@ControllerAdvice
public class JsonpAdvice extends AbstractJsonpResponseBodyAdvice {
public JsonpAdvice() {
super("callback");
}
}
GET /api/latest.json?callback=myCallbackFunction
等请求,控制器方法将生成如下响应:
HTTP/1.1 200 Ok
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
Date: Tue, 12 Dec 2017 16:16:04 GMT
Server: nginx/1.12.1
Content-Length: 225
Connection: Close
myCallbackFunction({<json>})
Script
标记从 JSONP 端点加载该响应,从而转变为执行 myCallbackFunction
函数。 攻击者可以使用其他回调名称导航 DOM 并与其交互。 例如,opener.document.body.someElemnt.firstChild.nextElementSibling.submit
可用于查找目标页面中的表格并进行提交。
def myJSONPService(callback: String) = Action {
val json = getJSONToBeReturned()
Ok(Jsonp(callback, json))
}
GET /api/latest.json?callback=myCallbackFunction
等请求,Example 1
中所述的控制器方法将生成如下响应:
HTTP/1.1 200 Ok
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
Date: Tue, 12 Dec 2017 16:16:04 GMT
Server: nginx/1.12.1
Content-Length: 225
Connection: Close
myCallbackFunction({<json>})
Script
标记从 JSONP 端点加载该响应,从而转变为执行 myCallbackFunction
函数。 攻击者可以使用其他回调名称导航 DOM 并与其交互。 例如,opener.document.body.someElemnt.firstChild.nextElementSibling.submit
可用于查找目标页面中的表格并进行提交。
...
PageReference ref = ApexPages.currentPage();
Map<String,String> params = ref.getParameters();
HttpRequest req = new HttpRequest();
req.setEndpoint(params.get('url'));
HTTPResponse res = new Http().send(req);
http
或 https
的协议,类似于下面这样:
string url = Request.Form["url"];
HttpClient client = new HttpClient();
HttpResponseMessage response = await client.GetAsync(url);
http
或 https
的协议,类似于下面这样:
char *url = maliciousInput();
CURL *curl = curl_easy_init();
curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_URL, url);
CURLcode res = curl_easy_perform(curl);
http
或 https
的协议,类似于下面这样:
...
final server = await HttpServer.bind('localhost', 18081);
server.listen((request) async {
final headers = request.headers;
final url = headers.value('url');
final client = IOClient();
final response = await client.get(Uri.parse(url!));
...
}
http
或 https
的协议,类似于下面这样:
url := request.Form.Get("url")
res, err =: http.Get(url)
...
http
或 https
的协议,类似于下面这样:
String url = request.getParameter("url");
CloseableHttpClient httpclient = HttpClients.createDefault();
HttpGet httpGet = new HttpGet(url);
CloseableHttpResponse response1 = httpclient.execute(httpGet);
http
或 https
的协议,类似于下面这样:
var http = require('http');
var url = require('url');
function listener(request, response){
var request_url = url.parse(request.url, true)['query']['url'];
http.request(request_url)
...
}
...
http.createServer(listener).listen(8080);
...
http
或 https
的协议,类似于下面这样:
val url: String = request.getParameter("url")
val httpclient: CloseableHttpClient = HttpClients.createDefault()
val httpGet = HttpGet(url)
val response1: CloseableHttpResponse = httpclient.execute(httpGet)
http
或 https
的协议,类似于下面这样:
$url = $_GET['url'];
$c = curl_init();
curl_setopt($c, CURLOPT_POST, 0);
curl_setopt($c,CURLOPT_URL,$url);
$response=curl_exec($c);
curl_close($c);
http
或 https
的协议,类似于下面这样:
url = request.GET['url']
handle = urllib.urlopen(url)
http
或 https
的协议,类似于下面这样:
url = req['url']
Net::HTTP.get(url)
http
或 https
的协议,类似于下面这样:
def getFile(url: String) = Action { request =>
...
val url = request.body.asText.getOrElse("http://google.com")
ws.url(url).get().map { response =>
Ok(s"Request sent to $url")
}
...
}
http
或 https
的协议,类似于下面这样:
...
sethostid(argv[1]);
...
sethostid()
,但是未被赋予权限的用户也可能会调用这个程序。这个例子中的代码允许用户输入直接控制系统设置的值。如果攻击者为主机 ID 提供一个恶意值,攻击者会错误地识别网络上受影响的机器或者引发其他一些意料之外的行为。
...
ACCEPT OPT1.
ACCEPT OPT2
COMPUTE OPTS = OPT1 + OPT2.
CALL 'MQOPEN' USING HCONN, OBJECTDESC, OPTS, HOBJ, COMPOCODE REASON.
...
...
<cfset code = SetProfileString(IniPath,
Section, "timeout", Form.newTimeout)>
...
Form.newTimeout
的值用于指定超时时间,因此攻击者可以通过指定一个超大数值来发起 denial of service (DoS),从而破坏应用程序的正常运行。
...
catalog := request.Form.Get("catalog")
path := request.Form.Get("path")
os.Setenv(catalog, path)
...
HttpServletRequest
中读取一个字符串,并将该字符串设置为数据库 Connection
中的当前目录。
...
conn.setCatalog(request.getParamter("catalog"));
...
http.IncomingMessage
请求变量中读取字符串,并使用该字符串设置其他 V8 命令行标记。
var v8 = require('v8');
...
var flags = url.parse(request.url, true)['query']['flags'];
...
v8.setFlagsFromString(flags);
...
<?php
...
