proceed(username, password);
}
});
...
...
obj = new XMLHttpRequest();
obj.open('GET','/fetchusers.jsp?id='+form.id.value,'true','scott','tiger');
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plist file and uses it to unzip a password-protected file.
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NSDictionary *dict= [NSDictionary dictionaryWithContentsOfFile:[[NSBundle mainBundle] pathForResource:@"Config" ofType:@"plist"]];
NSString *encoded_password = [dict valueForKey:@"encoded_password"];
NSData *decodedData = [[NSData alloc] initWithBase64EncodedString:encoded_password options:0];
NSString *decodedString = [[NSString alloc] initWithData:decodedData encoding:NSUTF8StringEncoding];
[SSZipArchive unzipFileAtPath:zipPath toDestination:destPath overwrite:TRUE password:decodedString error:&error];
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Config.plist file can read the value of encoded_password and easily determine that the value has been base64 encoded.
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$props = file('config.properties', FILE_IGNORE_NEW_LINES | FILE_SKIP_EMPTY_LINES);
$password = base64_decode($props[0]);
$link = mysql_connect($url, $usr, $password);
if (!$link) {
die('Could not connect: ' . mysql_error());
}
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config.properties can read the value of password and easily determine that the value has been base64 encoded. Any devious employee with access to this information can use it to break into the system.
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props = os.open('config.properties')
password = base64.b64decode(props[0])
link = MySQLdb.connect (host = "localhost",
user = "testuser",
passwd = password,
db = "test")
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config.properties can read the value of password and easily determine that the value has been base64 encoded. Any devious employee with access to this information can use it to break into the system.
require 'pg'
require 'base64'
...
passwd = Base64.decode64(ENV['PASSWD64'])
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conn = PG::Connection.new(:dbname => "myApp_production", :user => username, :password => passwd, :sslmode => 'require')
PASSWD64 and easily determine that the value has been base64 encoded. Any devious employee with access to this information can use it to break into the system.
...
val prop = new Properties();
prop.load(new FileInputStream("config.properties"));
val password = Base64.decode(prop.getProperty("password"));
DriverManager.getConnection(url, usr, password);
...
config.properties can read the value of password and easily determine that the value has been base64 encoded. Any devious employee with access to this information can use it to break into the system.plist file and uses it to unzip a password-protected file.
...
var myDict: NSDictionary?
if let path = NSBundle.mainBundle().pathForResource("Config", ofType: "plist") {
myDict = NSDictionary(contentsOfFile: path)
}
if let dict = myDict {
let password = base64decode(dict["encoded_password"])
zipArchive.unzipOpenFile(zipPath, password:password])
}
...
Config.plist file can read the value of encoded_password and easily determine that the value has been base64 encoded.
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root:qFio7llfVKk.s:19033:0:99999:7:::
...
...
...
Private Declare Function GetPrivateProfileString _
Lib "kernel32" Alias "GetPrivateProfileStringA" _
(ByVal lpApplicationName As String, _
ByVal lpKeyName As Any, ByVal lpDefault As String, _
ByVal lpReturnedString As String, ByVal nSize As Long, _
ByVal lpFileName As String) As Long
...
Dim password As String
...
password = StrConv(DecodeBase64(GetPrivateProfileString("MyApp", "Password", _
"", value, Len(value), _
App.Path & "\" & "Config.ini")), vbUnicode)
...
con.ConnectionString = "Driver={Microsoft ODBC for Oracle};Server=OracleServer.world;Uid=scott;Passwd=" & password &";"
...
Config.ini can read the value of Password and easily determine that the value has been base64 encoded. Any devious employee with access to this information can use it to break into the system.
pass = getPassword();
...
dbmsLog.println(id+":"+pass+":"+type+":"+tstamp);
Example 1 logs a plain text password to the file system. Although many developers trust the file system as a safe storage location for data, it should not be trusted implicitly, particularly when privacy is a concern.
...
webview.setWebViewClient(new WebViewClient() {
public void onReceivedHttpAuthRequest(WebView view,
HttpAuthHandler handler, String host, String realm) {
String[] credentials = view.getHttpAuthUsernamePassword(host, realm);
String username = credentials[0];
String password = credentials[1];
Intent i = new Intent();
i.setAction("SEND_CREDENTIALS");
i.putExtra("username", username);
i.putExtra("password", password);
view.getContext().sendBroadcast(i);
}
});
...
SEND_CREDENTIALS action will receive the message. The broadcast is not even protected with a permission to limit the number of recipients, although in this case we do not recommend using permissions as a fix.FileIOPermissions required in the application.
...
String permissionsXml = GetPermissionsFromXmlFile();
FileIOPermission perm = new FileIOPermission(PermissionState.None);
perm.FromXml(permissionsXml);
perm.Demand();
...
