...
RSACryptoServiceProvider rsa1 = new RSACryptoServiceProvider(Convert.ToInt32(tx.Text));
...
Example 1
中的代码将成功运行,但任何有权使用此功能的人将能够通过修改文本框值 tx.Text
来操纵加密算法的密钥大小参数。一旦程序发布,撤消与用户控制的密钥大小相关的问题就会非常困难,因为很难知道恶意用户是否确定了给定加密操作的密钥大小。
...
rsa.GenerateKey(random, user_input)
...
Example 1
中的代码将成功运行,但任何有权使用此功能的人将能够操纵加密算法的密钥大小参数,因为变量 user_input
可由用户控制。一旦软件发布,撤消与用户控制的密钥大小相关的问题就会非常困难。很难知道恶意用户是否控制了给定加密操作的密钥大小。
...
Properties prop = new Properties();
prop.load(new FileInputStream("config.properties"));
String keySize = prop.getProperty("keySize");
...
PBEKeySpec spec = new PBEKeySpec(
password.toCharArray(),
saltBytes,
pswdIterations,
Integer.parseInt(keySize)
);
SecretKey secretKey = factory.generateSecret(spec);
SecretKeySpec secret = new SecretKeySpec(secretKey.getEncoded(), "AES");
...
Example 1
中的代码将成功运行,但任何有权使用此功能的人将能够通过修改 keySize
属性来操纵加密算法的密钥大小参数。一旦程序发布,撤消与用户控制的密钥大小相关的问题就会非常困难,因为很难知道恶意用户是否确定了给定加密操作的密钥大小。
...
@property (strong, nonatomic) IBOutlet UITextField *inputTextField;
...
CCCrypt(kCCEncrypt,
kCCAlgorithmAES,
kCCOptionPKCS7Padding,
key,
sizeof(_inputTextField.text),
iv,
plaintext,
sizeof(plaintext),
ciphertext,
sizeof(ciphertext),
&numBytesEncrypted);
...
Example 1
中的代码将成功运行,但任何有权使用此功能的人将能够通过修改 UITextField inputTextField
中的文本来操纵加密算法的密钥大小参数。一旦程序发布,撤消与用户控制的密钥大小相关的问题就会非常困难,因为很难知道恶意用户是否确定了给定加密操作的密钥大小。
...
$hash = hash_pbkdf2('sha256', $password, $random_salt, 100000, strlen($password));
...
Example 1
中的代码将成功运行,但任何有权使用此功能的人将能够操纵加密算法的密钥大小参数,因为变量 user_input
可由用户控制。一旦程序发布,撤消与用户控制的密钥大小相关的问题就会非常困难,因为很难知道恶意用户是否确定了给定加密操作的密钥大小。
...
dk = hashlib.pbkdf2_hmac('sha256', password, random_salt, 100000, dklen=user_input)
...
Example 1
中的代码将成功运行,但任何有权使用此功能的人将能够操纵加密算法的密钥大小参数,因为变量 user_input
可由用户控制。一旦程序发布,撤消与用户控制的密钥大小相关的问题就会非常困难,因为很难知道恶意用户是否确定了给定加密操作的密钥大小。
...
dk = OpenSSL::PKCS5.pbkdf2_hmac(password, random_salt, 100000, user_input, digest)
...
Example 1
中的代码将成功运行,但任何有权使用此功能的人将能够操纵加密算法的密钥大小参数,因为变量 user_input
可由用户控制。一旦程序发布,撤消与用户控制的密钥大小相关的问题就会非常困难,因为很难知道恶意用户是否确定了给定加密操作的密钥大小。
...
@IBOutlet weak var inputTextField : UITextField!
...
let key = (inputTextField.text as NSString).dataUsingEncoding(NSUTF8StringEncoding)
let keyPointer = UnsafePointer<UInt8>(key.bytes)
let keyLength = size_t(key.length)
...
let operation : CCOperation = UInt32(kCCEncrypt)
let algoritm : CCAlgorithm = UInt32(kCCAlgorithmAES128)
let options : CCOptions = UInt32(kCCOptionPKCS7Padding)
var numBytesEncrypted :size_t = 0
CCCrypt(operation,
algorithm,
options,
keyPointer,
keyLength,
iv,
plaintextPointer,
plaintextLength,
ciphertextPointer,
ciphertextLength,
&numBytesEncrypted)
...