$table_name=$_GET['catalog'];
$retrieved_array = pg_copy_to($db_connection, $table_name);
...
?>
...
catalog = request.GET['catalog']
path = request.GET['path']
os.putenv(catalog, path)
...
Connection
的当前目录。
def connect(catalog: String) = Action { request =>
...
conn.setCatalog(catalog)
...
}
...
sqlite3(SQLITE_CONFIG_LOG, user_controllable);
...
Request
对象中读取一个字符串,并将该字符串设置为数据库 Connection
中的当前目录。
...
Dim conn As ADODB.Connection
Set conn = New ADODB.Connection
Dim rsTables As ADODB.Recordset
Dim Catalog As New ADOX.Catalog
Set Catalog.ActiveConnection = conn
Catalog.Create Request.Form("catalog")
...
...
v_account = request->get_form_field( 'account' ).
v_reference = request->get_form_field( 'ref_key' ).
CONCATENATE `user = '` sy-uname `'` INTO cl_where.
IF v_account IS NOT INITIAL.
CONCATENATE cl_where ` AND account = ` v_account INTO cl_where SEPARATED BY SPACE.
ENDIF.
IF v_reference IS NOT INITIAL.
CONCATENATE cl_where "AND ref_key = `" v_reference "`" INTO cl_where.
ENDIF.
SELECT *
FROM invoice_items
INTO CORRESPONDING FIELDS OF TABLE itab_items
WHERE (cl_where).
...
SELECT *
FROM invoice_items
INTO CORRESPONDING FIELDS OF TABLE itab_items
WHERE user = sy-uname
AND account = <account>
AND ref_key = <reference>.
"abc` OR MANDT NE `+"
,为 v_account 输入字符串“1000”,则该查询会变成:
SELECT *
FROM invoice_items
INTO CORRESPONDING FIELDS OF TABLE itab_items
WHERE user = sy-uname
AND account = 1000
AND ref_key = `abc` OR MANDT NE `+`.
OR MANDT NE `+`
条件会导致 WHERE
子句的估值永远为 true,因为,客户端字段永远不会等于 literal +,因此该查询在逻辑上等同于一个更为简化的查询:
SELECT * FROM invoice_items
INTO CORRESPONDING FIELDS OF TABLE itab_items.
invoice_items
表中的所有条目,而不论指定用户是谁。
PARAMETERS: p_street TYPE string,
p_city TYPE string.
Data: v_sql TYPE string,
stmt TYPE REF TO CL_SQL_STATEMENT.
v_sql = "UPDATE EMP_TABLE SET ".
"Update employee address. Build the update statement with changed details
IF street NE p_street.
CONCATENATE v_sql "STREET = `" p_street "`".
ENDIF.
IF city NE p_city.
CONCATENATE v_sql "CITY = `" p_city "`".
ENDIF.
l_upd = stmt->execute_update( v_sql ).
"ABC` SALARY = `1000000"
的字符串,则应用程序会使用修订后的薪资更新数据库!
...
var params:Object = LoaderInfo(this.root.loaderInfo).parameters;
var username:String = String(params["username"]);
var itemName:String = String(params["itemName"]);
var query:String = "SELECT * FROM items WHERE owner = " + username + " AND itemname = " + itemName;
stmt.sqlConnection = conn;
stmt.text = query;
stmt.execute();
...
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = <userName>
AND itemname = <itemName>;
itemName
不包含单引号字符时,才会正确执行这一查询。如果一个用户名为 wiley
的攻击者为 itemName
输入字符串“name' OR 'a'='a
”,那么查询就会变成:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name' OR 'a'='a';
OR 'a'='a'
会使 where 从句永远评估为 true,因此该查询在逻辑上将等同于一个更为简化的查询:
SELECT * FROM items;
items
表中的所有条目,而不论其指定所有者是谁。Example 1
.中构造和执行的查询所带来的影响。如果一个用户名为 wiley
的攻击者为 itemName
输入字符串“name'; DELETE FROM items; --
”,则该查询就会变为以下两个查询:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
--'
Example 1
.中所用的技巧进行攻击。如果攻击者输入字符串“name'); DELETE FROM items; SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a
”,将创建以下三个有效语句:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a';
owner
与被授予权限的当前用户一致的条目。
...
string userName = ctx.getAuthenticatedUserName();
string query = "SELECT * FROM items WHERE owner = '"
+ userName + "' AND itemname = '"
+ ItemName.Text + "'";
sda = new SqlDataAdapter(query, conn);
DataTable dt = new DataTable();
sda.Fill(dt);
...
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = <userName>
AND itemname = <itemName>;
itemName
不包含单引号字符时,才会正确执行这一查询。如果一个用户名为 wiley
的攻击者为 itemName
输入字符串“name' OR 'a'='a
”,那么查询就会变成:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name' OR 'a'='a';
OR 'a'='a'
会使 where 从句永远评估为 true,因此该查询在逻辑上将等同于一个更为简化的查询:
SELECT * FROM items;
items
表中的所有条目,而不论其指定所有者是谁。Example 1
.中构造和执行的查询所带来的影响。如果一个用户名为 wiley
的攻击者为 itemName
输入字符串“name'); DELETE FROM items; --
”,则该查询就会变为以下两个查询:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
--'
Example 1
.中所用的技巧进行攻击。如果攻击者输入字符串“name'); DELETE FROM items; SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a
”,将创建以下三个有效语句:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a';
例 2:此外,SQLite 使用以下代码可以获得类似的结果:
...
ctx.getAuthUserName(&userName); {
CString query = "SELECT * FROM items WHERE owner = '"
+ userName + "' AND itemname = '"
+ request.Lookup("item") + "'";
dbms.ExecuteSQL(query);
...
