...
password = ''.
...
...
URLRequestDefaults.setLoginCredentialsForHost(hostname, "scott", "");
...
Example 1 indicates that the user account "scott" is configured with an empty password, which an attacker can easily guess. After the program ships, updating the account to use a non-empty password will require a code change.
...
var storedPassword:String = "";
var temp:String;
if ((temp = readPassword()) != null) {
storedPassword = temp;
}
if(storedPassword.equals(userPassword))
// Access protected resources
...
}
...
readPassword() fails to retrieve the stored password due to a database error or another problem, then an attacker could trivially bypass the password check by providing an empty string for userPassword.
...
HttpRequest req = new HttpRequest();
req.setClientCertificate('mycert', '');
...
...
resource mysqlserver 'Microsoft.DBforMySQL/servers@2017-12-01' = {
...
properties: {
administratorLogin: 'admin'
administratorLoginPassword: ''
...
Example 1 succeeds, it indicates that the MySQL database is configured with an empty administrator password, which an attacker can easily guess. In Bicep, this may also be shown in deployment history or logs. After the program ships, updating the account to use a non-empty password will require a code change. Anyone with access to this information can use it to break into the system.
...
NetworkCredential netCred = new NetworkCredential("scott", "", domain);
...
Example 1 succeeds, it indicates that the network credential login "scott" is configured with an empty password, which an attacker can easily guess. After the program ships, updating the account to use a non-empty password will require a code change.
...
string storedPassword = "";
string temp;
if ((temp = ReadPassword(storedPassword)) != null) {
storedPassword = temp;
}
if(storedPassword.Equals(userPassword))
// Access protected resources
...
}
...
readPassword() fails to retrieve the stored password due to a database error or another problem, then an attacker could trivially bypass the password check by providing an empty string for userPassword.
...
rc = SQLConnect(*hdbc, server, SQL_NTS, "scott", SQL_NTS, "", SQL_NTS);
...
Example 1 succeeds, it indicates that the database user account "scott" is configured with an empty password, which an attacker can easily guess. After the program ships, updating the account to use a non-empty password will require a code change.
...
char *stored_password = "";
readPassword(stored_password);
if(safe_strcmp(stored_password, user_password))
// Access protected resources
...
}
...
readPassword() fails to retrieve the stored password due to a database error or another problem, then an attacker could trivially bypass the password check by providing an empty string for user_password.
...
<cfquery name = "GetSSNs" dataSource = "users"
username = "scott" password = "">
SELECT SSN
FROM Users
</cfquery>
...
Example 1 succeeds, it indicates that the database user account "scott" is configured with an empty password, which an attacker can easily guess. After the program ships, updating the account to use a non-empty password will require a code change.
...
var password = "";
var temp;
if ((temp = readPassword()) != null) {
password = temp;
}
if(password == userPassword()) {
// Access protected resources
...
}
...
readPassword() fails to retrieve the stored password due to a database error or another problem, then an attacker could trivially bypass the password check by providing an empty string for userPassword.
...
response.SetBasicAuth(usrName, "")
...
...
DriverManager.getConnection(url, "scott", "");
...
Example 1 succeeds, it indicates that the database user account "scott" is configured with an empty password, which an attacker can easily guess. After the program ships, updating the account to use a non-empty password will require a code change.
...
String storedPassword = "";
String temp;
if ((temp = readPassword()) != null) {
storedPassword = temp;
}
if(storedPassword.equals(userPassword))
// Access protected resources
...
}
...
readPassword() fails to retrieve the stored password due to a database error or another problem, then an attacker could trivially bypass the password check by providing an empty string for userPassword.
...
webview.setWebViewClient(new WebViewClient() {
public void onReceivedHttpAuthRequest(WebView view,
HttpAuthHandler handler, String host, String realm) {
String username = "";
String password = "";
if (handler.useHttpAuthUsernamePassword()) {
String[] credentials = view.getHttpAuthUsernamePassword(host, realm);
username = credentials[0];
password = credentials[1];
}
handler.proceed(username, password);
}
});
...
Example 2, if useHttpAuthUsernamePassword() returns false, an attacker will be able to view protected pages by supplying an empty password.
...
obj = new XMLHttpRequest();
obj.open('GET','/fetchusers.jsp?id='+form.id.value,'true','scott','');
...
{
...
"password" : ""
...
}
...
rc = SQLConnect(*hdbc, server, SQL_NTS, "scott", SQL_NTS, "", SQL_NTS);
...
Example 1 succeeds, it indicates that the database user account "scott" is configured with an empty password, which an attacker can easily guess. After the program ships, updating the account to use a non-empty password will require a code change.
...
NSString *stored_password = "";
readPassword(stored_password);
if(safe_strcmp(stored_password, user_password)) {
// Access protected resources
...
}
...
readPassword() fails to retrieve the stored password due to a database error or another problem, then an attacker could trivially bypass the password check by providing an empty string for user_password.
<?php
...