Example 1
中的代码将成功运行,但任何有权使用此功能的人将能够通过修改 UITextField inputTextField
中的文本来操纵加密算法的密钥大小参数。一旦程序发布,撤消与用户控制的密钥大小相关的问题就会非常困难,因为很难知道恶意用户是否确定了给定加密操作的密钥大小。MessageProtectionOrder
属性允许指定应用签名和加密的顺序(以及是否应对签名进行加密)。将 MessageProtectionOrder
属性设置为除 SignBeforeEncryptAndEncryptSignature
以外的任何设置都将构成潜在安全问题。SignBeforeEncryptAndEncryptSignature
的可能替代设置及其相关问题。<authorization>
标签可能导致权限提升或匿名访问。<authorization>
元素指定授权规则列表。如果存在 <authorization>
元素且任何规则均不适用于发送者,则拒绝访问 [1]。<authorization>
标签,而且可能支持匿名访问。
<policies>
...
<protection>
<fault signatureOptions="IncludeAddressing, IncludeSoapBody" encryptBody="true" />
<policies>
...
<protection>
<request signatureOptions="IncludeAddressing, IncludeSoapBody" encryptBody="true" />
<policies>
...
<protection>
<response signatureOptions="IncludeAddressing, IncludeSoapBody" encryptBody="true" />
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE lolz [
<!ENTITY lol "lol">
<!ENTITY lol2 "&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;">
<!ENTITY lol3 "&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;">
<!ENTITY lol4 "&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;">
<!ENTITY lol5 "&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;">
<!ENTITY lol6 "&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;">
<!ENTITY lol7 "&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;">
<!ENTITY lol8 "&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;">
<!ENTITY lol9 "&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;">
]>
<lolz>&lol9;</lolz>
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE lolz [
<!ENTITY lol "lol">
<!ENTITY lol2 "&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;">
<!ENTITY lol3 "&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;">
<!ENTITY lol4 "&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;">
<!ENTITY lol5 "&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;">
<!ENTITY lol6 "&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;">
<!ENTITY lol7 "&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;">
<!ENTITY lol8 "&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;">
<!ENTITY lol9 "&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;">
]>
<lolz>&lol9;</lolz>
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE lolz [
<!ENTITY lol "lol">
<!ENTITY lol2 "&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;">
<!ENTITY lol3 "&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;">
<!ENTITY lol4 "&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;">
<!ENTITY lol5 "&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;">
<!ENTITY lol6 "&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;">
<!ENTITY lol7 "&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;">
<!ENTITY lol8 "&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;">
<!ENTITY lol9 "&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;">
]>
<lolz>&lol9;</lolz>
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE lolz [
<!ENTITY lol "lol">
<!ENTITY lol2 "&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;">
<!ENTITY lol3 "&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;">
<!ENTITY lol4 "&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;">
<!ENTITY lol5 "&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;">
<!ENTITY lol6 "&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;">
<!ENTITY lol7 "&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;">
<!ENTITY lol8 "&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;">
<!ENTITY lol9 "&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;">
]>
<lolz>&lol9;</lolz>
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE lolz [
<!ENTITY lol "lol">
<!ENTITY lol2 "&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;">
<!ENTITY lol3 "&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;">
<!ENTITY lol4 "&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;">
<!ENTITY lol5 "&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;">
<!ENTITY lol6 "&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;">
<!ENTITY lol7 "&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;">
<!ENTITY lol8 "&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;">
<!ENTITY lol9 "&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;">
]>
<lolz>&lol9;</lolz>
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE lolz [
<!ENTITY lol "lol">
<!ENTITY lol2 "&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;&lol;">
<!ENTITY lol3 "&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;&lol2;">
<!ENTITY lol4 "&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;&lol3;">
<!ENTITY lol5 "&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;&lol4;">
<!ENTITY lol6 "&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;&lol5;">
<!ENTITY lol7 "&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;&lol6;">
<!ENTITY lol8 "&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;&lol7;">
<!ENTITY lol9 "&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;&lol8;">
]>
<lolz>&lol9;</lolz>
...