...
sprintf (sql, "SELECT * FROM items WHERE owner='%s' AND itemname='%s'", username, request.Lookup("item"));
printf("SQL to execute is: \n\t\t %s\n", sql);
rc = sqlite3_exec(db,sql, NULL,0, &err);
...
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = <userName>
AND itemname = <itemName>;
itemName
不包含单引号字符时,才会正确执行这一查询。如果一个用户名为 wiley
的攻击者为 itemName
输入字符串“name' OR 'a'='a
”,那么查询就会变成:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name' OR 'a'='a';
OR 'a'='a'
会使 where 从句永远评估为 true,因此该查询在逻辑上将等同于一个更为简化的查询:
SELECT * FROM items;
items
表中的所有条目,而不论其指定所有者是谁。Example 1
.中构造和执行的查询所带来的影响。如果一个用户名为 wiley
的攻击者为 itemName
输入字符串“name'); DELETE FROM items; --
”,则该查询就会变为以下两个查询:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
--'
Example 1
.中所用的技巧进行攻击。如果攻击者输入字符串“name'); DELETE FROM items; SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a
”,将创建以下三个有效语句:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a';
...
ACCEPT USER.
ACCEPT ITM.
MOVE "SELECT * FROM items WHERE owner = '" TO QUERY1.
MOVE "' AND itemname = '" TO QUERY2.
MOVE "'" TO QUERY3.
STRING
QUERY1, USER, QUERY2, ITM, QUERY3 DELIMITED BY SIZE
INTO QUERY
END-STRING.
EXEC SQL
EXECUTE IMMEDIATE :QUERY
END-EXEC.
...
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = <userName>
AND itemname = <itemName>;
itemName
不包含单引号字符时,才会正确执行这一查询。如果一个用户名为 wiley
的攻击者为 itm
输入字符串“name' OR 'a'='a
”,那么查询就会变成:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name' OR 'a'='a';
OR 'a'='a'
条件会导致 where 子句的估值永远为 true,因此该查询在逻辑上等同于一个更为简化的查询:
SELECT * FROM items;
items
表中的所有条目,而不论其指定所有者是谁。Example 1
.中构造和执行的查询所带来的影响。如果一个用户名为 wiley
的攻击者为 itemName
输入字符串“name'; DELETE FROM items; --
”,则该查询就会变为以下两个查询:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
--'
Example 1
.中所用的技巧进行攻击。如果攻击者输入字符串“name'); DELETE FROM items; SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a
”,将创建以下三个有效语句:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a';
...
<cfquery name="matchingItems" datasource="cfsnippets">
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner='#Form.userName#'
AND itemId=#Form.ID#
</cfquery>
...
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = <userName>
AND itemId = <ID>;
Form.ID
不包含单引号字符时,才会正确执行这一查询。如果一个用户名为 wiley
的攻击者为 Form.ID
输入字符串“name' OR 'a'='a
”,那么查询就会变成:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemId = 'name' OR 'a'='a';
OR 'a'='a'
会使 where 从句永远评估为 true,因此该查询在逻辑上将等同于一个更为简化的查询:
SELECT * FROM items;
items
表中的所有条目,而不论其指定所有者是谁。Example 1
.中构造和执行的查询所带来的影响。如果一个用户名为 hacker
的攻击者为 Form.ID
输入字符串“hacker'); DELETE FROM items; --
”,则该查询就会变为以下两个查询:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'hacker'
AND itemId = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
--'
Example 1
.中所用的技巧进行攻击。如果攻击者输入字符串“name'); DELETE FROM items; SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a
”,将创建以下三个有效语句:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'hacker'
AND itemId = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a';
...
final server = await HttpServer.bind('localhost', 18081);
server.listen((request) async {
final headers = request.headers;
final userName = headers.value('userName');
final itemName = headers.value('itemName');
final query = "SELECT * FROM items WHERE owner = '"
+ userName! + "' AND itemname = '"
+ itemName! + "'";
db.query(query);
}
...
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = <userName>
AND itemname = <itemName>;
itemName
不包含单引号字符时,该查询才能正常运行。如果一个用户名为 wiley
的攻击者为 itemName
输入字符串“name' OR 'a'='a
”,则该查询会变成:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name' OR 'a'='a';
OR 'a'='a'
,where 子句的值将始终为 true,这样该查询在逻辑上就等同于一个更为简单的查询:
SELECT * FROM items;
items
表中的所有条目,而不论其指定所有者是谁。Example 1
.中构造和执行的查询所带来的影响。如果一个用户名为 wiley
的攻击者为 itemName
输入字符串“name'; DELETE FROM items; --
”,则该查询就会变为以下两个查询:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
--'
Example 1
中所用的技巧进行攻击。如果攻击者输入字符串“name'); DELETE FROM items; SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a
”,将创建以下三个有效语句:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a';
...
rawQuery := request.URL.Query()
username := rawQuery.Get("userName")
itemName := rawQuery.Get("itemName")
query := "SELECT * FROM items WHERE owner = " + username + " AND itemname = " + itemName + ";"
db.Exec(query)
...
