@ControllerAdvice
public class JsonpAdvice extends AbstractJsonpResponseBodyAdvice {
public JsonpAdvice() {
super("callback");
}
}
GET /api/latest.json?callback=myCallbackFunction, the controller method will generate a response such as:
HTTP/1.1 200 Ok
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
Date: Tue, 12 Dec 2017 16:16:04 GMT
Server: nginx/1.12.1
Content-Length: 225
Connection: Close
myCallbackFunction({<json>})
Script tag to load the response from the JSONP endpoint, which will turn into the execution of the myCallbackFunction function. An attacker could use a different callback name to navigate and interact with the DOM. For example opener.document.body.someElemnt.firstChild.nextElementSibling.submit could be used to locate a form in the target page and submit it.
def myJSONPService(callback: String) = Action {
val json = getJSONToBeReturned()
Ok(Jsonp(callback, json))
}
GET /api/latest.json?callback=myCallbackFunction, the controller method described in Example 1 will generate a response such as:
HTTP/1.1 200 Ok
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
Date: Tue, 12 Dec 2017 16:16:04 GMT
Server: nginx/1.12.1
Content-Length: 225
Connection: Close
myCallbackFunction({<json>})
Script tag to load the response from the JSONP endpoint, which will turn into the execution of the myCallbackFunction function. An attacker could use a different callback name to navigate and interact with the DOM. For example opener.document.body.someElemnt.firstChild.nextElementSibling.submit could be used to locate a form in the target page and submit it.
...
PageReference ref = ApexPages.currentPage();
Map<String,String> params = ref.getParameters();
HttpRequest req = new HttpRequest();
req.setEndpoint(params.get('url'));
HTTPResponse res = new Http().send(req);
http or https such as:
string url = Request.Form["url"];
HttpClient client = new HttpClient();
HttpResponseMessage response = await client.GetAsync(url);
http or https like:
char *url = maliciousInput();
CURL *curl = curl_easy_init();
curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_URL, url);
CURLcode res = curl_easy_perform(curl);
http or https such as:
...
final server = await HttpServer.bind('localhost', 18081);
server.listen((request) async {
final headers = request.headers;
final url = headers.value('url');
final client = IOClient();
final response = await client.get(Uri.parse(url!));
...
}
http or https such as:
url := request.Form.Get("url")
res, err =: http.Get(url)
...
http or https like:
String url = request.getParameter("url");
CloseableHttpClient httpclient = HttpClients.createDefault();
HttpGet httpGet = new HttpGet(url);
CloseableHttpResponse response1 = httpclient.execute(httpGet);
http or https like:
var http = require('http');
var url = require('url');
function listener(request, response){
var request_url = url.parse(request.url, true)['query']['url'];
http.request(request_url)
...
}
...
http.createServer(listener).listen(8080);
...
http or https like:
val url: String = request.getParameter("url")
val httpclient: CloseableHttpClient = HttpClients.createDefault()
val httpGet = HttpGet(url)
val response1: CloseableHttpResponse = httpclient.execute(httpGet)
http or https like:
$url = $_GET['url'];
$c = curl_init();
curl_setopt($c, CURLOPT_POST, 0);
curl_setopt($c,CURLOPT_URL,$url);
$response=curl_exec($c);
curl_close($c);
http or https like:
url = request.GET['url']
handle = urllib.urlopen(url)
http or https like:
url = req['url']
Net::HTTP.get(url)
http or https like:
def getFile(url: String) = Action { request =>
...
val url = request.body.asText.getOrElse("http://google.com")
ws.url(url).get().map { response =>
Ok(s"Request sent to $url")
}
...
}
http or https like:Example 2: Few examples of how an attacker that has control over the
POST /checkDetails HTTP/1.1
url=https://example.com/product/1
url parameter can tamper the request in Example 1.
POST /checkDetails HTTP/1.1
url=https://localhost.com/admin
POST /checkDetails HTTP/1.1
url=file:///etc/passwd
http or https like:
...
sethostid(argv[1]);
...
sethostid(), unprivileged users may be able to invoke the program. The code in this example allows user input to directly control the value of a system setting. If an attacker provides a malicious value for host ID, the attacker may misidentify the affected machine on the network or cause other unintended behavior.
...
ACCEPT OPT1.
ACCEPT OPT2
COMPUTE OPTS = OPT1 + OPT2.
CALL 'MQOPEN' USING HCONN, OBJECTDESC, OPTS, HOBJ, COMPOCODE REASON.
...
...
<cfset code = SetProfileString(IniPath,
Section, "timeout", Form.newTimeout)>
...
Form.newTimeout is used to specify a timeout, an attacker may be able to mount a denial of service (DoS) attack against the application by specifying a sufficiently large number.
...
catalog := request.Form.Get("catalog")
path := request.Form.Get("path")
os.Setenv(catalog, path)
...
HttpServletRequest and sets it as the active catalog for a database Connection.