$connection = mysql_connect($host, 'scott', '');
...
?>
DECLARE
password VARCHAR(20);
BEGIN
password := "";
END;
...
db = mysql.connect("localhost","scott","","mydb")
...
...
conn = Mysql.new(database_host, "scott", "", databasename);
...
Example 1 succeeds, it indicates that the database user account "scott" is configured with an empty password, which an attacker can easily guess. After the program ships, updating the account to use a non-empty password will require a code change."" as a default value when none is specified. In this case you also need to make sure that the correct number of arguments are specified in order to make sure a password is passed to the function.
...
ws.url(url).withAuth("john", "", WSAuthScheme.BASIC)
...
...
let password = ""
let username = "scott"
let con = DBConnect(username, password)
...
Example 1 succeeds, it indicates that the database user account "scott" is configured with an empty password, which an attacker can easily guess. After the program ships, updating the account to use a non-empty password will require a code change.
...
var stored_password = ""
readPassword(stored_password)
if(stored_password == user_password) {
// Access protected resources
...
}
...
readPassword() fails to retrieve the stored password due to a database error or another problem, then an attacker could trivially bypass the password check by providing an empty string for user_password.
...
Dim con As New ADODB.Connection
Dim cmd As New ADODB.Command
Dim rst As New ADODB.Recordset
con.ConnectionString = "Driver={Microsoft ODBC for Oracle};Server=OracleServer.world;Uid=scott;Passwd=;"
...
Example 1 succeeds, it indicates that the database user account "scott" is configured with an empty password, which an attacker can easily guess. After the program ships, updating the account to use a non-empty password will require a code change.
...
password = 'tiger'.
...
...
URLRequestDefaults.setLoginCredentialsForHost(hostname, "scott", "tiger");
...
...
HttpRequest req = new HttpRequest();
req.setClientCertificate('mycert', 'tiger');
...
...
resource mysqlserver 'Microsoft.DBforMySQL/servers@2017-12-01' = {
...
properties: {
administratorLogin: 'administratorUserName'
administratorLoginPassword: 'administratorLoginPass'
...
...
NetworkCredential netCred =
new NetworkCredential("scott", "tiger", domain);
...
...
rc = SQLConnect(*hdbc, server, SQL_NTS, "scott",
SQL_NTS, "tiger", SQL_NTS);
...
...
MOVE "scott" TO UID.
MOVE "tiger" TO PASSWORD.
EXEC SQL
CONNECT :UID
IDENTIFIED BY :PASSWORD
AT :MYCONN
USING :MYSERVER
END-EXEC.
...
...
<cfquery name = "GetSSNs" dataSource = "users"
username = "scott" password = "tiger">
SELECT SSN
FROM Users
</cfquery>
...
...
var password = "foobarbaz";
...
javap -c command to access the disassembled code, which will contain the values of the passwords used. The result of this operation might look something like the following for Example 1:
javap -c ConnMngr.class
22: ldc #36; //String jdbc:mysql://ixne.com/rxsql
24: ldc #38; //String scott
26: ldc #17; //String tiger
password := "letmein"
...
response.SetBasicAuth(usrName, password)
...
DriverManager.getConnection(url, "scott", "tiger");
...
javap -c command to access the disassembled code, which will contain the values of the passwords used. The result of this operation might look something like the following for Example 1:
javap -c ConnMngr.class
22: ldc #36; //String jdbc:mysql://ixne.com/rxsql
24: ldc #38; //String scott
26: ldc #17; //String tiger
...
webview.setWebViewClient(new WebViewClient() {
public void onReceivedHttpAuthRequest(WebView view,
HttpAuthHandler handler, String host, String realm) {
handler.proceed("guest", "allow");
}
});
...
Example 1, this code will run successfully, but anyone who has access to it will have access to the password.
...
obj = new XMLHttpRequest();
obj.open('GET','/fetchusers.jsp?id='+form.id.value,'true','scott','tiger');
...
...
{
"username":"scott"
"password":"tiger"
}
...
...
DriverManager.getConnection(url, "scott", "tiger")
...
javap -c command to access the disassembled code, which will contain the values of the passwords used. The result of this operation might look something like the following for Example 1:
javap -c ConnMngr.class
22: ldc #36; //String jdbc:mysql://ixne.com/rxsql
24: ldc #38; //String scott
26: ldc #17; //String tiger
...
webview.webViewClient = object : WebViewClient() {
override fun onReceivedHttpAuthRequest( view: WebView,
handler: HttpAuthHandler, host: String, realm: String
) {
handler.proceed("guest", "allow")
}
}
...
Example 1, this code will run successfully, but anyone who has access to it will have access to the password.
...
rc = SQLConnect(*hdbc, server, SQL_NTS, "scott",
SQL_NTS, "tiger", SQL_NTS);
...
...
$link = mysql_connect($url, 'scott', 'tiger');
if (!$link) {
die('Could not connect: ' . mysql_error());
}
...