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = <userName>
AND itemname = <itemName>;
itemName
不包含单引号字符时,该查询才能正常运行。如果一个用户名为 wiley
的攻击者为 itemName
输入字符串“name' OR 'a'='a
”,则该查询会变成:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name' OR 'a'='a';
OR 'a'='a'
,where 子句的值将始终为 true,这样该查询在逻辑上就等同于一个更为简单的查询:
SELECT * FROM items;
items
表中的所有条目,而不论其指定所有者是谁。Example 1
.中构造和执行的查询所带来的影响。如果一个用户名为 wiley
的攻击者为 itemName
输入字符串“name'; DELETE FROM items; --
”,则该查询就会变为以下两个查询:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
--'
Example 1
中所用的技巧进行攻击。如果攻击者输入字符串 "name'; DELETE FROM items; SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a
",将创建以下三个有效语句:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a';
...
String userName = ctx.getAuthenticatedUserName();
String itemName = request.getParameter("itemName");
String query = "SELECT * FROM items WHERE owner = '"
+ userName + "' AND itemname = '"
+ itemName + "'";
ResultSet rs = stmt.execute(query);
...
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = <userName>
AND itemname = <itemName>;
itemName
不包含单引号字符时,才会正确执行这一查询。如果一个用户名为 wiley
的攻击者为 itemName
输入字符串“name' OR 'a'='a
”,那么查询就会变成:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name' OR 'a'='a';
OR 'a'='a'
会使 where 从句永远评估为 true,因此该查询在逻辑上将等同于一个更为简化的查询:
SELECT * FROM items;
items
表中的所有条目,而不论其指定所有者是谁。Example 1
.中构造和执行的查询所带来的影响。如果一个用户名为 wiley
的攻击者为 itemName
输入字符串“name'; DELETE FROM items; --
”,则该查询就会变为以下两个查询:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
--'
Example 1
.中所用的技巧进行攻击。如果攻击者输入字符串“name'); DELETE FROM items; SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a
”,将创建以下三个有效语句:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a';
Example 1
以适应 Android 平台。
...
PasswordAuthentication pa = authenticator.getPasswordAuthentication();
String userName = pa.getUserName();
String itemName = this.getIntent().getExtras().getString("itemName");
String query = "SELECT * FROM items WHERE owner = '"
+ userName + "' AND itemname = '"
+ itemName + "'";
SQLiteDatabase db = this.openOrCreateDatabase("DB", MODE_PRIVATE, null);
Cursor c = db.rawQuery(query, null);
...
...
var username = document.form.username.value;
var itemName = document.form.itemName.value;
var query = "SELECT * FROM items WHERE owner = " + username + " AND itemname = " + itemName + ";";
db.transaction(function (tx) {
tx.executeSql(query);
}
)
...
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = <userName>
AND itemname = <itemName>;
itemName
不包含单引号字符时,才会正确执行这一查询。如果一个用户名为 wiley
的攻击者为 itemName
输入字符串“name' OR 'a'='a
”,那么查询就会变成:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name' OR 'a'='a';
OR 'a'='a'
会使 where 从句永远评估为 true,因此该查询在逻辑上将等同于一个更为简化的查询:
SELECT * FROM items;
items
表中的所有条目,而不论其指定所有者是谁。Example 1
.中构造和执行的查询所带来的影响。如果一个用户名为 wiley
的攻击者为 itemName
输入字符串“name'; DELETE FROM items; --
”,则该查询就会变为以下两个查询:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
--'
Example 1
.中所用的技巧进行攻击。如果攻击者输入字符串“name'); DELETE FROM items; SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a
”,将创建以下三个有效语句:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a';
...
$userName = $_SESSION['userName'];
$itemName = $_POST['itemName'];
$query = "SELECT * FROM items WHERE owner = '$userName' AND itemname = '$itemName';";
$result = mysql_query($query);
...
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = <userName>
AND itemname = <itemName>;
itemName
不包含单引号字符时,才会正确执行这一查询。如果一个用户名为 wiley
的攻击者为 itemName
输入字符串“name' OR 'a'='a
”,那么查询就会变成:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name' OR 'a'='a';
OR 'a'='a'
会使 where 从句永远评估为 true,因此该查询在逻辑上将等同于一个更为简化的查询:
SELECT * FROM items;
items
表中的所有条目,而不论其指定所有者是谁。Example 1
.中构造和执行的查询所带来的影响。如果一个用户名为 wiley
的攻击者为 itemName
输入字符串“name'; DELETE FROM items; --
”,则该查询就会变为以下两个查询:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
--'
Example 1
.中所用的技巧进行攻击。如果攻击者输入字符串“name'); DELETE FROM items; SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a
”,将创建以下三个有效语句:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a';
procedure get_item (
itm_cv IN OUT ItmCurTyp,
usr in varchar2,
itm in varchar2)
is
open itm_cv for ' SELECT * FROM items WHERE ' ||
'owner = '''|| usr || '''' ||
' AND itemname = ''' || itm || '''';
end get_item;
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = <userName>
AND itemname = <itemName>;
itemName
不包含单引号字符时,才会正确执行这一查询。如果一个用户名为 wiley
的攻击者为 itm
输入字符串“name' OR 'a'='a
”,那么查询就会变成:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name' OR 'a'='a';
OR 'a'='a'
条件会导致 where 子句的估值永远为 true,因此该查询在逻辑上等同于一个更为简化的查询:
SELECT * FROM items;
items
表中的所有条目,而不论其指定所有者是谁。Example 1
.中构造和执行的查询所带来的影响。如果一个用户名为 wiley
的攻击者为 itemName
输入字符串“name'; DELETE FROM items; --
”,则该查询就会变为以下两个查询:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
--'
Example 1
.中所用的技巧进行攻击。如果攻击者输入字符串“name'); DELETE FROM items; SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a
”,将创建以下三个有效语句:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a';
...
userName = req.field('userName')
itemName = req.field('itemName')
query = "SELECT * FROM items WHERE owner = ' " + userName +" ' AND itemname = ' " + itemName +"';"
cursor.execute(query)
result = cursor.fetchall()
...