DATA(ixml) = cl_ixml=>create( ).
DATA(stream_factory) = ixml->create_stream_factory( ).
istream = stream_factory->create_istream_string(
`<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> ` &&
`<!DOCTYPE foo [ <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd"> ]> ` &&
`<stockCheck>&xxe;</stockCheck>` ).
istream->set_dtd_restriction( level = 0 ).
DATA(document) = ixml->create_document( ).
parser = ixml->create_parser(
stream_factory = stream_factory
istream = istream
document = document ).
parser->set_validating( mode = `0` ).
DATA(rc) = parser->parse( ).
...
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [
<!ELEMENT foo ANY >
<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///c:/winnt/win.ini" >]><foo>&xxe;</foo>
- (void) parseSomeXML: (NSString *) rawXml {
BOOL success;
NSData *rawXmlConvToData = [rawXml dataUsingEncoding:NSUTF8StringEncoding];
NSXMLParser *myParser = [[NSXMLParser alloc] initWithData:rawXmlConvToData];
[myParser setShouldResolveExternalEntities:YES];
[myParser setDelegate:self];
}
rawXml
,该 XML 的形式如下所示:
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [
<!ELEMENT foo ANY >
<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///c:/boot.ini" >]><foo>&xxe;</foo>
boot.ini
文件的内容。
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [
<!ELEMENT foo ANY >
<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///dev/random" >]><foo>&xxe;</foo>
String xml = "...";
...
try {
SAXParserFactory factory = SAXParserFactory.newInstance();
SAXParser saxParser = factory.newSAXParser();
DefaultHandler handler = new DefaultHandler() {
@Override
public void characters(char[] ch, int start, int length) throws SAXException {
System.out.println(new String(ch, start, length));
}
};
saxParser.parse(new InputSource(new StringReader(xml)), handler);
} catch (Exception e) {
e.printStackTrace();
}
...
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [
<!ELEMENT foo ANY >
<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///dev/random" >]><foo>&xxe;</foo>
- (void) parseSomeXML: (NSString *) rawXml {
BOOL success;
NSData *rawXmlConvToData = [rawXml dataUsingEncoding:NSUTF8StringEncoding];
NSXMLParser *myParser = [[NSXMLParser alloc] initWithData:rawXmlConvToData];
[myParser setShouldResolveExternalEntities:YES];
[myParser setDelegate:self];
}
rawXml
,该 XML 的形式如下所示:
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [
<!ELEMENT foo ANY >
<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///c:/boot.ini" >]><foo>&xxe;</foo>
boot.ini
文件的内容。
...
<?php
$goodXML = $_GET["key"];
$doc = simplexml_load_string($goodXml);
echo $doc->testing;
?>
...
Example 2
中的代码:
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [
<!ELEMENT foo ANY >
<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///c:/boot.ini" >]><foo>&xxe;</foo>
boot.ini
文件的内容填充 <foo> 元素的内容。攻击者可能会利用返回到客户端的 XML 元素来窃取数据或获取有关网络资源是否存在的信息。
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [
<!ELEMENT foo ANY >
<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///dev/random" >]><foo>&xxe;</foo>
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [
<!ELEMENT foo ANY >
<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///etc/passwd" >]><foo>&xxe;</foo>
/etc/passwd
的内容并将它们包含在文档中。
def readFile() = Action { request =>
val xml = request.cookies.get("doc")
val doc = XMLLoader.loadString(xml)
...