...
conn.setCatalog(request.getParamter("catalog"));
...
http.IncomingMessage request variable and uses it to set additional V8 commnd line flags.
var v8 = require('v8');
...
var flags = url.parse(request.url, true)['query']['flags'];
...
v8.setFlagsFromString(flags);
...
<?php
...
$table_name=$_GET['catalog'];
$retrieved_array = pg_copy_to($db_connection, $table_name);
...
?>
...
catalog = request.GET['catalog']
path = request.GET['path']
os.putenv(catalog, path)
...
Connection.
def connect(catalog: String) = Action { request =>
...
conn.setCatalog(catalog)
...
}
...
sqlite3(SQLITE_CONFIG_LOG, user_controllable);
...
Request object and sets it as the active catalog for a database Connection.
...
Dim conn As ADODB.Connection
Set conn = New ADODB.Connection
Dim rsTables As ADODB.Recordset
Dim Catalog As New ADOX.Catalog
Set Catalog.ActiveConnection = conn
Catalog.Create Request.Form("catalog")
...
...
v_account = request->get_form_field( 'account' ).
v_reference = request->get_form_field( 'ref_key' ).
CONCATENATE `user = '` sy-uname `'` INTO cl_where.
IF v_account IS NOT INITIAL.
CONCATENATE cl_where ` AND account = ` v_account INTO cl_where SEPARATED BY SPACE.
ENDIF.
IF v_reference IS NOT INITIAL.
CONCATENATE cl_where "AND ref_key = `" v_reference "`" INTO cl_where.
ENDIF.
SELECT *
FROM invoice_items
INTO CORRESPONDING FIELDS OF TABLE itab_items
WHERE (cl_where).
...
SELECT *
FROM invoice_items
INTO CORRESPONDING FIELDS OF TABLE itab_items
WHERE user = sy-uname
AND account = <account>
AND ref_key = <reference>.
"abc` OR MANDT NE `+" for v_reference and string '1000' for v_account, then the query becomes the following:
SELECT *
FROM invoice_items
INTO CORRESPONDING FIELDS OF TABLE itab_items
WHERE user = sy-uname
AND account = 1000
AND ref_key = `abc` OR MANDT NE `+`.
OR MANDT NE `+` condition causes the WHERE clause to always evaluate to true because the client field can never be equal to literal +, so query becomes logically equivalent to the much simpler query:
SELECT * FROM invoice_items
INTO CORRESPONDING FIELDS OF TABLE itab_items.
invoice_items table, regardless of the specified user.
PARAMETERS: p_street TYPE string,
p_city TYPE string.
Data: v_sql TYPE string,
stmt TYPE REF TO CL_SQL_STATEMENT.
v_sql = "UPDATE EMP_TABLE SET ".
"Update employee address. Build the update statement with changed details
IF street NE p_street.
CONCATENATE v_sql "STREET = `" p_street "`".
ENDIF.
IF city NE p_city.
CONCATENATE v_sql "CITY = `" p_city "`".
ENDIF.
l_upd = stmt->execute_update( v_sql ).
"ABC` SALARY = `1000000" for the parameter p_street, the application lets the database be updated with revised salary!
...
var params:Object = LoaderInfo(this.root.loaderInfo).parameters;
var username:String = String(params["username"]);
var itemName:String = String(params["itemName"]);
var query:String = "SELECT * FROM items WHERE owner = " + username + " AND itemname = " + itemName;
stmt.sqlConnection = conn;
stmt.text = query;
stmt.execute();
...
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = <userName>
AND itemname = <itemName>;
itemName does not contain a single-quote character. If an attacker with the user name wiley enters the string "name' OR 'a'='a" for itemName, then the query becomes the following:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name' OR 'a'='a';
OR 'a'='a' condition causes the where clause to always evaluate to true, so the query becomes logically equivalent to the much simpler query:
SELECT * FROM items;
items table, regardless of their specified owner.Example 1. If an attacker with the user name wiley enters the string "name'; DELETE FROM items; --" for itemName, then the query becomes the following two queries:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
--'
Example 1. If an attacker enters the string "name'); DELETE FROM items; SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a", the following three valid statements will be created:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a';
owner matches the user name of the currently-authenticated user.
...
string userName = ctx.getAuthenticatedUserName();
string query = "SELECT * FROM items WHERE owner = '"
+ userName + "' AND itemname = '"
+ ItemName.Text + "'";
sda = new SqlDataAdapter(query, conn);
DataTable dt = new DataTable();
sda.Fill(dt);
...