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = <userName>
AND itemname = <itemName>;
itemName
不包含单引号字符时,才会正确执行这一查询。如果一个用户名为 wiley
的攻击者为 itemName
输入字符串“name' OR 'a'='a
”,那么查询就会变成:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name' OR 'a'='a';
OR 'a'='a'
会使 where 从句永远评估为 true,因此该查询在逻辑上将等同于一个更为简化的查询:
SELECT * FROM items;
items
表中的所有条目,而不论其指定所有者是谁。Example 1
.中构造和执行的查询所带来的影响。如果一个用户名为 wiley
的攻击者为 itemName
输入字符串“name'; DELETE FROM items; --
”,则该查询就会变为以下两个查询:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
--'
Example 1
.中所用的技巧进行攻击。如果攻击者输入字符串“name'); DELETE FROM items; SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a
”,将创建以下三个有效语句:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a';
...
userName = getAuthenticatedUserName()
itemName = params[:itemName]
sqlQuery = "SELECT * FROM items WHERE owner = '#{userName}' AND itemname = '#{itemName}'"
rs = conn.query(sqlQuery)
...
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = <userName>
AND itemname = <itemName>;
itemName
不包含单引号字符时,才会正确执行这一查询。如果一个用户名为 wiley
的攻击者为 itemName
输入字符串“name' OR 'a'='a
”,那么查询就会变成:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name' OR 'a'='a';
OR 'a'='a'
会使 where 从句永远评估为 true,因此该查询在逻辑上将等同于一个更为简化的查询:
SELECT * FROM items;
items
表中的所有条目,而不论其指定所有者是谁。
...
id = params[:id]
itemName = Mysql.escape_string(params[:itemName])
sqlQuery = "SELECT * FROM items WHERE id = #{userName} AND itemname = '#{itemName}'"
rs = conn.query(sqlQuery)
...
SELECT * FROM items WHERE id=<id> AND itemname = <itemName>;
itemName
中指定单引号,并且似乎已经避免了 SQL injection 漏洞。然而,由于 Ruby 不是静态类型语言,即使我们期望 id
是某种整数,因为这是通过用户输入来指定的,它也不一定是一个数字。如果攻击者可以将 id
的值更改为 1 OR id!=1--
,因为没有检查 id
实际上是数字,SQL 查询现在变为:
SELECT * FROM items WHERE id=1 OR id!=1-- AND itemname = 'anyValue';
SELECT * FROM items WHERE id=1 OR id!=1;
id
的值是否等于 1,这当然相当于表中的一切内容。
def doSQLQuery(value:String) = Action.async { implicit request =>
val result: Future[Seq[User]] = db.run {
sql"select * from users where name = '#$value'".as[User]
}
...
}
SELECT * FROM users
WHERE name = <userName>
userName
不包含单引号字符时,该查询才能正常运行。 如果一个用户名为 wiley
的攻击者为 userName
输入字符串“name' OR 'a'='a
”,则该查询会变成:
SELECT * FROM users
WHERE name = 'name' OR 'a'='a';
OR 'a'='a'
,where 子句的值将始终为 true,这样该查询在逻辑上就等同于一个更为简单的查询:
SELECT * FROM users;
users
表中存储的所有条目,而不论其指定用户是谁。owner
与当前经过身份验证的用户的名称一致的条目。
...
let queryStatementString = "SELECT * FROM items WHERE owner='\(username)' AND itemname='\(item)'"
var queryStatement: OpaquePointer? = nil
if sqlite3_prepare_v2(db, queryStatementString, -1, &queryStatement, nil) == SQLITE_OK {
if sqlite3_step(queryStatement) == SQLITE_ROW {
...
}
}
...
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = '<userName>'
AND itemname = '<itemName>'
itemName
不包含单引号字符时,该查询才能正常运行。如果一个用户名为 wiley
的攻击者为 itemName
输入字符串“name' OR 'a'='a
”,则该查询会变成:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name' OR 'a'='a';
OR 'a'='a'
,where 子句的值将始终为 true,这样该查询在逻辑上就等同于一个更为简单的查询:
SELECT * FROM items;
items
表中的所有条目,而不论其指定所有者是谁。Example 1
.中构造和执行的查询所带来的影响。如果一个用户名为 wiley
的攻击者为 itemName
输入字符串“name'); DELETE FROM items; --
”,则该查询就会变为以下两个查询:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
--'
Example 1
.中所用的技巧进行攻击。如果攻击者输入字符串“name'); DELETE FROM items; SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a
”,将创建以下三个有效语句:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a';
...
username = Session("username")
itemName = Request.Form("itemName")
strSQL = "SELECT * FROM items WHERE owner = '"& userName &"' AND itemname = '" & itemName &"'"
objRecordSet.Open strSQL, strConnect, adOpenDynamic, adLockOptimistic, adCmdText
...