...
CrytoKeyAuditRule auditRule = new CryptoKeyAuditRule(IdRef, (CryptoKeyRights) input, AuditFlags.Success);
...
input then they can specify what type of operation can be logged. If the user can manipulate this to CryptoKeyRights.Delete, then they may be able to read the encryption key without it being logged, making you unaware that an attacker has stolen your encryption keys.
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uid = 'scott'.
password = 'tiger'.
WRITE: / 'Default username for FTP connection is: ', uid.
WRITE: / 'Default password for FTP connection is: ', password.
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pass = getPassword();
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trace(id+":"+pass+":"+type+":"+tstamp);
Example 1 logs a plain text password to the file system. Although many developers trust the file system as a safe storage location for data, it should not be trusted implicitly, particularly when privacy is a concern.
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ResetPasswordResult passRes = System.resetPassword(id1, true);
System.Debug('New password: '+passRes.getPassword());
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pass = GetPassword();
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dbmsLog.WriteLine(id+":"+pass+":"+type+":"+tstamp);
Example 1 logs a plain text password to the file system. Although many developers trust the file system as a safe storage location for data, it should not be trusted implicitly, particularly when privacy is a concern.get_password() function returns the user-supplied plain text password associated with the account.
pass = get_password();
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fprintf(dbms_log, "%d:%s:%s:%s", id, pass, type, tstamp);
Example 1 logs a plain text password to the file system. Although many developers trust the file system as a safe storage location for any and all data, it should not be trusted implicitly, particularly when privacy is a concern.
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MOVE "scott" TO UID.
MOVE "tiger" TO PASSWORD.
DISPLAY "Default username for database connection is: ", UID.
DISPLAY "Default password for database connection is: ", PASSWORD.
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Session.pword variable contains the plain text password associated with the account.
<cflog file="app_log" application="No" Thread="No"
text="#Session.uname#:#Session.pword#:#type#:#Now()#">
Example 1 logs a plain text password to the file system. Although many developers trust the file system as a safe storage location for data, it should not be trusted implicitly, particularly when privacy is a concern.
var pass = getPassword();
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dbmsLog.println(id+":"+pass+":"+type+":"+tstamp);
Example 1 logs a plain text password to the file system. Although many developers trust the file system as a safe storage location for data, it should not be trusted implicitly, particularly when privacy is a concern.GetPassword() function, which returns user-supplied plain text password associated with the account.
pass = GetPassword();
...
if err != nil {
log.Printf('%s: %s %s %s', id, pass, type, tsstamp)
}
Example 1 logs a plain text password to the application eventlog. Although many developers trust the eventlog as a safe storage location for data, it should not be trusted implicitly, particularly when privacy is a concern.
pass = getPassword();
...
dbmsLog.println(id+":"+pass+":"+type+":"+tstamp);
Example 1 logs a plain text password to the file system. Although many developers trust the file system as a safe storage location for data, it should not be trusted implicitly, particularly when privacy is a concern.
...
webview.setWebViewClient(new WebViewClient() {
public void onReceivedHttpAuthRequest(WebView view,
HttpAuthHandler handler, String host, String realm) {
String[] credentials = view.getHttpAuthUsernamePassword(host, realm);
String username = credentials[0];
String password = credentials[1];
Intent i = new Intent();
i.setAction("SEND_CREDENTIALS");
i.putExtra("username", username);
i.putExtra("password", password);
view.getContext().sendBroadcast(i);
}
});
...
SEND_CREDENTIALS action will receive the message. The broadcast is not even protected with a permission to limit the number of recipients, although in this case we do not recommend using permissions as a fix.
localStorage.setItem('password', password);
pass = getPassword()
...
dbmsLog.println("$id:$pass:$type:$tstamp")
Example 1 logs a plain text password to the file system. Although many developers trust the file system as a safe storage location for data, it should not be trusted implicitly, particularly when privacy is a concern.
...
webview.webViewClient = object : WebViewClient() {
override fun onReceivedHttpAuthRequest(view: WebView,
handler: HttpAuthHandler, host: String, realm: String
) {
val credentials = view.getHttpAuthUsernamePassword(host, realm)
val username = credentials!![0]
val password = credentials[1]
val i = Intent()
i.action = "SEND_CREDENTIALS"
i.putExtra("username", username)
i.putExtra("password", password)
view.context.sendBroadcast(i)
}
}
...