DECLARE
password VARCHAR(20);
BEGIN
password := "tiger";
END;
password = "tiger"
...
response.writeln("Password:" + password)
...
Mysql.new(URI(hostname, 'scott', 'tiger', databasename)
...
...
ws.url(url).withAuth("john", "secret", WSAuthScheme.BASIC)
...
javap -c command to access the disassembled code, which will contain the values of the passwords used. The result of this operation might look something such as the following for Example 1:
javap -c MyController.class
24: ldc #38; //String john
26: ldc #17; //String secret
...
let password = "secret"
let username = "scott"
let con = DBConnect(username, password)
...
Example 2: The following ODBC connection string uses a hardcoded password:
...
https://user:secretpassword@example.com
...
...
server=Server;database=Database;UID=UserName;PWD=Password;Encrypt=yes;
...
...
Dim con As New ADODB.Connection
Dim cmd As New ADODB.Command
Dim rst As New ADODB.Recordset
con.ConnectionString = "Driver={Microsoft ODBC for Oracle};Server=OracleServer.world;Uid=scott;Passwd=tiger;"
...
...
credential_settings:
username: scott
password: tiger
...
<form method="get">
Name of new user: <input type="text" name="username">
Password for new user: <input type="password" name="user_passwd">
<input type="submit" name="action" value="Create User">
</form>
method attributed is GET, thus omitting the attribute results in the same outcome.
...
<param name="foo" class="org.jasypt.util.password.BasicPasswordEncoder">
...
</param>
...
import hashlib
def register(request):
password = request.GET['password']
username = request.GET['username']
hash = hashlib.md5(get_random_salt() + ":" + password).hexdigest()
store(username, hash)
...
require 'openssl'
def register(request)
password = request.params['password']
username = request.params['username']
salt = get_random_salt
hash = OpenSSL::Digest.digest("MD5", salt + ":" + password)
store(username, hash)
end
...
Null passwords can compromise security.null to password variables is never a good idea as it may allow attackers to bypass password verification or might indicate that resources are protected by an empty password.null, attempts to read a stored value for the password, and compares it against a user-supplied value.
...
var storedPassword:String = null;
var temp:String;
if ((temp = readPassword()) != null) {
storedPassword = temp;
}
if(Utils.verifyPassword(userPassword, storedPassword))
// Access protected resources
...
}
...
readPassword() fails to retrieve the stored password due to a database error or another problem, then an attacker could trivially bypass the password check by providing a null value for userPassword.null to password variables is never a good idea as it might enable attackers to bypass password verification or might indicate that resources are protected by an empty password.null, attempts to read a stored value for the password, and compares it against a user-supplied value.
...
string storedPassword = null;
string temp;
if ((temp = ReadPassword(storedPassword)) != null) {
storedPassword = temp;
}
if (Utils.VerifyPassword(storedPassword, userPassword)) {
// Access protected resources
...
}
...
ReadPassword() fails to retrieve the stored password due to a database error or other problem, then an attacker can easily bypass the password check by providing a null value for userPassword.null to password variables is never a good idea as it may allow attackers to bypass password verification or might indicate that resources are protected by an empty password.null, attempts to read a stored value for the password, and compares it against a user-supplied value.
...
string storedPassword = null;
string temp;
if ((temp = ReadPassword(storedPassword)) != null) {
storedPassword = temp;
}
if(Utils.VerifyPassword(storedPassword, userPassword))
// Access protected resources
...
}
...
ReadPassword() fails to retrieve the stored password due to a database error or another problem, then an attacker could trivially bypass the password check by providing a null value for userPassword.null to password variables is never a good idea as it may allow attackers to bypass password verification or might indicate that resources are protected by an empty password.null, attempts to read a stored value for the password, and compares it against a user-supplied value.
...
char *stored_password = NULL;
readPassword(stored_password);
if(safe_strcmp(stored_password, user_password))
// Access protected resources
...
}
...
readPassword() fails to retrieve the stored password due to a database error or another problem, then an attacker could trivially bypass the password check by providing a null value for user_password.null to password variables is never a good idea as it might enable attackers to bypass password verification or it might indicate that resources are protected by an empty password.null to password variables is a bad idea because it can allow attackers to bypass password verification or might indicate that resources are protected by an empty password.null, attempts to read a stored value for the password, and compares it against a user-supplied value.
...
String storedPassword = null;
String temp;
if ((temp = readPassword()) != null) {
storedPassword = temp;
}
if(Utils.verifyPassword(userPassword, storedPassword))
// Access protected resources
...
}
...
readPassword() fails to retrieve the stored password due to a database error or another problem, then an attacker could trivially bypass the password check by providing a null value for userPassword.null, reads credentials from an Android WebView store if they have not been previously rejected by the server for the current request, and uses them to setup authentication for viewing protected pages.