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = <userName>
AND itemname = <itemName>;
itemName
不包含单引号字符时,才会正确执行这一查询。如果一个用户名为 wiley
的攻击者为 itemName
输入字符串“name' OR 'a'='a
”,那么查询就会变成:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name' OR 'a'='a';
OR 'a'='a'
会使 where 从句永远评估为 true,因此该查询在逻辑上将等同于一个更为简化的查询:
SELECT * FROM items;
items
表中的所有条目,而不论其指定所有者是谁。Example 1
.中构造和执行的查询所带来的影响。如果一个用户名为 wiley
的攻击者为 itemName
输入字符串“name'; DELETE FROM items; --
”,则该查询就会变为以下两个查询:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
--'
Example 1
.中所用的技巧进行攻击。如果攻击者输入字符串“name'); DELETE FROM items; SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a
”,将创建以下三个有效语句:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a';
...
CALL FUNCTION 'FTP_VERSION'
...
IMPORTING
EXEPATH = p
VERSION = v
WORKING_DIR = dir
RFCPATH = rfcp
RFCVERSION = rfcv
TABLES
FTP_TRACE = FTP_TRACE.
WRITE: 'exepath: ', p, 'version: ', v, 'working_dir: ', dir, 'rfcpath: ', rfcp, 'rfcversion: ', rfcv.
...
try {
...
}
catch(e:Error) {
trace(e.getStackTrace());
}
Example 1
中,搜索路径可能会暗示操作系统的类型、系统上安装了哪些应用程序以及管理员在配置程序时采取了哪些保护措施。<apex:messages/>
元素中泄露异常信息:
try {
...
} catch (Exception e) {
ApexPages.Message msg = new ApexPages.Message(ApexPages.Severity.FATAL, e.getMessage());
ApexPages.addMessage(msg);
}
try
{
...
}
catch (Exception e)
{
Response.Write(e.ToString());
}
Example 1
中,泄露的信息可能会暗示有关操作系统类型、系统上安装了哪些应用程序以及管理员在配置程序时采取了哪些保护措施的信息。
int sockfd;
int flags;
char hostname[1024];
hostname[1023] = '\0';
gethostname(hostname, 1023);
...
sockfd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
flags = 0;
send(sockfd, hostname, strlen(hostname), flags);
Example 1
中,搜索路径可能会暗示操作系统的类型、系统上安装了哪些应用程序以及管理员在配置程序时采取了哪些保护措施。SQLCODE
和错误消息 SQlERRMC
。
...
EXEC SQL
WHENEVER SQLERROR
PERFORM DEBUG-ERR
SQL-EXEC.
...
DEBUG-ERR.
DISPLAY "Error code is: " SQLCODE.
DISPLAY "Error message is: " SQLERRMC.
...
Example 1
中,可通过一条数据库错误消息来揭示应用程序容易受到 SQL Injection 攻击。其他的错误消息可以揭示有关该系统的更多间接线索。
<cfcatch type="Any">
<cfset exception=getException(myObj)>
<cfset message=exception.toString()>
<cfoutput>
Exception message: #message#
</cfoutput>
</cfcatch>
func handler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
host, err := os.Hostname()
...
fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s is busy, please try again later.", host)
}
Example 1
中,泄露的信息可能会暗示有关操作系统类型、系统上安装了哪些应用程序以及管理员在配置程序时采取了哪些保护措施的信息。
server.error.include-stacktrace=always
Example 1
中,泄露的信息可能会暗示有关操作系统类型、系统上安装了哪些应用程序以及管理员在配置程序时采取了哪些保护措施的信息。
...
dirReader.readEntries(function(results){
...
}, function(error){
$("#myTextArea").val('There was a problem: ' + error);
});
...
Example 1
中,泄露的信息可能会暗示有关操作系统类型、系统上安装了哪些应用程序以及管理员在配置程序时采取了哪些保护措施的信息。
protected fun doPost(req: HttpServletRequest, res: HttpServletResponse) {
...
val out: PrintWriter = res.getWriter()
try {
...
} catch (e: Exception) {
out.println(e.message)
}
}
Example 1
中,泄露的信息可能会暗示有关操作系统类型、系统上安装了哪些应用程序以及管理员在配置程序时采取了哪些保护措施的信息。
...
try {
...
} catch (e: Exception) {
val exception = Log.getStackTraceString(e)
val intent = Intent()
intent.action = "SEND_EXCEPTION"
intent.putExtra("exception", exception)
view.context.sendBroadcast(intent)
}
...
...
companion object {
const val TAG = "NfcActivity"
private const val DATA_SPLITTER = "__:DATA:__"
private const val MIME_TYPE = "application/my.applications.mimetype"
}
...
val tm = Context.getSystemService(Context.TELEPHONY_SERVICE) as TelephonyManager
val VERSION = tm.getDeviceSoftwareVersion();
...
val nfcAdapter = NfcAdapter.getDefaultAdapter(this)
val text: String = "$TAG$DATA_SPLITTER$VERSION"
val record = NdefRecord(NdefRecord.TNF_MIME_MEDIA, MIME_TYPE.getBytes(), ByteArray(0), text.toByteArray())
val records = arrayOf(record)
val msg = NdefMessage(records)
nfcAdapter.setNdefPushMessage(msg, this)
...
NSString *deviceName = [[UIDevice currentDevice] name];
NSString *baseUrl = @"http://myserver.com/?dev=";
NSString *urlString = [baseUrl stringByAppendingString:deviceName];
NSURL *url = [NSURL URLWithString:urlString];
NSURLRequest* request = [NSURLRequest requestWithURL:url cachePolicy:NSURLRequestUseProtocolCachePolicy timeoutInterval:60.0];
NSError *err = nil;
NSURLResponse* response = nil;
NSData *data = [NSURLConnection sendSynchronousRequest:request returningResponse:&response error:&err];
<?php
...
echo "Server error! Printing the backtrace";
debug_print_backtrace();
...