SEND_CREDENTIALS action will receive the message. The broadcast is not even protected with a permission to limit the number of recipients, although in this case we do not recommend using permissions as a fix.
locationManager = [[CLLocationManager alloc] init];
locationManager.delegate = self;
locationManager.desiredAccuracy = kCLLocationAccuracyBest;
locationManager.distanceFilter = kCLDistanceFilterNone;
[locationManager startUpdatingLocation];
CLLocation *location = [locationManager location];
// Configure the new event with information from the location
CLLocationCoordinate2D coordinate = [location coordinate];
NSString *latitude = [NSString stringWithFormat:@"%f", coordinate.latitude];
NSString *longitude = [NSString stringWithFormat:@"%f", coordinate.longitude];
NSLog(@"dLatitude : %@", latitude);
NSLog(@"dLongitude : %@",longitude);
NSString *urlWithParams = [NSString stringWithFormat:TOKEN_URL, latitude, longitude];
NSMutableURLRequest *request = [NSMutableURLRequest requestWithURL:[NSURL URLWithString:urlWithParams]];
[request setHTTPMethod:@"GET"];
[[NSURLConnection alloc] initWithRequest:request delegate:self];
NSUserDefaults *defaults = [NSUserDefaults standardUserDefaults];
// Add password to user defaults
[defaults setObject:@"Super Secret" forKey:@"passwd"];
[defaults synchronize];
getPassword() function that returns user-supplied plain text password associated with the account.
<?php
$pass = getPassword();
trigger_error($id . ":" . $pass . ":" . $type . ":" . $tstamp);
?>
Example 1 logs a plain text password to the application eventlog. Although many developers trust the eventlog as a safe storage location for data, it should not be trusted implicitly, particularly when privacy is a concern.OWA_SEC.get_password() function returns the user-supplied plain text password associated with the account, which is then printed to the HTTP response.
...
HTP.htmlOpen;
HTP.headOpen;
HTP.title (.Account Information.);
HTP.headClose;
HTP.bodyOpen;
HTP.br;
HTP.print('User ID: ' ||
OWA_SEC.get_user_id || '');
HTP.print('User Password: ' ||
OWA_SEC.get_password || '');
HTP.br;
HTP.bodyClose;
HTP.htmlClose;
...
getPassword() function that returns user-supplied plain text password associated with the account.
pass = getPassword();
logger.warning('%s: %s %s %s', id, pass, type, tsstamp)
Example 1 logs a plain text password to the application eventlog. Although many developers trust the eventlog as a safe storage location for data, it should not be trusted implicitly, particularly when privacy is a concern.get_password() function returns the user-supplied plain text password associated with the account.
pass = get_password()
...
dbms_logger.warn("#{id}:#{pass}:#{type}:#{tstamp}")
Example 1 logs a plain text password to the file system. Although many developers trust the file system as a safe storage location for data, it should not be trusted implicitly, particularly when privacy is a concern.
val pass = getPassword()
...
dbmsLog.println(id+":"+pass+":"+type+":"+tstamp)
Example 1 logs a plain text password to the file system. Although many developers trust the file system as a safe storage location for data, it should not be trusted implicitly, particularly when privacy is a concern.
import CoreLocation
...
var locationManager : CLLocationManager!
var seenError : Bool = false
var locationFixAchieved : Bool = false
var locationStatus : NSString = "Not Started"
seenError = false
locationFixAchieved = false
locationManager = CLLocationManager()
locationManager.delegate = self
locationManager.locationServicesEnabled
locationManager.desiredAccuracy = kCLLocationAccuracyBest
locationManager.startUpdatingLocation()
...
if let location: CLLocation! = locationManager.location {
var coordinate : CLLocationCoordinate2D = location.coordinate
let latitude = NSString(format:@"%f", coordinate.latitude)
let longitude = NSString(format:@"%f", coordinate.longitude)
NSLog("dLatitude : %@", latitude)
NSLog("dLongitude : %@",longitude)
let urlString : String = "http://myserver.com/?lat=\(latitude)&lon=\(longitude)"
let url : NSURL = NSURL(string:urlString)
let request : NSURLRequest = NSURLRequest(URL:url)
var err : NSError?
var response : NSURLResponse?
var data : NSData = NSURLConnection.sendSynchronousRequest(request, returningResponse: &response, error:&err)
} else {
println("no location...")
}
let defaults : NSUserDefaults = NSUserDefaults.standardUserDefaults()
// Add password to user defaults
defaults.setObject("Super Secret" forKey:"passwd")
defaults.synchronize()
getPassword function returns the user-supplied plain text password associated with the account.
pass = getPassword
...
App.EventLog id & ":" & pass & ":" & type & ":" &tstamp, 4
...
Example 1 logs a plain text password to the application eventlog. Although many developers trust the eventlog as a safe storage location for data, it should not be trusted implicitly, particularly when privacy is a concern.AppSearch code.
...