...
webview.setWebViewClient(new WebViewClient() {
public void onReceivedHttpAuthRequest(WebView view,
HttpAuthHandler handler, String host, String realm) {
String username = null;
String password = null;
if (handler.useHttpAuthUsernamePassword()) {
String[] credentials = view.getHttpAuthUsernamePassword(host, realm);
username = credentials[0];
password = credentials[1];
}
handler.proceed(username, password);
}
});
...
Example 1, if useHttpAuthUsernamePassword() returns false, an attacker will be able to view protected pages by supplying a null password.null password.null:
...
var password=null;
...
{
password=getPassword(user_data);
...
}
...
if(password==null){
// Assumption that the get didn't work
...
}
...
null to password variables because it might enable attackers to bypass password verification or indicate that resources are not protected by a password.null password.
{
...
"password" : null
...
}
null password. Null passwords can compromise security.null to password variables is never a good idea as it may allow attackers to bypass password verification or might indicate that resources are protected by an empty password.null, attempts to read a stored value for the password, and compares it against a user-supplied value.
...
NSString *stored_password = NULL;
readPassword(stored_password);
if(safe_strcmp(stored_password, user_password)) {
// Access protected resources
...
}
...
readPassword() fails to retrieve the stored password due to a database error or another problem, then an attacker could trivially bypass the password check by providing a null value for user_password.null to password variables is never a good idea as it may allow attackers to bypass password verification or might indicate that resources are protected by an empty password.null, attempts to read a stored value for the password, and compares it against a user-supplied value.
<?php
...
$storedPassword = NULL;
if (($temp = getPassword()) != NULL) {
$storedPassword = $temp;
}
if(strcmp($storedPassword,$userPassword) == 0) {
// Access protected resources
...
}
...
?>
readPassword() fails to retrieve the stored password due to a database error or another problem, then an attacker could trivially bypass the password check by providing a null value for userPassword.null to password variables is never a good idea as it may allow attackers to bypass password verification or might indicate that resources are protected by an empty password.null.
DECLARE
password VARCHAR(20);
BEGIN
password := null;
END;
null to password variables is never a good idea as it may allow attackers to bypass password verification or might indicate that resources are protected by an empty password.null, attempts to read a stored value for the password, and compares it against a user-supplied value.
...
storedPassword = NULL;
temp = getPassword()
if (temp is not None) {
storedPassword = temp;
}
if(storedPassword == userPassword) {
// Access protected resources
...
}
...
getPassword() fails to retrieve the stored password due to a database error or another problem, then an attacker could trivially bypass the password check by providing a null value for userPassword.nil to password variables is never a good idea as it may allow attackers to bypass password verification or might indicate that resources are protected by an empty password.nil, attempts to read a stored value for the password, and compares it against a user-supplied value.
...
@storedPassword = nil
temp = readPassword()
storedPassword = temp unless temp.nil?
unless Utils.passwordVerified?(@userPassword, @storedPassword)
...
end
...
readPassword() fails to retrieve the stored password due to a database error or another problem, then an attacker could trivially bypass the password check by providing a null value for @userPassword.nil as a default value when none is specified. In this case you also need to make sure that the correct number of arguments are specified in order to make sure a password is passed to the function.null to password variables is a bad idea because it can allow attackers to bypass password verification or might indicate that resources are protected by an empty password.null, attempts to read a stored value for the password, and compares it against a user-supplied value.
...
ws.url(url).withAuth("john", null, WSAuthScheme.BASIC)
...
null password. Null passwords can compromise security.nil to password variables is never a good idea as it may allow attackers to bypass password verification or might indicate that resources are protected by an empty password.null, attempts to read a stored value for the password, and compares it against a user-supplied value.
...
var stored_password = nil
readPassword(stored_password)
if(stored_password == user_password) {
// Access protected resources
...
}
...
readPassword() fails to retrieve the stored password due to a database error or another problem, then an attacker could trivially bypass the password check by providing a null value for user_password.null to password variables is never a good idea as it may allow attackers to bypass password verification or might indicate that resources are protected by an empty password.null and uses it to connect to a database.
...
Dim storedPassword As String
Set storedPassword = vbNullString
Dim con As New ADODB.Connection
Dim cmd As New ADODB.Command
Dim rst As New ADODB.Recordset
con.ConnectionString = "Driver={Microsoft ODBC for Oracle};Server=OracleServer.world;Uid=scott;Passwd=" & storedPassword &";"
...
Example 1 succeeds, it indicates that the database user account "scott" is configured with an empty password, which an attacker can easily guess. After the program ships, updating the account to use a non-empty password will require a code change.
...
* Default username for FTP connection is "scott"
* Default password for FTP connection is "tiger"
...
...
// Default username for database connection is "scott"
// Default password for database connection is "tiger"
...
...
// Default username for database connection is "scott"
// Default password for database connection is "tiger"
...
...
// Default username for database connection is "scott"
// Default password for database connection is "tiger"
...
...
// Default username for database connection is "scott"
// Default password for database connection is "tiger"
...
...
* Default username for database connection is "scott"
* Default password for database connection is "tiger"
...
