...
host_name = request->get_form_field( 'host' ).
CALL FUNCTION 'FTP_CONNECT'
EXPORTING
USER = user
PASSWORD = password
HOST = host_name
RFC_DESTINATION = 'SAPFTP'
IMPORTING
HANDLE = mi_handle
EXCEPTIONS
NOT_CONNECTED = 1
OTHERS = 2.
...
int rPort = Int32.Parse(Request.Item("rPort"));
...
IPEndPoint endpoint = new IPEndPoint(address,rPort);
socket = new Socket(endpoint.AddressFamily,
SocketType.Stream, ProtocolType.Tcp);
socket.Connect(endpoint);
...
...
char* rPort = getenv("rPort");
...
serv_addr.sin_port = htons(atoi(rPort));
if (connect(sockfd,&serv_addr,sizeof(serv_addr)) < 0)
error("ERROR connecting");
...
...
ACCEPT QNAME.
EXEC CICS
READQ TD
QUEUE(QNAME)
INTO(DATA)
LENGTH(LDATA)
END-EXEC.
...
ServerSocket object and uses a port number read from an HTTP request to create a socket.
<cfobject action="create" type="java" class="java.net.ServerSocket" name="myObj">
<cfset srvr = myObj.init(#url.port#)>
<cfset socket = srvr.accept()>
Passing user input to objects imported from other languages can be very dangerous.
final server = await HttpServer.bind('localhost', 18081);
server.listen((request) async {
final remotePort = headers.value('port');
final serverSocket = await ServerSocket.bind(host, remotePort as int);
final httpServer = HttpServer.listenOn(serverSocket);
});
...
func someHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request){
r.parseForm()
deviceName := r.FormValue("device")
...
syscall.BindToDevice(fd, deviceName)
}
String remotePort = request.getParameter("remotePort");
...
ServerSocket srvr = new ServerSocket(remotePort);
Socket skt = srvr.accept();
...
WebView.
...
WebView webview = new WebView(this);
setContentView(webview);
String url = this.getIntent().getExtras().getString("url");
webview.loadUrl(url);
...
var socket = new WebSocket(document.URL.indexOf("url=")+20);
...
char* rHost = getenv("host");
...
CFReadStreamRef readStream;
CFWriteStreamRef writeStream;
CFStreamCreatePairWithSocketToHost(NULL, (CFStringRef)rHost, 80, &readStream, &writeStream);
...
<?php
$host=$_GET['host'];
$dbconn = pg_connect("host=$host port=1234 dbname=ticketdb");
...
$result = pg_prepare($dbconn, "my_query", 'SELECT * FROM pricelist WHERE name = $1');
$result = pg_execute($dbconn, "my_query", array("ticket"));
?>
...
filename := SUBSTR(OWA_UTIL.get_cgi_env('PATH_INFO'), 2);
WPG_DOCLOAD.download_file(filename);
...
host=request.GET['host']
dbconn = db.connect(host=host, port=1234, dbname=ticketdb)
c = dbconn.cursor()
...
result = c.execute('SELECT * FROM pricelist')
...
def controllerMethod = Action { request =>
val result = request.getQueryString("key").map { key =>
val user = db.getUser()
cache.set(key, user)
Ok("Cached Request")
}
Ok("Done")
}
...
func application(app: UIApplication, openURL url: NSURL, options: [String : AnyObject]) -> Bool {
var inputStream : NSInputStream?
var outputStream : NSOutputStream?
...
var readStream : Unmanaged<CFReadStream>?
var writeStream : Unmanaged<CFWriteStream>?
let rHost = getQueryStringParameter(url.absoluteString, "host")
CFStreamCreatePairWithSocketToHost(kCFAllocatorDefault, rHost, 80, &readStream, &writeStream);
...
}
func getQueryStringParameter(url: String?, param: String) -> String? {
if let url = url, urlComponents = NSURLComponents(string: url), queryItems = (urlComponents.queryItems as? [NSURLQueryItem]) {
return queryItems.filter({ (item) in item.name == param }).first?.value!
}
return nil
}
...
...