}
func parseXML(xml: String) {
parser = NSXMLParser(data: rawXml.dataUsingEncoding(NSUTF8StringEncoding)!)
parser.delegate = self
parser.shouldResolveExternalEntities = true
parser.parse()
}
rawXml
内容,该 XML 的形式如下所示:
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [
<!ELEMENT foo ANY >
<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///c:/boot.ini" >]><foo>&xxe;</foo>
boot.ini
文件的内容。shoes
:
<order>
<price>100.00</price>
<item>shoes</item>
</order>
shoes
替换成 shoes</item><price>1.00</price><item>shoes
。新的 XML 如下所示:
<order>
<price>100.00</price>
<item>shoes</item><price>1.00</price><item>shoes</item>
</order>
<price>
标签中的值将会覆盖第一个 <price>
标签中的值。这样,攻击者就可以只花 1 美元购买一双价值 100 美元的鞋。shoes
。
<order>
<price>100.00</price>
<item>shoes</item>
</order>
shoes
替换成 shoes</item><price>1.00</price><item>shoes
。新的 XML 如下所示:
<order>
<price>100.00</price>
<item>shoes</item><price>1.00</price><item>shoes</item>
</order>
<price>
标签中的值将会覆盖第一个 <price>
标签中的值。这样,攻击者就可以只花 1 美元购买一双价值 100 美元的鞋。shoes
。
<order>
<price>100.00</price>
<item>shoes</item>
</order>
shoes
替换成 shoes</item><price>1.00</price><item>shoes
。新的 XML 如下所示:
<order>
<price>100.00</price>
<item>shoes</item><price>1.00</price><item>shoes</item>
</order>
<price>
标签中的值将会覆盖第一个 <price>
标签中的值。这样,攻击者就可以只花 1 美元购买一双价值 100 美元的鞋。shoes
:
<order>
<price>100.00</price>
<item>shoes</item>
</order>
shoes
替换成 shoes</item><price>1.00</price><item>shoes
。新的 XML 如下所示:
<order>
<price>100.00</price>
<item>shoes</item><price>1.00</price><item>shoes</item>
</order>
<price>
标签中的值将会覆盖第一个 <price>
标签中的值。这样,攻击者就可以只花 1 美元购买一双价值 100 美元的鞋。shoes
。
<order>
<price>100.00</price>
<item>shoes</item>
</order>
shoes
替换成 shoes</item><price>1.00</price><item>shoes
。新的 XML 如下所示:
<order>
<price>100.00</price>
<item>shoes</item><price>1.00</price><item>shoes</item>
</order>
<price>
标签中的值将会覆盖第一个 <price>
标签中的值。这样,攻击者就可以只花 1 美元购买一双价值 100 美元的鞋。shoes
。
<order>
<price>100.00</price>
<item>shoes</item>
</order>
shoes
替换成 shoes</item><price>1.00</price><item>shoes
。新的 XML 如下所示:
<order>
<price>100.00</price>
<item>shoes</item><price>1.00</price><item>shoes</item>
</order>
shoes
。
<order>
<price>100.00</price>
<item>shoes</item>
</order>
shoes
替换成 shoes</item><price>1.00</price><item>shoes
。新的 XML 如下所示:
<order>
<price>100.00</price>
<item>shoes</item><price>1.00</price><item>shoes</item>
</order>
<price>
标签中的值将会覆盖第一个 <price>
标签中的值。这样,攻击者就可以只花 1 美元购买一双价值 100 美元的鞋。shoes
。
<order>
<price>100.00</price>
<item>shoes</item>
</order>
shoes
替换成 shoes</item><price>1.00</price><item>shoes
。新的 XML 如下所示:
<order>
<price>100.00</price>
<item>shoes</item><price>1.00</price><item>shoes</item>
</order>
<price>
标签中的值将会覆盖第一个 <price>
标签中的值。这样,攻击者就可以只花 1 美元购买一双价值 100 美元的鞋。
...
<?php
$goodXML = $_GET["key"];
$doc = simplexml_load_string($goodXml);
echo $doc->testing;
?>
...