...
<!-- Default username for database connection is "scott" -->
<!-- Default password for database connection is "tiger" -->
...
...
// Default username for database connection is "scott"
// Default password for database connection is "tiger"
...
...
// Default username for database connection is "scott"
// Default password for database connection is "tiger"
...
...
// Default username for database connection is "scott"
// Default password for database connection is "tiger"
...
...
// Default username for database connection is "scott"
// Default password for database connection is "tiger"
...
...
-- Default username for database connection is "scott"
-- Default password for database connection is "tiger"
...
...
# Default username for database connection is "scott"
# Default password for database connection is "tiger"
...
...
#Default username for database connection is "scott"
#Default password for database connection is "tiger"
...
...
// Default username for database connection is "scott"
// Default password for database connection is "tiger"
...
...
'Default username for database connection is "scott"
'Default password for database connection is "tiger"
...
response.sendRedirect("j_security_check?j_username="+usr+"&j_password="+pass);
...
var fs:FileStream = new FileStream();
fs.open(new File("config.properties"), FileMode.READ);
var decoder:Base64Decoder = new Base64Decoder();
decoder.decode(fs.readMultiByte(fs.bytesAvailable, File.systemCharset));
var password:String = decoder.toByteArray().toString();
URLRequestDefaults.setLoginCredentialsForHost(hostname, usr, password);
...
config.properties can read the value of password and easily determine that the value has been base64 encoded. Any devious employee with access to this information can use it to break into the system.
...
string value = regKey.GetValue(passKey).ToString());
byte[] decVal = Convert.FromBase64String(value);
NetworkCredential netCred =
new NetworkCredential(username,decVal.toString(),domain);
...
password. Any devious employee with access to this information can use it to break into the system.
...
RegQueryValueEx(hkey, TEXT(.SQLPWD.), NULL,
NULL, (LPBYTE)password64, &size64);
Base64Decode(password64, size64, (BYTE*)password, &size);
rc = SQLConnect(*hdbc, server, SQL_NTS, uid,
SQL_NTS, password, SQL_NTS);
...
password64 and easily determine that the value has been base64 encoded. Any devious employee with access to this information can use it to break into the system.
...
01 RECORDX.
05 UID PIC X(10).
05 PASSWORD PIC X(10).
05 LEN PIC S9(4) COMP.
...
EXEC CICS
READ
FILE('CFG')
INTO(RECORDX)
RIDFLD(ACCTNO)
...
END-EXEC.
CALL "g_base64_decode_inplace" using
BY REFERENCE PASSWORD
BY REFERENCE LEN
ON EXCEPTION
DISPLAY "Requires GLib library" END-DISPLAY
END-CALL.
EXEC SQL
CONNECT :UID
IDENTIFIED BY :PASSWORD
END-EXEC.
...
CFG can read the value of password and easily determine that the value has been base64 encoded. Any devious employee with access to this information can use it to break into the system.
...
file, _ := os.Open("config.json")
decoder := json.NewDecoder(file)
decoder.Decode(&values)
password := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(values.Password)
request.SetBasicAuth(values.Username, password)
...
config.json can read the value of password and easily determine that the value has been base64 encoded. Any devious employee with access to this information can use it to break into the system.
...
Properties prop = new Properties();
prop.load(new FileInputStream("config.properties"));
String password = Base64.decode(prop.getProperty("password"));
DriverManager.getConnection(url, usr, password);
...
config.properties can read the value of password and easily determine that the value has been base64 encoded. Any devious employee with access to this information can use it to break into the system.
...
webview.setWebViewClient(new WebViewClient() {
public void onReceivedHttpAuthRequest(WebView view,
HttpAuthHandler handler, String host, String realm) {
String[] credentials = view.getHttpAuthUsernamePassword(host, realm);
String username = new String(Base64.decode(credentials[0], DEFAULT));
String password = new String(Base64.decode(credentials[1], DEFAULT));
handler.proceed(username, password);
}
});
...
...
obj = new XMLHttpRequest();
obj.open('GET','/fetchusers.jsp?id='+form.id.value,'true','scott','tiger');
...
plist file and uses it to unzip a password-protected file.
...
NSDictionary *dict= [NSDictionary dictionaryWithContentsOfFile:[[NSBundle mainBundle] pathForResource:@"Config" ofType:@"plist"]];
NSString *encoded_password = [dict valueForKey:@"encoded_password"];
NSData *decodedData = [[NSData alloc] initWithBase64EncodedString:encoded_password options:0];
NSString *decodedString = [[NSString alloc] initWithData:decodedData encoding:NSUTF8StringEncoding];
[SSZipArchive unzipFileAtPath:zipPath toDestination:destPath overwrite:TRUE password:decodedString error:&error];
...
Config.plist file can read the value of encoded_password and easily determine that the value has been base64 encoded.
...