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = <userName>
AND itemname = <itemName>;
itemName does not contain a single-quote character. If an attacker with the user name wiley enters the string "name' OR 'a'='a" for itemName, then the query becomes the following:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name' OR 'a'='a';
OR 'a'='a' condition causes the where clause to always evaluate to true, so the query becomes logically equivalent to the much simpler query:
SELECT * FROM items;
items table, regardless of their specified owner.Example 1. If an attacker with the user name wiley enters the string "name'); DELETE FROM items; --" for itemName, then the query becomes the following two queries:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
--'
Example 1. If an attacker enters the string "name'); DELETE FROM items; SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a", the following three valid statements will be created:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a';
Example 2:Alternatively, a similar result could be obtained with SQLite using the following code:
...
ctx.getAuthUserName(&userName); {
CString query = "SELECT * FROM items WHERE owner = '"
+ userName + "' AND itemname = '"
+ request.Lookup("item") + "'";
dbms.ExecuteSQL(query);
...
...
sprintf (sql, "SELECT * FROM items WHERE owner='%s' AND itemname='%s'", username, request.Lookup("item"));
printf("SQL to execute is: \n\t\t %s\n", sql);
rc = sqlite3_exec(db,sql, NULL,0, &err);
...
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = <userName>
AND itemname = <itemName>;
itemName does not contain a single-quote character. If an attacker with the user name wiley enters the string "name' OR 'a'='a" for itemName, then the query becomes the following:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name' OR 'a'='a';
OR 'a'='a' condition causes the where clause to always evaluate to true, so the query becomes logically equivalent to the much simpler query:
SELECT * FROM items;
items table, regardless of their specified owner.Example 1. If an attacker with the user name wiley enters the string "name'); DELETE FROM items; --" for itemName, then the query becomes the following two queries:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
--'
Example 1. If an attacker enters the string "name'); DELETE FROM items; SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a", the following three valid statements will be created:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a';
...
ACCEPT USER.
ACCEPT ITM.
MOVE "SELECT * FROM items WHERE owner = '" TO QUERY1.
MOVE "' AND itemname = '" TO QUERY2.
MOVE "'" TO QUERY3.
STRING
QUERY1, USER, QUERY2, ITM, QUERY3 DELIMITED BY SIZE
INTO QUERY
END-STRING.
EXEC SQL
EXECUTE IMMEDIATE :QUERY
END-EXEC.
...
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = <userName>
AND itemname = <itemName>;
itemName does not contain a single-quote character. If an attacker with the user name wiley enters the string "name' OR 'a'='a" for itm, then the query becomes the following:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name' OR 'a'='a';
OR 'a'='a' condition causes the where clause to always evaluate to true, so query becomes logically equivalent to the much simpler query:
SELECT * FROM items;
items table, regardless of their specified owner.Example 1. If an attacker with the user name wiley enters the string "name'; DELETE FROM items; --" for itemName, then the query becomes the following two queries:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
--'
Example 1. If an attacker enters the string "name'); DELETE FROM items; SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a", the following three valid statements will be created:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a';
...
<cfquery name="matchingItems" datasource="cfsnippets">
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner='#Form.userName#'
AND itemId=#Form.ID#
</cfquery>
...
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = <userName>
AND itemId = <ID>;
Form.ID does not contain a single-quote character. If an attacker with the user name wiley enters the string "name' OR 'a'='a" for Form.ID, then the query becomes the following:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemId = 'name' OR 'a'='a';
OR 'a'='a' condition causes the where clause to always evaluate to true, so the query becomes logically equivalent to the much simpler query:
SELECT * FROM items;
items table, regardless of their specified owner.Example 1. If an attacker with the user name hacker enters the string "hacker'); DELETE FROM items; --" for Form.ID, then the query becomes the following two queries:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'hacker'
AND itemId = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
--'
Example 1. If an attacker enters the string "name'); DELETE FROM items; SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a", the following three valid statements will be created:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'hacker'
AND itemId = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a';
...
final server = await HttpServer.bind('localhost', 18081);
server.listen((request) async {
final headers = request.headers;
final userName = headers.value('userName');
final itemName = headers.value('itemName');
final query = "SELECT * FROM items WHERE owner = '"
+ userName! + "' AND itemname = '"
+ itemName! + "'";
db.query(query);
}
...
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = <userName>
AND itemname = <itemName>;
itemName does not contain a single-quote character. If an attacker with the user name wiley enters the string "name' OR 'a'='a" for itemName, then the query becomes the following:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name' OR 'a'='a';
OR 'a'='a' condition causes the where clause to always evaluate to true, so the query becomes logically equivalent to the much simpler query:
SELECT * FROM items;
items table, regardless of their specified owner.Example 1. If an attacker with the user name wiley enters the string "name'; DELETE FROM items; --" for itemName, then the query becomes the following two queries:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
--'
Example 1. If an attacker enters the string "name'); DELETE FROM items; SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a", the following three valid statements will be created:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a';
...
rawQuery := request.URL.Query()
username := rawQuery.Get("userName")
itemName := rawQuery.Get("itemName")
query := "SELECT * FROM items WHERE owner = " + username + " AND itemname = " + itemName + ";"
db.Exec(query)
...