Example 2
中的代码:
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="ISO-8859-1"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [
<!ELEMENT foo ANY >
<!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///c:/boot.ini" >]><foo>&xxe;</foo>
boot.ini
文件的内容填充 <foo> 元素的内容。攻击者可能会利用返回到客户端的 XML 元素来窃取数据或获取有关网络资源是否存在的信息。shoes
。
<order>
<price>100.00</price>
<item>shoes</item>
</order>
shoes
替换成 shoes</item><price>1.00</price><item>shoes
。新的 XML 如下所示:
<order>
<price>100.00</price>
<item>shoes</item><price>1.00</price><item>shoes</item>
</order>
<price>
标签中的值将会覆盖第一个 <price>
标签中的值。这样,攻击者就可以只花 1 美元购买一双价值 100 美元的鞋。shoes
。
<order>
<price>100.00</price>
<item>shoes</item>
</order>
shoes
替换成 shoes</item><price>1.00</price><item>shoes
。新的 XML 如下所示:
<order>
<price>100.00</price>
<item>shoes</item><price>1.00</price><item>shoes</item>
</order>
<price>
标签中的值将会覆盖第一个 <price>
标签中的值。这样,攻击者就可以只花 1 美元购买一双价值 100 美元的鞋。shoes
。
<order>
<price>100.00</price>
<item>shoes</item>
</order>
shoes
替换成 shoes</item><price>1.00</price><item>shoes
。新的 XML 如下所示:
<order>
<price>100.00</price>
<item>shoes</item><price>1.00</price><item>shoes</item>
</order>
<price>
标签中的值将会覆盖第一个 <price>
标签中的值。这样,攻击者就可以只花 1 美元购买一双价值 100 美元的鞋。shoes
。
<order>
<price>100.00</price>
<item>shoes</item>
</order>
shoes
替换成 shoes</item><price>1.00</price><item>shoes
。新的 XML 如下所示:
<order>
<price>100.00</price>
<item>shoes</item><price>1.00</price><item>shoes</item>
</order>
<price>
标签中的值将会覆盖第一个 <price>
标签中的值。这样,攻击者就可以只花 1 美元购买一双价值 100 美元的鞋。a:t
标签。
<a:t>YoY results: up 10%</a:t>
...
string acctID = Request["acctID"];
string query = null;
if(acctID != null) {
StringBuffer sb = new StringBuffer("/accounts/account[acctID='");
sb.append(acctID);
sb.append("']/email/text()");
query = sb.toString();
}
XPathDocument docNav = new XPathDocument(myXml);
XPathNavigator nav = docNav.CreateNavigator();
nav.Evaluate(query);
...
/accounts/account[acctID='1']/email/text()
acctID
不包含单引号字符时,才会正确执行这一查询。如果攻击者为 acctID
输入字符串 1' or '1' = '1
,则该查询会变成:/accounts/account[acctID='1' or '1' = '1']/email/text()
1' or '1' = '1
会使 where 从句永远评估为 true,因此该查询在逻辑上将等同于一个更为简化的查询://email/text()
...
NSString *accountStr = account.text;
xmlXPathContextPtr xpathCtx;
NSString *query = @"/accounts/account[actId='" + accountStr + @"']/email/text()";
xpathCtx = xmlXPathNewContext(doc);
/* Evaluate XPath expression */
xmlChar *queryString =
(xmlChar *)[query cStringUsingEncoding:NSUTF8StringEncoding];
xpathObj = xmlXPathEvalExpression(queryString, xpathCtx);
...
/accounts/account[acctID='1']/email/text()
acctID
不包含单引号字符时,才会正确执行这一查询。如果攻击者为 acctID
输入字符串 1' or '1' = '1
,则该查询会变成:/accounts/account[acctID='1' or '1' = '1']/email/text()
1' or '1' = '1
会使 where 从句永远评估为 true,因此该查询在逻辑上将等同于一个更为简化的查询://email/text()
query = "/accounts/account[acctID='" & url.acctID & "']/email/text()";
selectedElements = XmlSearch(myxmldoc, query);
/accounts/account[acctID='1']/email/text()
acctID
不包含单引号字符时,才会正确执行这一查询。如果攻击者为 acctID
输入字符串 1' or '1' = '1
,则该查询会变成:/accounts/account[acctID='1' or '1' = '1']/email/text()
1' or '1' = '1
会使 where 从句永远评估为 true,因此该查询在逻辑上将等同于一个更为简化的查询://email/text()
...