$props = file('config.properties', FILE_IGNORE_NEW_LINES | FILE_SKIP_EMPTY_LINES);
$password = base64_decode($props[0]);
$link = mysql_connect($url, $usr, $password);
if (!$link) {
die('Could not connect: ' . mysql_error());
}
...
config.properties can read the value of password and easily determine that the value has been base64 encoded. Any devious employee with access to this information can use it to break into the system.
...
props = os.open('config.properties')
password = base64.b64decode(props[0])
link = MySQLdb.connect (host = "localhost",
user = "testuser",
passwd = password,
db = "test")
...
config.properties can read the value of password and easily determine that the value has been base64 encoded. Any devious employee with access to this information can use it to break into the system.
require 'pg'
require 'base64'
...
passwd = Base64.decode64(ENV['PASSWD64'])
...
conn = PG::Connection.new(:dbname => "myApp_production", :user => username, :password => passwd, :sslmode => 'require')
PASSWD64 and easily determine that the value has been base64 encoded. Any devious employee with access to this information can use it to break into the system.
...
val prop = new Properties();
prop.load(new FileInputStream("config.properties"));
val password = Base64.decode(prop.getProperty("password"));
DriverManager.getConnection(url, usr, password);
...
config.properties can read the value of password and easily determine that the value has been base64 encoded. Any devious employee with access to this information can use it to break into the system.plist file and uses it to unzip a password-protected file.
...
var myDict: NSDictionary?
if let path = NSBundle.mainBundle().pathForResource("Config", ofType: "plist") {
myDict = NSDictionary(contentsOfFile: path)
}
if let dict = myDict {
let password = base64decode(dict["encoded_password"])
zipArchive.unzipOpenFile(zipPath, password:password])
}
...
Config.plist file can read the value of encoded_password and easily determine that the value has been base64 encoded.
...
root:qFio7llfVKk.s:19033:0:99999:7:::
...
...
...
Private Declare Function GetPrivateProfileString _
Lib "kernel32" Alias "GetPrivateProfileStringA" _
(ByVal lpApplicationName As String, _
ByVal lpKeyName As Any, ByVal lpDefault As String, _
ByVal lpReturnedString As String, ByVal nSize As Long, _
ByVal lpFileName As String) As Long
...
Dim password As String
...
password = StrConv(DecodeBase64(GetPrivateProfileString("MyApp", "Password", _
"", value, Len(value), _
App.Path & "\" & "Config.ini")), vbUnicode)
...
con.ConnectionString = "Driver={Microsoft ODBC for Oracle};Server=OracleServer.world;Uid=scott;Passwd=" & password &";"
...
Config.ini can read the value of Password and easily determine that the value has been base64 encoded. Any devious employee with access to this information can use it to break into the system.
String password=request.getParameter("password");
...
DefaultUser user = (DefaultUser) ESAPI.authenticator().createUser(username, password, password);
...
*Get the report that is to be deleted
r_name = request->get_form_field( 'report_name' ).
CONCATENATE `C:\\users\\reports\\` r_name INTO dsn.
DELETE DATASET dsn.
...
..\\..\\usr\\sap\\DVEBMGS00\\exe\\disp+work.exe", the application will delete a critical file and immediately crash the SAP system.
...
PARAMETERS: p_date TYPE string.
*Get the invoice file for the date provided
CALL FUNCTION 'FILE_GET_NAME'
EXPORTING
logical_filename = 'INVOICE'
parameter_1 = p_date
IMPORTING
file_name = v_file
EXCEPTIONS
file_not_found = 1
OTHERS = 2.
IF sy-subrc <> 0.
* Implement suitable error handling here
ENDIF.
OPEN DATASET v_file FOR INPUT IN TEXT MODE.
DO.
READ DATASET v_file INTO v_record.
IF SY-SUBRC NE 0.
EXIT.
ELSE.
WRITE: / v_record.
ENDIF.
ENDDO.
...
..\\..\\usr\\sap\\sys\\profile\\default.pfl" instead of a valid date, the application will reveal all the default SAP application server profile parameter settings - possibly leading to more refined attacks.../../tomcat/conf/server.xml", which causes the application to delete one of its own configuration files.Example 2: The following code uses input from a configuration file to determine which file to open and write to a "Debug" console or a log file. If the program runs with adequate privileges and malicious users can change the configuration file, they can use the program to read any file on the system that ends with the extension
var params:Object = LoaderInfo(this.root.loaderInfo).parameters;
var rName:String = String(params["reportName"]);
var rFile:File = new File("/usr/local/apfr/reports/" + rName);
...
rFile.deleteFile();
.txt.
var fs:FileStream = new FileStream();
fs.open(new File(String(configStream.readObject())+".txt"), FileMode.READ);
fs.readBytes(arr);
trace(arr);
public class MyController {
...
public PageRerference loadRes() {
PageReference ref = ApexPages.currentPage();
Map<String,String> params = ref.getParameters();
if (params.containsKey('resName')) {
if (params.containsKey('resPath')) {
return PageReference.forResource(params.get('resName'), params.get('resPath'));
}
}
return null;
}
}
..\\..\\Windows\\System32\\krnl386.exe", which will cause the application to delete an important Windows system file.Example 2: The following code uses input from a configuration file to determine which file to open and echo back to the user. If the program runs with adequate privileges and malicious users can change the configuration file, they can use the program to read any file on the system that ends with the extension ".txt".