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = <userName>
AND itemname = <itemName>;
itemName does not contain a single-quote character. If an attacker with the user name wiley enters the string "name' OR 'a'='a" for itemName, then the query becomes the following:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name' OR 'a'='a';
OR 'a'='a' condition causes the where clause to always evaluate to true, so the query becomes logically equivalent to the much simpler query:
SELECT * FROM items;
items table, regardless of their specified owner.Example 1. If an attacker with the user name wiley enters the string "name'; DELETE FROM items; --" for itemName, then the query becomes the following two queries:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
--'
Example 1. If an attacker enters the string "name'; DELETE FROM items; SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a", the following three valid statements are created:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a';
...
String userName = ctx.getAuthenticatedUserName();
String itemName = request.getParameter("itemName");
String query = "SELECT * FROM items WHERE owner = '"
+ userName + "' AND itemname = '"
+ itemName + "'";
ResultSet rs = stmt.execute(query);
...
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = <userName>
AND itemname = <itemName>;
itemName does not contain a single-quote character. If an attacker with the user name wiley enters the string "name' OR 'a'='a" for itemName, then the query becomes the following:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name' OR 'a'='a';
OR 'a'='a' condition causes the where clause to always evaluate to true, so the query becomes logically equivalent to the much simpler query:
SELECT * FROM items;
items table, regardless of their specified owner.Example 1. If an attacker with the user name wiley enters the string "name'; DELETE FROM items; --" for itemName, then the query becomes the following two queries:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
--'
Example 1. If an attacker enters the string "name'); DELETE FROM items; SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a", the following three valid statements will be created:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a';
Example 1 to the Android platform.
...
PasswordAuthentication pa = authenticator.getPasswordAuthentication();
String userName = pa.getUserName();
String itemName = this.getIntent().getExtras().getString("itemName");
String query = "SELECT * FROM items WHERE owner = '"
+ userName + "' AND itemname = '"
+ itemName + "'";
SQLiteDatabase db = this.openOrCreateDatabase("DB", MODE_PRIVATE, null);
Cursor c = db.rawQuery(query, null);
...
...
var username = document.form.username.value;
var itemName = document.form.itemName.value;
var query = "SELECT * FROM items WHERE owner = " + username + " AND itemname = " + itemName + ";";
db.transaction(function (tx) {
tx.executeSql(query);
}
)
...
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = <userName>
AND itemname = <itemName>;
itemName does not contain a single-quote character. If an attacker with the user name wiley enters the string "name' OR 'a'='a" for itemName, then the query becomes the following:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name' OR 'a'='a';
OR 'a'='a' condition causes the where clause to always evaluate to true, so the query becomes logically equivalent to the much simpler query:
SELECT * FROM items;
items table, regardless of their specified owner.Example 1. If an attacker with the user name wiley enters the string "name'; DELETE FROM items; --" for itemName, then the query becomes the following two queries:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
--'
Example 1. If an attacker enters the string "name'); DELETE FROM items; SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a", the following three valid statements will be created:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a';
...
$userName = $_SESSION['userName'];
$itemName = $_POST['itemName'];
$query = "SELECT * FROM items WHERE owner = '$userName' AND itemname = '$itemName';";
$result = mysql_query($query);
...
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = <userName>
AND itemname = <itemName>;
itemName does not contain a single-quote character. If an attacker with the user name wiley enters the string "name' OR 'a'='a" for itemName, then the query becomes the following:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name' OR 'a'='a';
OR 'a'='a' condition causes the where clause to always evaluate to true, so the query becomes logically equivalent to the much simpler query:
SELECT * FROM items;
items table, regardless of their specified owner.Example 1. If an attacker with the user name wiley enters the string "name'; DELETE FROM items; --" for itemName, then the query becomes the following two queries:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
--'
Example 1. If an attacker enters the string "name'); DELETE FROM items; SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a", the following three valid statements will be created:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a';
procedure get_item (
itm_cv IN OUT ItmCurTyp,
usr in varchar2,
itm in varchar2)
is
open itm_cv for ' SELECT * FROM items WHERE ' ||
'owner = '''|| usr || '''' ||
' AND itemname = ''' || itm || '''';
end get_item;
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = <userName>
AND itemname = <itemName>;
itemName does not contain a single-quote character. If an attacker with the user name wiley enters the string "name' OR 'a'='a" for itm, then the query becomes the following:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name' OR 'a'='a';
OR 'a'='a' condition causes the where clause to always evaluate to true, so query becomes logically equivalent to the much simpler query:
SELECT * FROM items;
items table, regardless of their specified owner.Example 1. If an attacker with the user name wiley enters the string "name'; DELETE FROM items; --" for itemName, then the query becomes the following two queries:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
--'
Example 1. If an attacker enters the string "name'); DELETE FROM items; SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a", the following three valid statements will be created:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a';
...
userName = req.field('userName')
itemName = req.field('itemName')
query = "SELECT * FROM items WHERE owner = ' " + userName +" ' AND itemname = ' " + itemName +"';"
cursor.execute(query)
result = cursor.fetchall()
...