// Document object to index
val doc = Doc(
namespace="user1",
id="noteId",
score=10,
text="This document contains private data"
)
// Adding document object to AppSearch index
val putRequest = PutDocumentsRequest.Builder().addDocuments(doc).build()
SharedPreferences class.password is stored on the device in plain text.
SharedPreferences userPreferences = this.getSharedPreferences("userPreferences", MODE_WORLD_READABLE);
SharedPreferences.Editor editor = userPreferences.editor();
editor.putString("username", userName);
editor.putString("password", password);
...
editor.language("language", language);
...
SharedPreferences is private to the application and cannot be accessed by other applications, physical access to the device could potentially allow access to these files. Furthermore, in Example 1, setting the mode to MODE_WORLD_READABLE makes the preference file available to other applications, further violating user privacy.
MIDDLEWARE_CLASSES = (
...
'django.middleware.csrf.CsrfViewMiddleware',
'django.middleware.gzip.GZipMiddleware',
...
)
...
HKHealthStore healthStore = new HKHealthStore();
HKBloodTypeObject blood = healthStore.GetBloodType(null);
NSLog("%@", blood.BloodType);
var urlWithParams = String.format(TOKEN_URL, block.BloodType);
var responseString = await client.GetStringAsync(urlWithParams);
...
NSLog function, allows a developer to create an app which may read all logs on the device (even when they don't own the other apps).
...
HKHealthStore healthStore = new HKHealthStore();
HKBloodTypeObject blood = healthStore.GetBloodType(null);
// Add blood type to user defaults
NSUserDefaults.StandardUserDefaults.SetString(blood.BloodType, "bloodType");
...
...
HKHealthStore *healthStore = [[HKHealthStore alloc] init];
HKBloodTypeObject *blood = [healthStore bloodTypeWithError:nil];
NSLog(@"%@", [blood bloodType]);
NSString *urlWithParams = [NSString stringWithFormat:TOKEN_URL, [blood bloodType]];
NSMutableURLRequest *request = [NSMutableURLRequest requestWithURL:[NSURL URLWithString:urlWithParams]];
[request setHTTPMethod:@"GET"];
[[NSURLConnection alloc] initWithRequest:request delegate:self];
...
NSLog function, allows a developer to create an app which may read all logs on the device (even when they don't own the other apps).
...
HKHealthStore *healthStore = [[HKHealthStore alloc] init];
HKBloodTypeObject *blood = [healthStore bloodTypeWithError:nil];
// Add blood type to user defaults
[defaults setObject:[blood bloodType] forKey:@"bloodType"];
[defaults synchronize];
...
...
let healthStore = HKHealthStore()
let blood = try healthStore.bloodType()
print(blood.bloodType)
let urlString : String = "http://myserver.com/?data=\(blood.bloodType)"
let url : NSURL = NSURL(string:urlString)
let request : NSURLRequest = NSURLRequest(URL:url)
var err : NSError?
var response : NSURLResponse?
var data : NSData = NSURLConnection.sendSynchronousRequest(request, returningResponse: &response, error:&err)
...
NSLog function, allows a developer to create an app which may read all logs on the device (even when they don't own the other apps).
...
let healthStore = HKHealthStore()
let blood = try healthStore.bloodType()
print(blood.bloodType)
// Add blood type to user defaults
defaults.setObject("BloodType" forKey:blood.bloodType)
defaults.synchronize()
...
String object.
public static String getPassword() {
String inputPassword = "";
ConsoleKeyInfo nextKey = Console.ReadKey(true);
while (nextKey.Key != Console.ReadKey(true)) {
inputPassword.AppendChar(nextKey.KeyChar);
Console.Write("*");
nextKey = Console.ReadKey(true);
}
return inputPassword;
}
String is an immutable object, the contents cannot be nullified, meaning that the sensitive data is open to anyone able to inspect the heap prior to garbage collection.String object makes it impossible to reliably purge the data from memory.Strings are used to store sensitive data, however, becauseString objects are immutable, only the JVM garbage collector can remove the value of a String from memory can only be done by the JVM garbage collector. The garbage collector is not required to run unless the JVM is low on memory, so there is no guarantee as to when garbage collection will take place. In the event of an application crash, a memory dump of the application might reveal sensitive data.String.
private JPasswordField pf;
...
final char[] password = pf.getPassword();
...
String passwordAsString = new String(password);
String object makes it impossible to reliably purge the data from memory.Strings are used to store sensitive data, however, since String objects are immutable, assigning a new value to them will create a new String and assign its reference to the one being assigned. The original value will be kept in memory until ARC (Automatic Reference Counting) deallocates the object and releases its memory. Swift makes no guarantee about the lifetime of an object until the end of the closest surrounding scope. If an attacker dumps the contents of memory before the object is deallocated, the contents can be read.String.
let password = passwordTextField.text!
// use the password