Begin MSWinsockLib.Winsock tcpServer
...
Dim Response As Response
Dim Request As Request
Dim Session As Session
Dim Application As Application
Dim Server As Server
Dim Port As Variant
Set Response = objContext("Response")
Set Request = objContext("Request")
Set Session = objContext("Session")
Set Application = objContext("Application")
Set Server = objContext("Server")
Set Port = Request.Form("port")
...
tcpServer.LocalPort = Port
tcpServer.Accept
...
...
taintedConnectionStr = request->get_form_field( 'dbconn_name' ).
TRY.
DATA(con) = cl_sql_connection=>get_connection( `R/3*` && taintedConnectionStr ).
...
con->close( ).
CATCH cx_sql_exception INTO FINAL(exc).
...
ENDTRY.
...
sethostid(argv[1]);
...
sethostid(), unprivileged users may be able to invoke the program. The code in this example allows user input to directly control the value of a system setting. If an attacker provides a malicious value for host ID, the attacker may misidentify the affected machine on the network or cause other unintended behavior.
...
ACCEPT OPT1.
ACCEPT OPT2
COMPUTE OPTS = OPT1 + OPT2.
CALL 'MQOPEN' USING HCONN, OBJECTDESC, OPTS, HOBJ, COMPOCODE REASON.
...
...
<cfset code = SetProfileString(IniPath,
Section, "timeout", Form.newTimeout)>
...
Form.newTimeout is used to specify a timeout, an attacker may be able to mount a denial of service (DoS) attack against the application by specifying a sufficiently large number.
...
catalog := request.Form.Get("catalog")
path := request.Form.Get("path")
os.Setenv(catalog, path)
...
HttpServletRequest and sets it as the active catalog for a database Connection.
...
conn.setCatalog(request.getParamter("catalog"));
...
http.IncomingMessage request variable and uses it to set additional V8 commnd line flags.
var v8 = require('v8');
...
var flags = url.parse(request.url, true)['query']['flags'];
...
v8.setFlagsFromString(flags);
...
<?php
...
$table_name=$_GET['catalog'];
$retrieved_array = pg_copy_to($db_connection, $table_name);
...
?>
...
catalog = request.GET['catalog']
path = request.GET['path']
os.putenv(catalog, path)
...
Connection.
def connect(catalog: String) = Action { request =>
...
conn.setCatalog(catalog)
...
}
...
sqlite3(SQLITE_CONFIG_LOG, user_controllable);
...
Request object and sets it as the active catalog for a database Connection.
...
Dim conn As ADODB.Connection
Set conn = New ADODB.Connection
Dim rsTables As ADODB.Recordset
Dim Catalog As New ADOX.Catalog
Set Catalog.ActiveConnection = conn
Catalog.Create Request.Form("catalog")
...
...
v_account = request->get_form_field( 'account' ).
v_reference = request->get_form_field( 'ref_key' ).
CONCATENATE `user = '` sy-uname `'` INTO cl_where.
IF v_account IS NOT INITIAL.
CONCATENATE cl_where ` AND account = ` v_account INTO cl_where SEPARATED BY SPACE.
ENDIF.
IF v_reference IS NOT INITIAL.
CONCATENATE cl_where "AND ref_key = `" v_reference "`" INTO cl_where.
ENDIF.
SELECT *
FROM invoice_items
INTO CORRESPONDING FIELDS OF TABLE itab_items
WHERE (cl_where).
...
SELECT *
FROM invoice_items
INTO CORRESPONDING FIELDS OF TABLE itab_items
WHERE user = sy-uname
AND account = <account>
AND ref_key = <reference>.
"abc` OR MANDT NE `+" for v_reference and string '1000' for v_account, then the query becomes the following:
SELECT *
FROM invoice_items
INTO CORRESPONDING FIELDS OF TABLE itab_items
WHERE user = sy-uname
AND account = 1000
AND ref_key = `abc` OR MANDT NE `+`.
OR MANDT NE `+` condition causes the WHERE clause to always evaluate to true because the client field can never be equal to literal +, so query becomes logically equivalent to the much simpler query:
SELECT * FROM invoice_items
INTO CORRESPONDING FIELDS OF TABLE itab_items.
invoice_items table, regardless of the specified user.