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = <userName>
AND itemname = <itemName>;
itemName does not contain a single-quote character. If an attacker with the user name wiley enters the string "name' OR 'a'='a" for itemName, then the query becomes the following:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name' OR 'a'='a';
OR 'a'='a' condition causes the where clause to always evaluate to true, so the query becomes logically equivalent to the much simpler query:
SELECT * FROM items;
items table, regardless of their specified owner.Example 1. If an attacker with the user name wiley enters the string "name'; DELETE FROM items; --" for itemName, then the query becomes the following two queries:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
--'
Example 1. If an attacker enters the string "name'); DELETE FROM items; SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a", the following three valid statements will be created:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a';
...
userName = getAuthenticatedUserName()
itemName = params[:itemName]
sqlQuery = "SELECT * FROM items WHERE owner = '#{userName}' AND itemname = '#{itemName}'"
rs = conn.query(sqlQuery)
...
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = <userName>
AND itemname = <itemName>;
itemName does not contain a single-quote character. If an attacker with the user name wiley enters the string "name' OR 'a'='a" for itemName, then the query becomes the following:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name' OR 'a'='a';
OR 'a'='a' condition causes the where clause to always evaluate to true, so the query becomes logically equivalent to the much simpler query:
SELECT * FROM items;
items table, regardless of their specified owner.
...
id = params[:id]
itemName = Mysql.escape_string(params[:itemName])
sqlQuery = "SELECT * FROM items WHERE id = #{userName} AND itemname = '#{itemName}'"
rs = conn.query(sqlQuery)
...
SELECT * FROM items WHERE id=<id> AND itemname = <itemName>;
itemName and seemingly prevented the SQL injection vulnerability. However as Ruby is not a statically typed language, even though we are expecting id to be an integer of some variety, as this is assigned from user input it won't necessarily be a number. If an attacker can instead change the value of id to 1 OR id!=1--, since there is no check that id is in fact numeric, the SQL query now becomes:
SELECT * FROM items WHERE id=1 OR id!=1-- AND itemname = 'anyValue';
SELECT * FROM items WHERE id=1 OR id!=1;
id is equal to 1 or not, which of course equates to everything within the table.
def doSQLQuery(value:String) = Action.async { implicit request =>
val result: Future[Seq[User]] = db.run {
sql"select * from users where name = '#$value'".as[User]
}
...
}
SELECT * FROM users
WHERE name = <userName>
userName does not contain a single-quote character. If an attacker with the user name wiley enters the string "name' OR 'a'='a" for userName, then the query becomes the following:
SELECT * FROM users
WHERE name = 'name' OR 'a'='a';
OR 'a'='a' condition causes the where clause to always evaluate to true, so the query becomes logically equivalent to the much simpler query:
SELECT * FROM users;
users table, regardless of their specified user.owner matches the user name of the currently-authenticated user.
...
let queryStatementString = "SELECT * FROM items WHERE owner='\(username)' AND itemname='\(item)'"
var queryStatement: OpaquePointer? = nil
if sqlite3_prepare_v2(db, queryStatementString, -1, &queryStatement, nil) == SQLITE_OK {
if sqlite3_step(queryStatement) == SQLITE_ROW {
...
}
}
...
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = '<userName>'
AND itemname = '<itemName>'
itemName does not contain a single-quote character. If an attacker with the user name wiley enters the string "name' OR 'a'='a" for itemName, then the query becomes the following:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name' OR 'a'='a';
OR 'a'='a' condition causes the where clause to always evaluate to true, so the query becomes logically equivalent to the much simpler query:
SELECT * FROM items;
items table, regardless of their specified owner.Example 1. If an attacker with the user name wiley enters the string "name'); DELETE FROM items; --" for itemName, then the query becomes the following two queries:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
--'
Example 1. If an attacker enters the string "name'); DELETE FROM items; SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a", the following three valid statements will be created:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a';
...
username = Session("username")
itemName = Request.Form("itemName")
strSQL = "SELECT * FROM items WHERE owner = '"& userName &"' AND itemname = '" & itemName &"'"
objRecordSet.Open strSQL, strConnect, adOpenDynamic, adLockOptimistic, adCmdText
...
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = <userName>
AND itemname = <itemName>;
itemName does not contain a single-quote character. If an attacker with the user name wiley enters the string "name' OR 'a'='a" for itemName, then the query becomes the following:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name' OR 'a'='a';
OR 'a'='a' condition causes the where clause to always evaluate to true, so the query becomes logically equivalent to the much simpler query:
SELECT * FROM items;
items table, regardless of their specified owner.Example 1. If an attacker with the user name wiley enters the string "name'; DELETE FROM items; --" for itemName, then the query becomes the following two queries:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
--'
Example 1. If an attacker enters the string "name'); DELETE FROM items; SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a", the following three valid statements will be created:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a';
...
CALL FUNCTION 'FTP_VERSION'
...