String acctID = request.getParameter("acctID");
String query = null;
if(acctID != null) {
StringBuffer sb = new StringBuffer("/accounts/account[acctID='");
sb.append(acctID);
sb.append("']/email/text()");
query = sb.toString();
}
DocumentBuilderFactory domFactory = DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstance();
domFactory.setNamespaceAware(true);
DocumentBuilder builder = domFactory.newDocumentBuilder();
Document doc = builder.parse("accounts.xml");
XPathFactory factory = XPathFactory.newInstance();
XPath xpath = factory.newXPath();
XPathExpression expr = xpath.compile(query);
Object result = expr.evaluate(doc, XPathConstants.NODESET);
...
/accounts/account[acctID='1']/email/text()
acctID
不包含单引号字符时,才会正确执行这一查询。如果攻击者为 acctID
输入字符串 1' or '1' = '1
,则该查询会变成:/accounts/account[acctID='1' or '1' = '1']/email/text()
1' or '1' = '1
会使 where 从句永远评估为 true,因此该查询在逻辑上将等同于一个更为简化的查询://email/text()
...
NSString *accountStr = account.text;
xmlXPathContextPtr xpathCtx;
NSString *query = @"/accounts/account[actId='" + accountStr + @"']/email/text()";
xpathCtx = xmlXPathNewContext(doc);
/* Evaluate XPath expression */
xmlChar *queryString =
(xmlChar *)[query cStringUsingEncoding:NSUTF8StringEncoding];
xpathObj = xmlXPathEvalExpression(queryString, xpathCtx);
...
/accounts/account[acctID='1']/email/text()
acctID
不包含单引号字符时,才会正确执行这一查询。如果攻击者为 acctID
输入字符串 1' or '1' = '1
,则该查询会变成:/accounts/account[acctID='1' or '1' = '1']/email/text()
1' or '1' = '1
会使 where 从句永远评估为 true,因此该查询在逻辑上将等同于一个更为简化的查询://email/text()
...
<?php
load('articles.xml');
$xpath = new DOMXPath($doc);
$emailAddrs = $xpath->query("/accounts/account[acctID='" . $_GET["test1"] . "']/email/text()");
//$arts = $xpath->evaluate("/accounts/account[acctID='" . $_GET["test1"] . "']/email/text()")
foreach ($emailAddrs as $email)
{
echo $email->nodeValue."";
}
?>
...
/accounts/account[acctID='1']/email/text()
acctID
不包含单引号字符时,才会正确执行这一查询。如果攻击者为 acctID
输入字符串 1' or '1' = '1
,则该查询会变成:/accounts/account[acctID='1' or '1' = '1']/email/text()
1' or '1' = '1
会使 where 从句永远评估为 true,因此该查询在逻辑上将等同于一个更为简化的查询://email/text()
...
tree = etree.parse('articles.xml')
emailAddrs = "/accounts/account[acctID=" + request.GET["test1"] + "]/email/text()"
r = tree.xpath(emailAddrs)
...
/accounts/account[acctID='1']/email/text()
acctID
不包含单引号字符时,才会正确执行这一查询。如果攻击者为 acctID
输入字符串 1' or '1' = '1
,则该查询会变成:/accounts/account[acctID='1' or '1' = '1']/email/text()
1' or '1' = '1
会使 where 从句永远评估为 true,因此该查询在逻辑上将等同于一个更为简化的查询://email/text()
...
String squery = "for \$user in doc(users.xml)//user[username='" + Request["username"] + "'and pass='" + Request["password"] + "'] return \$user";
Processor processor = new Processor();
XdmNode indoc = processor.NewDocumentBuilder().Build(new Uri(Server.MapPath("users.xml")));
StreamReader query = new StreamReader(squery);
XQueryCompiler compiler = processor.NewXQueryCompiler();
XQueryExecutable exp = compiler.Compile(query.ReadToEnd());
XQueryEvaluator eval = exp.Load();
eval.ContextItem = indoc;
Serializer qout = new Serializer();
qout.SetOutputProperty(Serializer.METHOD, "xml");
qout.SetOutputProperty(Serializer.DOCTYPE_PUBLIC, "-//W3C//DTD XHTML 1.0 Strict//EN");
qout.SetOutputProperty(Serializer.DOCTYPE_SYSTEM, "http://www.w3.org/TR/xhtml1/DTD/xhtml1-strict.dtd");
qout.SetOutputProperty(Serializer.INDENT, "yes");
qout.SetOutputProperty(Serializer.OMIT_XML_DECLARATION, "no");
qout.SetOutputWriter(Response.Output);
eval.Run(qout);
...