PARAMETERS: p_street TYPE string,
p_city TYPE string.
Data: v_sql TYPE string,
stmt TYPE REF TO CL_SQL_STATEMENT.
v_sql = "UPDATE EMP_TABLE SET ".
"Update employee address. Build the update statement with changed details
IF street NE p_street.
CONCATENATE v_sql "STREET = `" p_street "`".
ENDIF.
IF city NE p_city.
CONCATENATE v_sql "CITY = `" p_city "`".
ENDIF.
l_upd = stmt->execute_update( v_sql ).
"ABC` SALARY = `1000000" for the parameter p_street, the application lets the database be updated with revised salary!
...
var params:Object = LoaderInfo(this.root.loaderInfo).parameters;
var username:String = String(params["username"]);
var itemName:String = String(params["itemName"]);
var query:String = "SELECT * FROM items WHERE owner = " + username + " AND itemname = " + itemName;
stmt.sqlConnection = conn;
stmt.text = query;
stmt.execute();
...
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = <userName>
AND itemname = <itemName>;
itemName does not contain a single-quote character. If an attacker with the user name wiley enters the string "name' OR 'a'='a" for itemName, then the query becomes the following:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name' OR 'a'='a';
OR 'a'='a' condition causes the where clause to always evaluate to true, so the query becomes logically equivalent to the much simpler query:
SELECT * FROM items;
items table, regardless of their specified owner.Example 1. If an attacker with the user name wiley enters the string "name'; DELETE FROM items; --" for itemName, then the query becomes the following two queries:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
--'
Example 1. If an attacker enters the string "name'); DELETE FROM items; SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a", the following three valid statements will be created:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a';
owner matches the user name of the currently-authenticated user.
...
string userName = ctx.getAuthenticatedUserName();
string query = "SELECT * FROM items WHERE owner = '"
+ userName + "' AND itemname = '"
+ ItemName.Text + "'";
sda = new SqlDataAdapter(query, conn);
DataTable dt = new DataTable();
sda.Fill(dt);
...
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = <userName>
AND itemname = <itemName>;
itemName does not contain a single-quote character. If an attacker with the user name wiley enters the string "name' OR 'a'='a" for itemName, then the query becomes the following:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name' OR 'a'='a';
OR 'a'='a' condition causes the where clause to always evaluate to true, so the query becomes logically equivalent to the much simpler query:
SELECT * FROM items;
items table, regardless of their specified owner.Example 1. If an attacker with the user name wiley enters the string "name'); DELETE FROM items; --" for itemName, then the query becomes the following two queries:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
--'
Example 1. If an attacker enters the string "name'); DELETE FROM items; SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a", the following three valid statements will be created:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a';
Example 2:Alternatively, a similar result could be obtained with SQLite using the following code:
...
ctx.getAuthUserName(&userName); {
CString query = "SELECT * FROM items WHERE owner = '"
+ userName + "' AND itemname = '"
+ request.Lookup("item") + "'";
dbms.ExecuteSQL(query);
...
...
sprintf (sql, "SELECT * FROM items WHERE owner='%s' AND itemname='%s'", username, request.Lookup("item"));
printf("SQL to execute is: \n\t\t %s\n", sql);
rc = sqlite3_exec(db,sql, NULL,0, &err);
...
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = <userName>
AND itemname = <itemName>;
itemName does not contain a single-quote character. If an attacker with the user name wiley enters the string "name' OR 'a'='a" for itemName, then the query becomes the following:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name' OR 'a'='a';
OR 'a'='a' condition causes the where clause to always evaluate to true, so the query becomes logically equivalent to the much simpler query:
SELECT * FROM items;
items table, regardless of their specified owner.Example 1. If an attacker with the user name wiley enters the string "name'); DELETE FROM items; --" for itemName, then the query becomes the following two queries:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
--'
Example 1. If an attacker enters the string "name'); DELETE FROM items; SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a", the following three valid statements will be created:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a';
...
ACCEPT USER.