IMPORTING
EXEPATH = p
VERSION = v
WORKING_DIR = dir
RFCPATH = rfcp
RFCVERSION = rfcv
TABLES
FTP_TRACE = FTP_TRACE.
WRITE: 'exepath: ', p, 'version: ', v, 'working_dir: ', dir, 'rfcpath: ', rfcp, 'rfcversion: ', rfcv.
...
try {
...
}
catch(e:Error) {
trace(e.getStackTrace());
}
Example 1, the search path could imply information about the type of operating system, the applications installed on the system, and the amount of care that the administrators have put into configuring the program.<apex:messages/> element of a Visualforce page:
try {
...
} catch (Exception e) {
ApexPages.Message msg = new ApexPages.Message(ApexPages.Severity.FATAL, e.getMessage());
ApexPages.addMessage(msg);
}
try
{
...
}
catch (Exception e)
{
Response.Write(e.ToString());
}
Example 1, the leaked information could imply information about the type of operating system, the applications installed on the system, and the amount of care that the administrators have put into configuring the program.
int sockfd;
int flags;
char hostname[1024];
hostname[1023] = '\0';
gethostname(hostname, 1023);
...
sockfd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
flags = 0;
send(sockfd, hostname, strlen(hostname), flags);
Example 1, the search path could imply information about the type of operating system, the applications installed on the system, and the amount of care that the administrators have put into configuring the program.SQLCODE and the error message SQlERRMC associated with the SQL command that caused the error to the terminal.
...
EXEC SQL
WHENEVER SQLERROR
PERFORM DEBUG-ERR
SQL-EXEC.
...
DEBUG-ERR.
DISPLAY "Error code is: " SQLCODE.
DISPLAY "Error message is: " SQLERRMC.
...
Example 1, a database error message can reveal that the application is vulnerable to a SQL injection attack. Other error messages can reveal more oblique clues about the system.
<cfcatch type="Any">
<cfset exception=getException(myObj)>
<cfset message=exception.toString()>
<cfoutput>
Exception message: #message#
</cfoutput>
</cfcatch>
func handler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
host, err := os.Hostname()
...
fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s is busy, please try again later.", host)
}
Example 1, the leaked information could imply information about the type of operating system, the applications installed on the system, and the amount of care that the administrators have put into configuring the program.
server.error.include-stacktrace=always
Example 1, the leaked information could imply information about the type of operating system, the applications installed on the system, and the amount of care that the administrators have put into configuring the program.
...
dirReader.readEntries(function(results){
...
}, function(error){
$("#myTextArea").val('There was a problem: ' + error);
});
...
Example 1, the leaked information could imply information about the type of operating system, the applications installed on the system, and the amount of care that the administrators have put into configuring the program.
protected fun doPost(req: HttpServletRequest, res: HttpServletResponse) {
...
val out: PrintWriter = res.getWriter()
try {
...
} catch (e: Exception) {
out.println(e.message)
}
}
Example 1, the leaked information could imply information about the type of operating system, the applications installed on the system, and the amount of care that the administrators have put into configuring the program.
...
try {
...
} catch (e: Exception) {
val exception = Log.getStackTraceString(e)
val intent = Intent()
intent.action = "SEND_EXCEPTION"
intent.putExtra("exception", exception)
view.context.sendBroadcast(intent)
}
...
...
companion object {
const val TAG = "NfcActivity"
private const val DATA_SPLITTER = "__:DATA:__"
private const val MIME_TYPE = "application/my.applications.mimetype"
}
...
val tm = Context.getSystemService(Context.TELEPHONY_SERVICE) as TelephonyManager
val VERSION = tm.getDeviceSoftwareVersion();
...
val nfcAdapter = NfcAdapter.getDefaultAdapter(this)
val text: String = "$TAG$DATA_SPLITTER$VERSION"
val record = NdefRecord(NdefRecord.TNF_MIME_MEDIA, MIME_TYPE.getBytes(), ByteArray(0), text.toByteArray())
val records = arrayOf(record)
val msg = NdefMessage(records)
nfcAdapter.setNdefPushMessage(msg, this)
...
NSString *deviceName = [[UIDevice currentDevice] name];
NSString *baseUrl = @"http://myserver.com/?dev=";
NSString *urlString = [baseUrl stringByAppendingString:deviceName];
NSURL *url = [NSURL URLWithString:urlString];
NSURLRequest* request = [NSURLRequest requestWithURL:url cachePolicy:NSURLRequestUseProtocolCachePolicy timeoutInterval:60.0];
NSError *err = nil;
NSURLResponse* response = nil;
NSData *data = [NSURLConnection sendSynchronousRequest:request returningResponse:&response error:&err];
<?php
...
echo "Server error! Printing the backtrace";
debug_print_backtrace();
...
?>
Example 1, the leaked information could imply information about the type of operating system, the applications installed on the system, and the amount of care that the administrators have put into configuring the program.PATH_INFO and SCRIPT_NAME to the page.
...