String rName = Request.Item("reportName");
...
File.delete("C:\\users\\reports\\" + rName);
sr = new StreamReader(resmngr.GetString("sub")+".txt");
while ((line = sr.ReadLine()) != null) {
Console.WriteLine(line);
}
../../apache/conf/httpd.conf", which will cause the application to delete the specified configuration file.Example 2: The following code uses input from the command line to determine which file to open and echo back to the user. If the program runs with adequate privileges and malicious users can create soft links to the file, they can use the program to read the first part of any file on the system.
char* rName = getenv("reportName");
...
unlink(rName);
ifstream ifs(argv[0]);
string s;
ifs >> s;
cout << s;
...
EXEC CICS
WEB READ
FORMFIELD(FILE)
VALUE(FILENAME)
...
END-EXEC.
EXEC CICS
READ
FILE(FILENAME)
INTO(RECORD)
RIDFLD(ACCTNO)
UPDATE
...
END-EXEC.
...
..\\..\\Windows\\System32\\krnl386.exe", which will cause the application to delete an important Windows system file.
<cffile action = "delete"
file = "C:\\users\\reports\\#Form.reportName#">
final server = await HttpServer.bind('localhost', 18081);
server.listen((request) async {
final headers = request.headers;
final path = headers.value('path');
File(path!).delete();
}
Example 1, there is no validation of headers.value('path') prior to performing delete functions on files.../../tomcat/conf/server.xml", which causes the application to delete one of its own configuration files.Example 2: The following code uses input from a configuration file to determine which file to open and echo back to the user. If the program runs with adequate privileges and malicious users can change the configuration file, they can use the program to read any file on the system that ends with the extension
rName := "/usr/local/apfr/reports/" + req.FormValue("fName")
rFile, err := os.OpenFile(rName, os.O_RDWR|os.O_CREATE, 0755)
defer os.Remove(rName);
defer rFile.Close()
...
.txt.
...
config := ReadConfigFile()
filename := config.fName + ".txt";
data, err := ioutil.ReadFile(filename)
...
fmt.Println(string(data))
../../tomcat/conf/server.xml", which causes the application to delete one of its own configuration files.Example 2: The following code uses input from a configuration file to determine which file to open and echo back to the user. If the program runs with adequate privileges and malicious users can change the configuration file, they can use the program to read any file on the system that ends with the extension
String rName = request.getParameter("reportName");
File rFile = new File("/usr/local/apfr/reports/" + rName);
...
rFile.delete();
.txt.
fis = new FileInputStream(cfg.getProperty("sub")+".txt");
amt = fis.read(arr);
out.println(arr);
Example 1 to the Android platform.
...
String rName = this.getIntent().getExtras().getString("reportName");
File rFile = getBaseContext().getFileStreamPath(rName);
...
rFile.delete();
...
../../tomcat/conf/server.xml", which causes the application to delete one of its own configuration files.Example 2: The following code uses input from the local storage to determine which file to open and echo back to the user. If malicious users can change the contents of the local storage, they can use the program to read any file on the system that ends with the extension
...
var reportNameParam = "reportName=";
var reportIndex = document.indexOf(reportNameParam);
if (reportIndex < 0) return;
var rName = document.URL.substring(reportIndex+reportNameParam.length);
window.requestFileSystem(window.TEMPORARY, 1024*1024, function(fs) {
fs.root.getFile('/usr/local/apfr/reports/' + rName, {create: false}, function(fileEntry) {
fileEntry.remove(function() {
console.log('File removed.');
}, errorHandler);
}, errorHandler);
}, errorHandler);
.txt.
...
var filename = localStorage.sub + '.txt';
function oninit(fs) {
fs.root.getFile(filename, {}, function(fileEntry) {
fileEntry.file(function(file) {
var reader = new FileReader();
reader.onloadend = function(e) {
var txtArea = document.createElement('textarea');
txtArea.value = this.result;
document.body.appendChild(txtArea);
};
reader.readAsText(file);
}, errorHandler);
}, errorHandler);
}
window.requestFileSystem(window.TEMPORARY, 1024*1024, oninit, errorHandler);
...
../../tomcat/conf/server.xml", which causes the application to delete one of its own configuration files.Example 2: The following code uses input from a configuration file to determine which file to open and echo back to the user. If the program runs with adequate privileges and malicious users can change the configuration file, they can use the program to read any file on the system that ends with the extension
val rName: String = request.getParameter("reportName")
val rFile = File("/usr/local/apfr/reports/$rName")
...
rFile.delete()
.txt.
fis = FileInputStream(cfg.getProperty("sub").toString() + ".txt")
amt = fis.read(arr)
out.println(arr)
Example 1 to the Android platform.