ACCEPT ITM.
MOVE "SELECT * FROM items WHERE owner = '" TO QUERY1.
MOVE "' AND itemname = '" TO QUERY2.
MOVE "'" TO QUERY3.
STRING
QUERY1, USER, QUERY2, ITM, QUERY3 DELIMITED BY SIZE
INTO QUERY
END-STRING.
EXEC SQL
EXECUTE IMMEDIATE :QUERY
END-EXEC.
...
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = <userName>
AND itemname = <itemName>;
itemName does not contain a single-quote character. If an attacker with the user name wiley enters the string "name' OR 'a'='a" for itm, then the query becomes the following:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name' OR 'a'='a';
OR 'a'='a' condition causes the where clause to always evaluate to true, so query becomes logically equivalent to the much simpler query:
SELECT * FROM items;
items table, regardless of their specified owner.Example 1. If an attacker with the user name wiley enters the string "name'; DELETE FROM items; --" for itemName, then the query becomes the following two queries:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
--'
Example 1. If an attacker enters the string "name'); DELETE FROM items; SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a", the following three valid statements will be created:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a';
...
<cfquery name="matchingItems" datasource="cfsnippets">
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner='#Form.userName#'
AND itemId=#Form.ID#
</cfquery>
...
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = <userName>
AND itemId = <ID>;
Form.ID does not contain a single-quote character. If an attacker with the user name wiley enters the string "name' OR 'a'='a" for Form.ID, then the query becomes the following:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemId = 'name' OR 'a'='a';
OR 'a'='a' condition causes the where clause to always evaluate to true, so the query becomes logically equivalent to the much simpler query:
SELECT * FROM items;
items table, regardless of their specified owner.Example 1. If an attacker with the user name hacker enters the string "hacker'); DELETE FROM items; --" for Form.ID, then the query becomes the following two queries:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'hacker'
AND itemId = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
--'
Example 1. If an attacker enters the string "name'); DELETE FROM items; SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a", the following three valid statements will be created:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'hacker'
AND itemId = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a';
...
final server = await HttpServer.bind('localhost', 18081);
server.listen((request) async {
final headers = request.headers;
final userName = headers.value('userName');
final itemName = headers.value('itemName');
final query = "SELECT * FROM items WHERE owner = '"
+ userName! + "' AND itemname = '"
+ itemName! + "'";
db.query(query);
}
...
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = <userName>
AND itemname = <itemName>;
itemName does not contain a single-quote character. If an attacker with the user name wiley enters the string "name' OR 'a'='a" for itemName, then the query becomes the following:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name' OR 'a'='a';
OR 'a'='a' condition causes the where clause to always evaluate to true, so the query becomes logically equivalent to the much simpler query:
SELECT * FROM items;
items table, regardless of their specified owner.Example 1. If an attacker with the user name wiley enters the string "name'; DELETE FROM items; --" for itemName, then the query becomes the following two queries:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
--'
Example 1. If an attacker enters the string "name'); DELETE FROM items; SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a", the following three valid statements will be created:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a';
...
rawQuery := request.URL.Query()
username := rawQuery.Get("userName")
itemName := rawQuery.Get("itemName")
query := "SELECT * FROM items WHERE owner = " + username + " AND itemname = " + itemName + ";"
db.Exec(query)
...
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = <userName>
AND itemname = <itemName>;
itemName does not contain a single-quote character. If an attacker with the user name wiley enters the string "name' OR 'a'='a" for itemName, then the query becomes the following:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name' OR 'a'='a';
OR 'a'='a' condition causes the where clause to always evaluate to true, so the query becomes logically equivalent to the much simpler query:
SELECT * FROM items;
items table, regardless of their specified owner.Example 1. If an attacker with the user name wiley enters the string "name'; DELETE FROM items; --" for itemName, then the query becomes the following two queries:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
--'
Example 1. If an attacker enters the string "name'; DELETE FROM items; SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a", the following three valid statements are created:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a';
...
String userName = ctx.getAuthenticatedUserName();
String itemName = request.getParameter("itemName");
String query = "SELECT * FROM items WHERE owner = '"
+ userName + "' AND itemname = '"
+ itemName + "'";
ResultSet rs = stmt.execute(query);
...