HTP.htmlOpen;
HTP.headOpen;
HTP.title ('Environment Information');
HTP.headClose;
HTP.bodyOpen;
HTP.br;
HTP.print('Path Information: ' ||
OWA_UTIL.get_cgi_env('PATH_INFO') || '');
HTP.print('Script Name: ' ||
OWA_UTIL.get_cgi_env('SCRIPT_NAME') || '');
HTP.br;
HTP.bodyClose;
HTP.htmlClose;
...
}
Example 1, the search path could imply information about the type of operating system, the applications installed on the system, and the amount of care that the administrators have put into configuring the program.
...
import cgi
cgi.print_environ()
...
Example 1, the leaked information could imply information about the type of operating system, the applications installed on the system, and the amount of care that the administrators have put into configuring the program.
response = Rack::Response.new
...
stacktrace = caller # Kernel#caller returns an array of the execution stack
...
response.finish do |res|
res.write "There was a problem: #{stacktrace}"
end
Example 1, the search path could imply information about the type of operating system, the applications installed on the system, and the amount of care that the administrators have put into configuring the program.
def doSomething() = Action { request =>
...
Ok(Html(Properties.osName)) as HTML
}
Example 1, the leaked information could imply information about the type of operating system, the applications installed on the system, and the amount of care that the administrators have put into configuring the program.
let deviceName = UIDevice.currentDevice().name
let urlString : String = "http://myserver.com/?dev=\(deviceName)"
let url : NSURL = NSURL(string:urlString)
let request : NSURLRequest = NSURLRequest(URL:url)
var err : NSError?
var response : NSURLResponse?
var data : NSData = NSURLConnection.sendSynchronousRequest(request, returningResponse: &response, error:&err)
Response output stream:
...
If Err.number <>0 then
Response.Write "An Error Has Occurred on this page!<BR>"
Response.Write "The Error Number is: " & Err.number & "<BR>"
Response.Write "The Description given is: " & Err.Description & "<BR>"
End If
...
Example 1, the leaked information could imply information about the type of operating system, the applications installed on the system, and the amount of care that the administrators have put into configuring the program.
...
CALL FUNCTION 'FTP_VERSION'
...
IMPORTING
EXEPATH = p
VERSION = v
WORKING_DIR = dir
RFCPATH = rfcp
RFCVERSION = rfcv
TABLES
FTP_TRACE = FTP_TRACE.
WRITE: 'exepath: ', p, 'version: ', v, 'working_dir: ', dir, 'rfcpath: ', rfcp, 'rfcversion: ', rfcv.
...
try {
...
}
catch(e:Error) {
trace(e.getStackTrace());
}
Example 1, the search path could imply information about the type of operating system, the applications installed on the system, and the amount of care that the administrators have put into configuring the program.
try {
...
} catch (Exception e) {
System.Debug(LoggingLevel.ERROR, e.getMessage());
}
string cs="database=northwind;server=mySQLServer...";
SqlConnection conn=new SqlConnection(cs);
...
Console.Writeline(cs);
Example 1, the leaked information could imply information about the type of operating system, the applications installed on the system, and the amount of care that the administrators have put into configuring the program.
char* path = getenv("PATH");
...
fprintf(stderr, "cannot find exe on path %s\n", path);
Example 1, the search path could imply information about the type of operating system, the applications installed on the system, and the amount of care that the administrators have put into configuring the program.
...
EXEC CICS DUMP TRANSACTION
DUMPCODE('name')
FROM (data-area)
LENGTH (data-value)
END-EXEC.
...
<cfscript>
try {
obj = CreateObject("person");
}
catch(any excpt) {
f = FileOpen("c:\log.txt", "write");
FileWriteLine(f, "#excpt.Message#");
FileClose(f);
}
</cfscript>
final file = await File('example.txt').create();
final raf = await file.open(mode: FileMode.write);
final data = String.fromEnvironment("PASSWORD");
raf.writeString(data);
Example 1, the leaked information could imply information about the type of operating system, the applications installed on the system, and the amount of care that the administrators have put into configuring the program.
path := os.Getenv("PATH")
...
log.Printf("Cannot find exe on path %s\n", path)
Example 1, the search path could imply information about the type of operating system, the applications installed on the system, and the amount of care that the administrators have put into configuring the program.
protected void doPost (HttpServletRequest req, HttpServletResponse res) throws IOException {
...
PrintWriter out = res.getWriter();
try {
...
} catch (Exception e) {
out.println(e.getMessage());
}
}
Example 1, the leaked information could imply information about the type of operating system, the applications installed on the system, and the amount of care that the administrators have put into configuring the program.
...
try {
...
} catch (Exception e) {
String exception = Log.getStackTraceString(e);
Intent i = new Intent();
i.setAction("SEND_EXCEPTION");
i.putExtra("exception", exception);
view.getContext().sendBroadcast(i);
}
...
...
public static final String TAG = "NfcActivity";
private static final String DATA_SPLITTER = "__:DATA:__";
private static final String MIME_TYPE = "application/my.applications.mimetype";
...