?>
Example 1
中,泄露的信息可能会暗示有关操作系统类型、系统上安装了哪些应用程序以及管理员在配置程序时采取了哪些保护措施的信息。PATH_INFO
和 SCRIPT_NAME
。
...
HTP.htmlOpen;
HTP.headOpen;
HTP.title ('Environment Information');
HTP.headClose;
HTP.bodyOpen;
HTP.br;
HTP.print('Path Information: ' ||
OWA_UTIL.get_cgi_env('PATH_INFO') || '');
HTP.print('Script Name: ' ||
OWA_UTIL.get_cgi_env('SCRIPT_NAME') || '');
HTP.br;
HTP.bodyClose;
HTP.htmlClose;
...
}
Example 1
中,搜索路径可能会暗示操作系统的类型、系统上安装了哪些应用程序以及管理员在配置程序时采取了哪些保护措施。
...
import cgi
cgi.print_environ()
...
Example 1
中,泄露的信息可能会暗示有关操作系统类型、系统上安装了哪些应用程序以及管理员在配置程序时采取了哪些保护措施的信息。
response = Rack::Response.new
...
stacktrace = caller # Kernel#caller returns an array of the execution stack
...
response.finish do |res|
res.write "There was a problem: #{stacktrace}"
end
Example 1
中,搜索路径可能会暗示操作系统的类型、系统上安装了哪些应用程序以及管理员在配置程序时采取了哪些保护措施。
def doSomething() = Action { request =>
...
Ok(Html(Properties.osName)) as HTML
}
Example 1
中,泄露的信息可能会暗示有关操作系统类型、系统上安装了哪些应用程序以及管理员在配置程序时采取了哪些保护措施的信息。
let deviceName = UIDevice.currentDevice().name
let urlString : String = "http://myserver.com/?dev=\(deviceName)"
let url : NSURL = NSURL(string:urlString)
let request : NSURLRequest = NSURLRequest(URL:url)
var err : NSError?
var response : NSURLResponse?
var data : NSData = NSURLConnection.sendSynchronousRequest(request, returningResponse: &response, error:&err)
Response
输出流:
...
If Err.number <>0 then
Response.Write "An Error Has Occurred on this page!<BR>"
Response.Write "The Error Number is: " & Err.number & "<BR>"
Response.Write "The Description given is: " & Err.Description & "<BR>"
End If
...
Example 1
中,泄露的信息可能会暗示有关操作系统类型、系统上安装了哪些应用程序以及管理员在配置程序时采取了哪些保护措施的信息。
...
CALL FUNCTION 'FTP_VERSION'
...
IMPORTING
EXEPATH = p
VERSION = v
WORKING_DIR = dir
RFCPATH = rfcp
RFCVERSION = rfcv
TABLES
FTP_TRACE = FTP_TRACE.
WRITE: 'exepath: ', p, 'version: ', v, 'working_dir: ', dir, 'rfcpath: ', rfcp, 'rfcversion: ', rfcv.
...
try {
...
}
catch(e:Error) {
trace(e.getStackTrace());
}
Example 1
中,搜索路径可能会暗示操作系统的类型、系统上安装了哪些应用程序以及管理员在配置程序时采取了哪些保护措施。
try {
...
} catch (Exception e) {
System.Debug(LoggingLevel.ERROR, e.getMessage());
}
string cs="database=northwind;server=mySQLServer...";
SqlConnection conn=new SqlConnection(cs);
...
Console.Writeline(cs);
Example 1
中,泄露的信息可能会暗示有关操作系统类型、系统上安装了哪些应用程序以及管理员在配置程序时采取了哪些保护措施的信息。
char* path = getenv("PATH");
...
fprintf(stderr, "cannot find exe on path %s\n", path);
Example 1
中,搜索路径可能会暗示操作系统的类型、系统上安装了哪些应用程序以及管理员在配置程序时采取了哪些保护措施。
...
EXEC CICS DUMP TRANSACTION
DUMPCODE('name')
FROM (data-area)
LENGTH (data-value)
END-EXEC.
...
<cfscript>
try {
obj = CreateObject("person");
}
catch(any excpt) {
f = FileOpen("c:\log.txt", "write");
FileWriteLine(f, "#excpt.Message#");
FileClose(f);
}
</cfscript>
final file = await File('example.txt').create();
final raf = await file.open(mode: FileMode.write);
final data = String.fromEnvironment("PASSWORD");
raf.writeString(data);
Example 1
中,泄露的信息可能会暗示有关操作系统类型、系统上安装了哪些应用程序以及管理员在配置程序时采取了哪些保护措施的信息。
path := os.Getenv("PATH")
...
log.Printf("Cannot find exe on path %s\n", path)
Example 1
中,搜索路径可能会暗示操作系统的类型、系统上安装了哪些应用程序以及管理员在配置程序时采取了哪些保护措施。
protected void doPost (HttpServletRequest req, HttpServletResponse res) throws IOException {
...
PrintWriter out = res.getWriter();
try {
...
} catch (Exception e) {
out.println(e.getMessage());
}
}
Example 1
中,泄露的信息可能会暗示有关操作系统类型、系统上安装了哪些应用程序以及管理员在配置程序时采取了哪些保护措施的信息。
...
try {
...