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = <userName>
AND itemname = <itemName>;
itemName does not contain a single-quote character. If an attacker with the user name wiley enters the string "name' OR 'a'='a" for itemName, then the query becomes the following:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name' OR 'a'='a';
OR 'a'='a' condition causes the where clause to always evaluate to true, so the query becomes logically equivalent to the much simpler query:
SELECT * FROM items;
items table, regardless of their specified owner.Example 1. If an attacker with the user name wiley enters the string "name'; DELETE FROM items; --" for itemName, then the query becomes the following two queries:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
--'
Example 1. If an attacker enters the string "name'); DELETE FROM items; SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a", the following three valid statements will be created:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a';
Example 1 to the Android platform.
...
PasswordAuthentication pa = authenticator.getPasswordAuthentication();
String userName = pa.getUserName();
String itemName = this.getIntent().getExtras().getString("itemName");
String query = "SELECT * FROM items WHERE owner = '"
+ userName + "' AND itemname = '"
+ itemName + "'";
SQLiteDatabase db = this.openOrCreateDatabase("DB", MODE_PRIVATE, null);
Cursor c = db.rawQuery(query, null);
...
...
var username = document.form.username.value;
var itemName = document.form.itemName.value;
var query = "SELECT * FROM items WHERE owner = " + username + " AND itemname = " + itemName + ";";
db.transaction(function (tx) {
tx.executeSql(query);
}
)
...
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = <userName>
AND itemname = <itemName>;
itemName does not contain a single-quote character. If an attacker with the user name wiley enters the string "name' OR 'a'='a" for itemName, then the query becomes the following:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name' OR 'a'='a';
OR 'a'='a' condition causes the where clause to always evaluate to true, so the query becomes logically equivalent to the much simpler query:
SELECT * FROM items;
items table, regardless of their specified owner.Example 1. If an attacker with the user name wiley enters the string "name'; DELETE FROM items; --" for itemName, then the query becomes the following two queries:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
--'
Example 1. If an attacker enters the string "name'); DELETE FROM items; SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a", the following three valid statements will be created:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a';
...
$userName = $_SESSION['userName'];
$itemName = $_POST['itemName'];
$query = "SELECT * FROM items WHERE owner = '$userName' AND itemname = '$itemName';";
$result = mysql_query($query);
...
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = <userName>
AND itemname = <itemName>;
itemName does not contain a single-quote character. If an attacker with the user name wiley enters the string "name' OR 'a'='a" for itemName, then the query becomes the following:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name' OR 'a'='a';
OR 'a'='a' condition causes the where clause to always evaluate to true, so the query becomes logically equivalent to the much simpler query:
SELECT * FROM items;
items table, regardless of their specified owner.Example 1. If an attacker with the user name wiley enters the string "name'; DELETE FROM items; --" for itemName, then the query becomes the following two queries:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
--'
Example 1. If an attacker enters the string "name'); DELETE FROM items; SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a", the following three valid statements will be created:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a';
procedure get_item (
itm_cv IN OUT ItmCurTyp,
usr in varchar2,
itm in varchar2)
is
open itm_cv for ' SELECT * FROM items WHERE ' ||
'owner = '''|| usr || '''' ||
' AND itemname = ''' || itm || '''';
end get_item;
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = <userName>
AND itemname = <itemName>;
itemName does not contain a single-quote character. If an attacker with the user name wiley enters the string "name' OR 'a'='a" for itm, then the query becomes the following:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name' OR 'a'='a';
OR 'a'='a' condition causes the where clause to always evaluate to true, so query becomes logically equivalent to the much simpler query:
SELECT * FROM items;
items table, regardless of their specified owner.Example 1. If an attacker with the user name wiley enters the string "name'; DELETE FROM items; --" for itemName, then the query becomes the following two queries:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
--'
Example 1. If an attacker enters the string "name'); DELETE FROM items; SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a", the following three valid statements will be created:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a';
- Target fields that are not quoted
- Find ways to bypass the need for certain escaped metacharacters
- Use stored procedures to hide the injected metacharacters
...
userName = req.field('userName')
itemName = req.field('itemName')
query = "SELECT * FROM items WHERE owner = ' " + userName +" ' AND itemname = ' " + itemName +"';"
cursor.execute(query)
result = cursor.fetchall()
...
