Reino: Code Quality

Una mala calidad del código lleva a un comportamiento no predecible. Desde la perspectiva de un usuario, muchas veces también supone una usabilidad limitada. Pero para un atacante es una oportunidad para atacar al sistema de formas insospechadas.

Race Condition: Class Initialization Cycle

Abstract
La asignación de un campo estático a un nuevo objeto llama al constructor incluso si depende de la inicialización de otras variables, lo que puede llevar a que los objetos se inicialicen incorrectamente.
Explanation
Cuando se inicializa una clase Java, llama a los inicializadores por campos estáticos declarados en la clase antes que al constructor de la clase. Esto significa que se llamará antes a un constructor asignado a esto que a otro código y, si dicho constructor depende de otros campos o variables que se están inicializando, los objetos se inicializarían parcialmente o con valores incorrectos.

Ejemplo 1: la siguiente clase declara un campo estático y lo asigna a un objeto nuevo.


...
public class Box{
public int area;
public static final int width = 10;
public static final Box box = new Box();
public static final int height = (int) (Math.random() * 100);

public Box(){
area = width * height;
}
...
}
...


En el Example 1, el desarrollador espera que box.area sea un entero aleatorio que resulta ser múltiplo de 10, ya que width es igual a 10. Sin embargo, en realidad, siempre tuvo un valor codificado de 0. Se inicializan primero los campos estáticos finales declarados con una constante de tiempo de compilación y, a continuación, se ejecutan en orden. Esto significa que, puesto que height no es una constante de tiempo de compilación, se declara después de la declaración debox y, por consiguiente, se llama al constructor antes de que se inicialice el campo height.

Ejemplo 2: las siguientes clases declaran campos estáticos interdependientes.


...
class Foo{
public static final int f = Bar.b - 1;
...
}
...
class Bar{
public static final int b = Foo.f + 1;
...
}

This example is perhaps easier to identify, but would be dependent on which class is loaded first by the JVM. In this example Foo.f could be either -1 or 0, and Bar.b could be either 0 or 1.
References
[1] DCL00-J. Prevent class initialization cycles CERT
[2] Standards Mapping - Common Weakness Enumeration CWE ID 362, CWE ID 367
[3] Standards Mapping - Common Weakness Enumeration Top 25 2022 [22] CWE ID 362
[4] Standards Mapping - Common Weakness Enumeration Top 25 2023 [21] CWE ID 362
[5] Standards Mapping - DISA Control Correlation Identifier Version 2 CCI-000366, CCI-003178
[6] Standards Mapping - General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) Indirect Access to Sensitive Data
[7] Standards Mapping - NIST Special Publication 800-53 Revision 4 CM-6 Configuration Settings (P1), SA-11 Developer Security Testing and Evaluation (P1)
[8] Standards Mapping - NIST Special Publication 800-53 Revision 5 CM-6 Configuration Settings, SA-11 Developer Testing and Evaluation
[9] Standards Mapping - OWASP Application Security Verification Standard 4.0 1.11.2 Business Logic Architectural Requirements (L2 L3), 1.11.3 Business Logic Architectural Requirements (L3), 11.1.6 Business Logic Security Requirements (L2 L3)
[10] Standards Mapping - OWASP Top 10 2021 A04 Insecure Design
[11] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard Version 3.0 Requirement 6.5.6
[12] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard Version 3.1 Requirement 6.5.6
[13] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard Version 3.2 Requirement 6.5.6
[14] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard Version 3.2.1 Requirement 6.5.6
[15] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard Version 4.0 Requirement 6.2.4
[16] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard Version 4.0.1 Requirement 6.2.4
[17] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Software Security Framework 1.0 Control Objective 4.2 - Critical Asset Protection
[18] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Software Security Framework 1.1 Control Objective 4.2 - Critical Asset Protection, Control Objective B.3.3 - Terminal Software Attack Mitigation
[19] Standards Mapping - Payment Card Industry Software Security Framework 1.2 Control Objective 4.2 - Critical Asset Protection, Control Objective B.3.3 - Terminal Software Attack Mitigation
[20] Standards Mapping - SANS Top 25 2009 Insecure Interaction - CWE ID 362
[21] Standards Mapping - SANS Top 25 2010 Insecure Interaction - CWE ID 362
[22] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 3.1 APP3630.1 CAT II
[23] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 3.4 APP3630.1 CAT II
[24] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 3.5 APP3630.1 CAT II
[25] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 3.6 APP3630.1 CAT II
[26] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 3.7 APP3630.1 CAT II
[27] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 3.9 APP3630.1 CAT II
[28] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 3.10 APP3630.1 CAT II
[29] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.2 APSC-DV-001995 CAT II
[30] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.3 APSC-DV-001995 CAT II
[31] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.4 APSC-DV-001995 CAT II
[32] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.5 APSC-DV-001995 CAT II
[33] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.6 APSC-DV-001995 CAT II
[34] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.7 APSC-DV-001995 CAT II
[35] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.8 APSC-DV-001995 CAT II
[36] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.9 APSC-DV-001995 CAT II
[37] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.10 APSC-DV-001995 CAT II
[38] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.11 APSC-DV-001995 CAT II
[39] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 4.1 APSC-DV-001995 CAT II
[40] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 5.1 APSC-DV-001995 CAT II
[41] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 5.2 APSC-DV-001995 CAT II
[42] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 5.3 APSC-DV-001995 CAT II
[43] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 6.1 APSC-DV-001995 CAT II
[44] Standards Mapping - Security Technical Implementation Guide Version 6.2 APSC-DV-001995 CAT II
desc.structural.java.race_condition_class_initialization_cycle