...
val rName: String = getIntent().getExtras().getString("reportName")
val rFile: File = getBaseContext().getFileStreamPath(rName)
...
rFile.delete()
...
- (NSData*) testFileManager {
NSString *rootfolder = @"/Documents/";
NSString *filePath = [rootfolder stringByAppendingString:[fileName text]];
NSFileManager *fm = [NSFileManager defaultManager];
return [fm contentsAtPath:filePath];
}
../../tomcat/conf/server.xml", which causes the application to delete one of its own configuration files.Example 2: The following code uses input from a configuration file to determine which file to open and echo back to the user. If the program runs with adequate privileges and malicious users can change the configuration file, they can use the program to read any file on the system that ends with the extension
$rName = $_GET['reportName'];
$rFile = fopen("/usr/local/apfr/reports/" . rName,"a+");
...
unlink($rFile);
.txt.
...
$filename = $CONFIG_TXT['sub'] . ".txt";
$handle = fopen($filename,"r");
$amt = fread($handle, filesize($filename));
echo $amt;
...
../../tomcat/conf/server.xml", which causes the application to delete one of its own configuration files.Example 2: The following code uses input from a configuration file to determine which file to open and echo back to the user. If the program runs with adequate privileges and malicious users can change the configuration file, they can use the program to read any file on the system that ends with the extension
rName = req.field('reportName')
rFile = os.open("/usr/local/apfr/reports/" + rName)
...
os.unlink(rFile);
.txt.
...
filename = CONFIG_TXT['sub'] + ".txt";
handle = os.open(filename)
print handle
...
../../tomcat/conf/server.xml", which causes the application to delete one of its own configuration files.Example 2: The following code uses input from a configuration file to determine which file to open and echo back to the user. If the program runs with adequate privileges and malicious users can change the configuration file, they can use the program to read any file on the system that ends with the extension
rName = req['reportName']
File.delete("/usr/local/apfr/reports/#{rName}")
.txt.
...
fis = File.new("#{cfg.getProperty("sub")}.txt")
amt = fis.read
puts amt
../../tomcat/conf/server.xml", which causes the application to delete one of its own configuration files.Example 2: The following code uses input from a configuration file to determine which file to open and echo back to the user. If the program runs with adequate privileges and malicious users can change the configuration file, they can use the program to read any file on the system that ends with the extension
def readFile(reportName: String) = Action { request =>
val rFile = new File("/usr/local/apfr/reports/" + reportName)
...
rFile.delete()
}
.txt.
val fis = new FileInputStream(cfg.getProperty("sub")+".txt")
val amt = fis.read(arr)
out.println(arr)
func testFileManager() -> NSData {
let filePath : String = "/Documents/\(fileName.text)"
let fm : NSFileManager = NSFileManager.defaultManager()
return fm.contentsAtPath(filePath)
}
..\conf\server.xml", which causes the application to delete one of its own configuration files.Example 2: The following code uses input from a configuration file to determine which file to open and echo back to the user. If the program runs with adequate privileges and malicious users can change the configuration file, they can use the program to read any file on the system that ends with the extension
Dim rName As String
Dim fso As New FileSystemObject
Dim rFile as File
Set rName = Request.Form("reportName")
Set rFile = fso.GetFile("C:\reports\" & rName)
...
fso.DeleteFile("C:\reports\" & rName)
...
.txt.
Dim fileName As String
Dim tsContent As String
Dim ts As TextStream
Dim fso As New FileSystemObject
fileName = GetPrivateProfileString("MyApp", "sub", _
"", value, Len(value), _
App.Path & "\" & "Config.ini")
...
Set ts = fso.OpenTextFile(fileName,1)
tsContent = ts.ReadAll
Response.Write tsContent
...
Path.Combine takes several file paths as arguments. It concatenates them to get a full path, which is typically followed by a call to read() or write() to that file. The documentation describes several different scenarios based on whether the first or remaining parameters are absolute paths. Given an absolute path for the second or remaining parameters, Path.Combine() will return that absolute path. The previous parameters will be ignored. The implications here are significant for applications that have code similar to the following example.
// Called with user-controlled data
public static bytes[] getFile(String filename)
{
String imageDir = "\\FILESHARE\images\";
filepath = Path.Combine(imageDir, filename);
return File.ReadAllBytes(filepath);
}
C:\\inetpub\wwwroot\web.config), an attacker could control which file gets returned by the application.space character ("%20"), an application might be forced into disclosing the source for any PHP file. null character ("%00") appended to a file name in the request URL."%2ejsp", "%2ejhtml")."#" character is used in the extension (e.g. ".#php")./WEB-INF/ have known to be bypassed by requesting /WEB-INF./."+" character is appended to the file extension in the request URL (e.g. "jsp+")."%" character in the file name could also result in the disclosure of file source.