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = <userName>
AND itemname = <itemName>;
itemName does not contain a single-quote character. If an attacker with the user name wiley enters the string "name' OR 'a'='a" for itemName, then the query becomes the following:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name' OR 'a'='a';
OR 'a'='a' condition causes the where clause to always evaluate to true, so the query becomes logically equivalent to the much simpler query:
SELECT * FROM items;
items table, regardless of their specified owner.Example 1. If an attacker with the user name wiley enters the string "name'; DELETE FROM items; --" for itemName, then the query becomes the following two queries:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
--'
Example 1. If an attacker enters the string "name'); DELETE FROM items; SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a", the following three valid statements will be created:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a';
...
userName = getAuthenticatedUserName()
itemName = params[:itemName]
sqlQuery = "SELECT * FROM items WHERE owner = '#{userName}' AND itemname = '#{itemName}'"
rs = conn.query(sqlQuery)
...
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = <userName>
AND itemname = <itemName>;
itemName does not contain a single-quote character. If an attacker with the user name wiley enters the string "name' OR 'a'='a" for itemName, then the query becomes the following:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name' OR 'a'='a';
OR 'a'='a' condition causes the where clause to always evaluate to true, so the query becomes logically equivalent to the much simpler query:
SELECT * FROM items;
items table, regardless of their specified owner.
...
id = params[:id]
itemName = Mysql.escape_string(params[:itemName])
sqlQuery = "SELECT * FROM items WHERE id = #{userName} AND itemname = '#{itemName}'"
rs = conn.query(sqlQuery)
...
SELECT * FROM items WHERE id=<id> AND itemname = <itemName>;
itemName and seemingly prevented the SQL injection vulnerability. However as Ruby is not a statically typed language, even though we are expecting id to be an integer of some variety, as this is assigned from user input it won't necessarily be a number. If an attacker can instead change the value of id to 1 OR id!=1--, since there is no check that id is in fact numeric, the SQL query now becomes:
SELECT * FROM items WHERE id=1 OR id!=1-- AND itemname = 'anyValue';
SELECT * FROM items WHERE id=1 OR id!=1;
id is equal to 1 or not, which of course equates to everything within the table.
def doSQLQuery(value:String) = Action.async { implicit request =>
val result: Future[Seq[User]] = db.run {
sql"select * from users where name = '#$value'".as[User]
}
...
}
SELECT * FROM users
WHERE name = <userName>
userName does not contain a single-quote character. If an attacker with the user name wiley enters the string "name' OR 'a'='a" for userName, then the query becomes the following:
SELECT * FROM users
WHERE name = 'name' OR 'a'='a';
OR 'a'='a' condition causes the where clause to always evaluate to true, so the query becomes logically equivalent to the much simpler query:
SELECT * FROM users;
users table, regardless of their specified user.owner matches the user name of the currently-authenticated user.
...
let queryStatementString = "SELECT * FROM items WHERE owner='\(username)' AND itemname='\(item)'"
var queryStatement: OpaquePointer? = nil
if sqlite3_prepare_v2(db, queryStatementString, -1, &queryStatement, nil) == SQLITE_OK {
if sqlite3_step(queryStatement) == SQLITE_ROW {
...
}
}
...
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = '<userName>'
AND itemname = '<itemName>'
itemName does not contain a single-quote character. If an attacker with the user name wiley enters the string "name' OR 'a'='a" for itemName, then the query becomes the following:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name' OR 'a'='a';
OR 'a'='a' condition causes the where clause to always evaluate to true, so the query becomes logically equivalent to the much simpler query:
SELECT * FROM items;
items table, regardless of their specified owner.Example 1. If an attacker with the user name wiley enters the string "name'); DELETE FROM items; --" for itemName, then the query becomes the following two queries:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
--'
Example 1. If an attacker enters the string "name'); DELETE FROM items; SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a", the following three valid statements will be created:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a';
...
username = Session("username")
itemName = Request.Form("itemName")
strSQL = "SELECT * FROM items WHERE owner = '"& userName &"' AND itemname = '" & itemName &"'"
objRecordSet.Open strSQL, strConnect, adOpenDynamic, adLockOptimistic, adCmdText
...