TelephonyManager tm = (TelephonyManager)Context.getSystemService(Context.TELEPHONY_SERVICE);
String VERSION = tm.getDeviceSoftwareVersion();
...
NfcAdapter nfcAdapter = NfcAdapter.getDefaultAdapter(this);
if (nfcAdapter == null)
return;
String text = TAG + DATA_SPLITTER + VERSION;
NdefRecord record = new NdefRecord(NdefRecord.TNF_MIME_MEDIA,
MIME_TYPE.getBytes(), new byte[0], text.getBytes());
NdefRecord[] records = { record };
NdefMessage msg = new NdefMessage(records);
nfcAdapter.setNdefPushMessage(msg, this);
...
var http = require('http');
...
http.request(options, function(res){
...
}).on('error', function(e){
console.log('There was a problem with the request: ' + e);
});
...
Example 1, the leaked information could imply information about the type of operating system, the applications installed on the system, and the amount of care that the administrators have put into configuring the program.
try {
...
} catch (e: Exception) {
e.printStackTrace()
}
Example 1, the leaked information could imply information about the type of operating system, the applications installed on the system, and the amount of care that the administrators have put into configuring the program.
...
try {
...
} catch (e: Exception) {
Log.e(TAG, Log.getStackTraceString(e))
}
...
...
NSString* deviceID = [[UIDevice currentDevice] name];
NSLog(@"DeviceID: %@", deviceID);
...
deviceID entry to the list of user defaults, and stores them immediately to a plist file.
...
NSString* deviceID = [[UIDevice currentDevice] name];
[defaults setObject:deviceID forKey:@"deviceID"];
[defaults synchronize];
...
Example 2 stores system information from the mobile device in an unprotected plist file stored on the device. Although many developers trust plist files as a safe storage location for any and all data, it should not be trusted implicitly particularly when system information and privacy are a concern, since plist files could be read by anyone in possession of the device.
<?php
...
echo "Server error! Printing the backtrace";
debug_print_backtrace();
...
?>
Example 1, the leaked information could imply information about the type of operating system, the applications installed on the system, and the amount of care that the administrators have put into configuring the program.
try:
...
except:
print(sys.exc_info()[2])
Example 1, the leaked information could imply information about the type of operating system, the applications installed on the system, and the amount of care that the administrators have put into configuring the program.
...
begin
log = Logger.new(STDERR)
...
rescue Exception
log.info("Exception: " + $!)
...
end
Example 1, the leaked information could imply information about the type of operating system, the applications installed on the system, and the amount of care that the administrators have put into configuring the program. Of course, another problem with Example 1 is rescuing the root Exception instead of a specific type or error/exception, meaning it will catch all exceptions, potentially causing other unconsidered side effects.
...
println(Properties.osName)
...
Example 1, the leaked information could imply information about the type of operating system, the applications installed on the system, and the amount of care that the administrators have put into configuring the program.
let deviceName = UIDevice.currentDevice().name
...
NSLog("Device Identifier: %@", deviceName)
ASPError object to a script debugger, such as the Microsoft Script Debugger:
...
Debug.Write Server.GetLastError()
...
Finalize() method for StreamReader eventually calls Close(), but there is no guarantee as to how long it will take before the Finalize() method is invoked. In fact, there is no guarantee that Finalize() will ever be invoked. In a busy environment, this can result in the VM using up all of its available file handles.
private void processFile(string fName) {
StreamWriter sw = new StreamWriter(fName);
string line;
while ((line = sr.ReadLine()) != null)
processLine(line);
}
finalize() method for FileInputStream eventually calls close(), but there is no guarantee as to how long it will take before the finalize() method will be invoked. In a busy environment, this can result in the JVM using up all of its file handles.
private void processFile(String fName) throws FileNotFoundException, IOException {
FileInputStream fis = new FileInputStream(fName);
int sz;
byte[] byteArray = new byte[BLOCK_SIZE];
while ((sz = fis.read(byteArray)) != -1) {
processBytes(byteArray, sz);
}
}
...
CFIndex numBytes;
do {
UInt8 buf[bufferSize];
numBytes = CFReadStreamRead(readStream, buf, sizeof(buf));
if( numBytes > 0 ) {
handleBytes(buf, numBytes);
} else if( numBytes < 0 ) {
CFStreamError error = CFReadStreamGetError(readStream);
reportError(error);
}
} while( numBytes > 0 );
...
def readFile(filename: String): Unit = {
val data = Source.fromFile(fileName).getLines.mkString
// Use the data
}
...
func leak(reading input: InputStream) {
input.open()
let bufferSize = 1024
let buffer = UnsafeMutablePointer<UInt8>.allocate(capacity: bufferSize)
while input.hasBytesAvailable {
let read = input.read(buffer, maxLength: bufferSize)
}
buffer.deallocate(capacity: bufferSize)
}
...