for \$user in doc(users.xml)//user[username='test_user' and pass='pass123'] return \$user
username
或 password
不包含单引号字符时,才会正确执行这一查询。如果攻击者为 username
输入字符串 admin' or 1=1 or ''='
,则该查询会变成:for \$user in doc(users.xml)//user[username='admin' or 1=1 or ''='' and password='x' or ''=''] return \$user
admin' or 1=1 or ''='
会使 XQuery 表达式永远评估为 true。因此,该查询在逻辑上等同于更简单的查询://user[username='admin']
...
XQDataSource xqs = new XQDataSource();
XQConnection conn = xqs.getConnection();
String query = "for \$user in doc(users.xml)//user[username='" + request.getParameter("username") + "'and pass='" + request.getParameter("password") + "'] return \$user";
XQPreparedExpression xqpe = conn.prepareExpression(query);
XQResultSequence rs = xqpe.executeQuery();
...
for \$user in doc(users.xml)//user[username='test_user' and pass='pass123'] return \$user
username
或 password
不包含单引号字符时,才会正确执行这一查询。如果攻击者为 username
输入字符串 admin' or 1=1 or ''='
,则该查询会变成:for \$user in doc(users.xml)//user[username='admin' or 1=1 or ''='' and password='x' or ''=''] return \$user
admin' or 1=1 or ''='
会使 XQuery 表达式永远评估为 true。因此,该查询在逻辑上等同于更简单的查询://user[username='admin']
...
$memstor = InMemoryStore::getInstance();
$z = Zorba::getInstance($memstor);
try {
// get data manager
$dataman = $z->getXmlDataManager();
// load external XML document
$dataman->loadDocument('users.xml', file_get_contents('users.xml'));
// create and compile query
$express =
"for \$user in doc(users.xml)//user[username='" . $_GET["username"] . "'and pass='" . $_GET["password"] . "'] return \$user"
$query = $zorba->compileQuery($express);
// execute query
$result = $query->execute();
?>
...
for \$user in doc(users.xml)//user[username='test_user' and pass='pass123'] return \$user
username
或 password
不包含单引号字符时,才会正确执行这一查询。如果攻击者为 username
输入字符串 admin' or 1=1 or ''='
,则该查询会变成:for \$user in doc(users.xml)//user[username='admin' or 1=1 or ''='' and password='x' or ''=''] return \$user
admin' or 1=1 or ''='
会使 XQuery 表达式永远评估为 true。因此,该查询在逻辑上等同于更简单的查询://user[username='admin']
...
String xmlUrl = Request["xmlurl"];
String xslUrl = Request["xslurl"];
XslCompiledTransform xslt = new XslCompiledTransform();
xslt.Load(xslUrl);
xslt.Transform(xmlUrl, "books.html");
...
Example 1
会导致三种不同的漏洞利用:
<xsl:stylesheet version="1.0" xmlns:xsl="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform">
<xsl:template match="/">
<script>alert(123)</script>
</xsl:template>
</xsl:stylesheet>
<xsl:stylesheet version="1.0" xmlns:xsl="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform">
<xsl:template match="/">
<xsl:copy-of select="document('file:///c:/winnt/win.ini')"/>
</xsl:template>
</xsl:stylesheet>
/etc/passwd
文件的内容。
<xsl:stylesheet version="1.0" xmlns:xsl="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform" xmlns:msxsl="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:xslt" xmlns:App="http://www.tempuri.org/App">
<msxsl:script implements-prefix="App" language="C#">
<![CDATA[
public string ToShortDateString(string date)
{
System.Diagnostics.Process.Start("cmd.exe");
return "01/01/2001";
}
]]>
</msxsl:script>
<xsl:template match="ArrayOfTest">
<TABLE>
<xsl:for-each select="Test">
<TR>
<TD>
<xsl:value-of select="App:ToShortDateString(TestDate)" />
</TD>
</TR>
</xsl:for-each>
</TABLE>
</xsl:template>
</xsl:stylesheet>
...