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = <userName>
AND itemname = <itemName>;
itemName does not contain a single-quote character. If an attacker with the user name wiley enters the string "name' OR 'a'='a" for itemName, then the query becomes the following:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name' OR 'a'='a';
OR 'a'='a' condition causes the where clause to always evaluate to true, so the query becomes logically equivalent to the much simpler query:
SELECT * FROM items;
items table, regardless of their specified owner.Example 1. If an attacker with the user name wiley enters the string "name'; DELETE FROM items; --" for itemName, then the query becomes the following two queries:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
--'
Example 1. If an attacker enters the string "name'); DELETE FROM items; SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a", the following three valid statements will be created:
SELECT * FROM items
WHERE owner = 'wiley'
AND itemname = 'name';
DELETE FROM items;
SELECT * FROM items WHERE 'a'='a';
...
CALL FUNCTION 'FTP_VERSION'
...
IMPORTING
EXEPATH = p
VERSION = v
WORKING_DIR = dir
RFCPATH = rfcp
RFCVERSION = rfcv
TABLES
FTP_TRACE = FTP_TRACE.
WRITE: 'exepath: ', p, 'version: ', v, 'working_dir: ', dir, 'rfcpath: ', rfcp, 'rfcversion: ', rfcv.
...
try {
...
}
catch(e:Error) {
trace(e.getStackTrace());
}
Example 1, the search path could imply information about the type of operating system, the applications installed on the system, and the amount of care that the administrators have put into configuring the program.<apex:messages/> element of a Visualforce page:
try {
...
} catch (Exception e) {
ApexPages.Message msg = new ApexPages.Message(ApexPages.Severity.FATAL, e.getMessage());
ApexPages.addMessage(msg);
}
try
{
...
}
catch (Exception e)
{
Response.Write(e.ToString());
}
Example 1, the leaked information could imply information about the type of operating system, the applications installed on the system, and the amount of care that the administrators have put into configuring the program.
int sockfd;
int flags;
char hostname[1024];
hostname[1023] = '\0';
gethostname(hostname, 1023);
...
sockfd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
flags = 0;
send(sockfd, hostname, strlen(hostname), flags);
Example 1, the search path could imply information about the type of operating system, the applications installed on the system, and the amount of care that the administrators have put into configuring the program.SQLCODE and the error message SQlERRMC associated with the SQL command that caused the error to the terminal.
...
EXEC SQL
WHENEVER SQLERROR
PERFORM DEBUG-ERR
SQL-EXEC.
...
DEBUG-ERR.
DISPLAY "Error code is: " SQLCODE.
DISPLAY "Error message is: " SQLERRMC.
...
Example 1, a database error message can reveal that the application is vulnerable to a SQL injection attack. Other error messages can reveal more oblique clues about the system.
<cfcatch type="Any">
<cfset exception=getException(myObj)>
<cfset message=exception.toString()>
<cfoutput>
Exception message: #message#
</cfoutput>
</cfcatch>
func handler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
host, err := os.Hostname()
...
fmt.Fprintf(w, "%s is busy, please try again later.", host)
}
Example 1, the leaked information could imply information about the type of operating system, the applications installed on the system, and the amount of care that the administrators have put into configuring the program.
protected void doPost (HttpServletRequest req, HttpServletResponse res) throws IOException {
...
PrintWriter out = res.getWriter();
try {
...
} catch (Exception e) {
out.println(e.getMessage());
}
}
Example 1, the leaked information could imply information about the type of operating system, the applications installed on the system, and the amount of care that the administrators have put into configuring the program.
...
try {
...