} catch (Exception e) {
String exception = Log.getStackTraceString(e);
Intent i = new Intent();
i.setAction("SEND_EXCEPTION");
i.putExtra("exception", exception);
view.getContext().sendBroadcast(i);
}
...
...
public static final String TAG = "NfcActivity";
private static final String DATA_SPLITTER = "__:DATA:__";
private static final String MIME_TYPE = "application/my.applications.mimetype";
...
TelephonyManager tm = (TelephonyManager)Context.getSystemService(Context.TELEPHONY_SERVICE);
String VERSION = tm.getDeviceSoftwareVersion();
...
NfcAdapter nfcAdapter = NfcAdapter.getDefaultAdapter(this);
if (nfcAdapter == null)
return;
String text = TAG + DATA_SPLITTER + VERSION;
NdefRecord record = new NdefRecord(NdefRecord.TNF_MIME_MEDIA,
MIME_TYPE.getBytes(), new byte[0], text.getBytes());
NdefRecord[] records = { record };
NdefMessage msg = new NdefMessage(records);
nfcAdapter.setNdefPushMessage(msg, this);
...
var http = require('http');
...
http.request(options, function(res){
...
}).on('error', function(e){
console.log('There was a problem with the request: ' + e);
});
...
Example 1
中,泄露的信息可能会暗示有关操作系统类型、系统上安装了哪些应用程序以及管理员在配置程序时采取了哪些保护措施的信息。
try {
...
} catch (e: Exception) {
e.printStackTrace()
}
Example 1
中,泄露的信息可能会暗示有关操作系统类型、系统上安装了哪些应用程序以及管理员在配置程序时采取了哪些保护措施的信息。
...
try {
...
} catch (e: Exception) {
Log.e(TAG, Log.getStackTraceString(e))
}
...
...
NSString* deviceID = [[UIDevice currentDevice] name];
NSLog(@"DeviceID: %@", deviceID);
...
deviceID
条目,并立即将其存储在一个 plist 文件中。
...
NSString* deviceID = [[UIDevice currentDevice] name];
[defaults setObject:deviceID forKey:@"deviceID"];
[defaults synchronize];
...
Example 2
中的代码会将移动设备上的系统信息存储在该设备上一个不受保护的 plist 文件中。尽管许多开发人员认为 plist 文件是存储所有数据的安全位置,但这不是绝对的,特别是涉及到系统信息和隐私问题时,因为 plist 文件可被持有该设备的任何人读取。
<?php
...
echo "Server error! Printing the backtrace";
debug_print_backtrace();
...
?>
Example 1
中,泄露的信息可能会暗示有关操作系统类型、系统上安装了哪些应用程序以及管理员在配置程序时采取了哪些保护措施的信息。
try:
...
except:
print(sys.exc_info()[2])
Example 1
中,泄露的信息可能会暗示有关操作系统类型、系统上安装了哪些应用程序以及管理员在配置程序时采取了哪些保护措施的信息。
...
begin
log = Logger.new(STDERR)
...
rescue Exception
log.info("Exception: " + $!)
...
end
Example 1
中,泄露的信息可能会暗示有关操作系统类型、系统上安装了哪些应用程序以及管理员在配置程序时采取了哪些保护措施的信息。当然,Example 1
还有一个问题就是挽救根 Exception
而不是特定类型或错误/异常,这意味着它将捕获所有异常,从而可能导致其他未考虑到的负面影响。
...
println(Properties.osName)
...
Example 1
中,泄露的信息可能会暗示有关操作系统类型、系统上安装了哪些应用程序以及管理员在配置程序时采取了哪些保护措施的信息。
let deviceName = UIDevice.currentDevice().name
...
NSLog("Device Identifier: %@", deviceName)
ASPError
对象,如 Microsoft Script Debugger:
...
Debug.Write Server.GetLastError()
...
StreamReader
中的 Finalize()
方法最终会调用 Close()
,但是不能确定何时会调用 Finalize()
方法。事实上,无法确保 Finalize()
会被调用。因此,在繁忙的环境中,这可能会导致 VM 用尽它所有的文件句柄。
private void processFile(string fName) {
StreamWriter sw = new StreamWriter(fName);
string line;
while ((line = sr.ReadLine()) != null)
processLine(line);
}
FileInputStream
中的 finalize()
方法最终会调用 close()
,但是不能确定何时会调用 finalize()
方法。在繁忙的环境中,这会导致 JVM 用尽它所有的文件句柄。
private void processFile(String fName) throws FileNotFoundException, IOException {
FileInputStream fis = new FileInputStream(fName);
int sz;
byte[] byteArray = new byte[BLOCK_SIZE];
while ((sz = fis.read(byteArray)) != -1) {
processBytes(byteArray, sz);
}
}
...
CFIndex numBytes;
do {
UInt8 buf[bufferSize];
numBytes = CFReadStreamRead(readStream, buf, sizeof(buf));
if( numBytes > 0 ) {
handleBytes(buf, numBytes);
} else if( numBytes < 0 ) {
CFStreamError error = CFReadStreamGetError(readStream);
reportError(error);
}
} while( numBytes > 0 );
...
def readFile(filename: String): Unit = {
val data = Source.fromFile(fileName).getLines.mkString
// Use the data
}
...
func leak(reading input: InputStream) {
input.open()
let bufferSize = 1024
let buffer = UnsafeMutablePointer<UInt8>.allocate(capacity: bufferSize)
while input.hasBytesAvailable {
let read = input.read(buffer, maxLength: bufferSize)
}
buffer.deallocate(capacity: bufferSize)
}
...