InputStream xmlUrl = Utils.getFromURL(request.getParameter("xmlurl"));
InputStream xsltUrl = Utils.getFromURL(request.getParameter("xslurl"));
Source xmlSource = new StreamSource(xmlUrl);
Source xsltSource = new StreamSource(xsltUrl);
Result result = new StreamResult(System.out);
TransformerFactory transFact = TransformerFactory.newInstance();
Transformer trans = transFact.newTransformer(xsltSource);
trans.transform(xmlSource, result);
...
Example 1
中的代码会导致三种不同的漏洞利用:
<xsl:stylesheet version="1.0" xmlns:xsl="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform">
<xsl:template match="/">
<script>alert(123)</script>
</xsl:template>
</xsl:stylesheet>
<xsl:stylesheet version="1.0" xmlns:xsl="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform">
<xsl:template match="/">
<xsl:copy-of select="document('/etc/passwd')"/>
</xsl:template>
</xsl:stylesheet>
/etc/passwd
文件的内容。
<xsl:stylesheet version="1.0" xmlns:xsl="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform" xmlns:rt="http://xml.apache.org/xalan/java/java.lang.Runtime" xmlns:ob="http://xml.apache.org/xalan/java/java.lang.Object">
<xsl:template match="/">
<xsl:variable name="rtobject" select="rt:getRuntime()"/>
<xsl:variable name="process" select="rt:exec($rtobject,'ls')"/>
<xsl:variable name="processString" select="ob:toString($process)"/>
<xsl:value-of select="$processString"/>
</xsl:template>
</xsl:stylesheet>
...
<?php
$xml = new DOMDocument;
$xml->load('local.xml');
$xsl = new DOMDocument;
$xsl->load($_GET['key']);
$processor = new XSLTProcessor;
$processor->registerPHPFunctions();
$processor->importStyleSheet($xsl);
echo $processor->transformToXML($xml);
?>
...
Example 1
中的代码会导致三种不同的漏洞利用:
<xsl:stylesheet version="1.0" xmlns:xsl="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform" xmlns:php="http://php.net/xsl">
<xsl:template match="/">
<script>alert(123)</script>
</xsl:template>
</xsl:stylesheet>
<xsl:stylesheet version="1.0" xmlns:xsl="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform" xmlns:php="http://php.net/xsl">
<xsl:template match="/">
<xsl:copy-of select="document('/etc/passwd')"/>
</xsl:template>
</xsl:stylesheet>
/etc/passwd
文件的内容。
<xsl:stylesheet version="1.0" xmlns:xsl="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform" xmlns:php="http://php.net/xsl">
<xsl:template match="/">
<xsl:value-of select="php:function('passthru','ls -la')"/>
</xsl:template>
</xsl:stylesheet>
...
xml = StringIO.StringIO(request.POST['xml'])
xslt = StringIO.StringIO(request.POST['xslt'])
xslt_root = etree.XML(xslt)
transform = etree.XSLT(xslt_root)
result_tree = transform(xml)
return render_to_response(template_name, {'result': etree.tostring(result_tree)})
...
Example 1
中的代码会导致三种不同的漏洞利用:
<xsl:stylesheet version="1.0" xmlns:xsl="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform">
<xsl:template match="/">
<script>alert(123)</script>
</xsl:template>
</xsl:stylesheet>
<xsl:stylesheet version="1.0" xmlns:xsl="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform">
<xsl:template match="/">
<xsl:copy-of select="document('/etc/passwd')"/>
</xsl:template>
</xsl:stylesheet>
/etc/passwd
文件的内容。