} catch (Exception e) {
String exception = Log.getStackTraceString(e);
Intent i = new Intent();
i.setAction("SEND_EXCEPTION");
i.putExtra("exception", exception);
view.getContext().sendBroadcast(i);
}
...
...
public static final String TAG = "NfcActivity";
private static final String DATA_SPLITTER = "__:DATA:__";
private static final String MIME_TYPE = "application/my.applications.mimetype";
...
TelephonyManager tm = (TelephonyManager)Context.getSystemService(Context.TELEPHONY_SERVICE);
String VERSION = tm.getDeviceSoftwareVersion();
...
NfcAdapter nfcAdapter = NfcAdapter.getDefaultAdapter(this);
if (nfcAdapter == null)
return;
String text = TAG + DATA_SPLITTER + VERSION;
NdefRecord record = new NdefRecord(NdefRecord.TNF_MIME_MEDIA,
MIME_TYPE.getBytes(), new byte[0], text.getBytes());
NdefRecord[] records = { record };
NdefMessage msg = new NdefMessage(records);
nfcAdapter.setNdefPushMessage(msg, this);
...
...
dirReader.readEntries(function(results){
...
}, function(error){
$("#myTextArea").val('There was a problem: ' + error);
});
...
Example 1, the leaked information could imply information about the type of operating system, the applications installed on the system, and the amount of care that the administrators have put into configuring the program.
protected fun doPost(req: HttpServletRequest, res: HttpServletResponse) {
...
val out: PrintWriter = res.getWriter()
try {
...
} catch (e: Exception) {
out.println(e.message)
}
}
Example 1, the leaked information could imply information about the type of operating system, the applications installed on the system, and the amount of care that the administrators have put into configuring the program.
...
try {
...
} catch (e: Exception) {
val exception = Log.getStackTraceString(e)
val intent = Intent()
intent.action = "SEND_EXCEPTION"
intent.putExtra("exception", exception)
view.context.sendBroadcast(intent)
}
...
...
companion object {
const val TAG = "NfcActivity"
private const val DATA_SPLITTER = "__:DATA:__"
private const val MIME_TYPE = "application/my.applications.mimetype"
}
...
val tm = Context.getSystemService(Context.TELEPHONY_SERVICE) as TelephonyManager
val VERSION = tm.getDeviceSoftwareVersion();
...
val nfcAdapter = NfcAdapter.getDefaultAdapter(this)
val text: String = "$TAG$DATA_SPLITTER$VERSION"
val record = NdefRecord(NdefRecord.TNF_MIME_MEDIA, MIME_TYPE.getBytes(), ByteArray(0), text.toByteArray())
val records = arrayOf(record)
val msg = NdefMessage(records)
nfcAdapter.setNdefPushMessage(msg, this)
...
NSString *deviceName = [[UIDevice currentDevice] name];
NSString *baseUrl = @"http://myserver.com/?dev=";
NSString *urlString = [baseUrl stringByAppendingString:deviceName];
NSURL *url = [NSURL URLWithString:urlString];
NSURLRequest* request = [NSURLRequest requestWithURL:url cachePolicy:NSURLRequestUseProtocolCachePolicy timeoutInterval:60.0];
NSError *err = nil;
NSURLResponse* response = nil;
NSData *data = [NSURLConnection sendSynchronousRequest:request returningResponse:&response error:&err];
<?php
...
echo "Server error! Printing the backtrace";
debug_print_backtrace();
...
?>
Example 1, the leaked information could imply information about the type of operating system, the applications installed on the system, and the amount of care that the administrators have put into configuring the program.PATH_INFO and SCRIPT_NAME to the page.
...
HTP.htmlOpen;
HTP.headOpen;
HTP.title ('Environment Information');
HTP.headClose;
HTP.bodyOpen;
HTP.br;
HTP.print('Path Information: ' ||
OWA_UTIL.get_cgi_env('PATH_INFO') || '');
HTP.print('Script Name: ' ||
OWA_UTIL.get_cgi_env('SCRIPT_NAME') || '');
HTP.br;
HTP.bodyClose;
HTP.htmlClose;
...
}
Example 1, the search path could imply information about the type of operating system, the applications installed on the system, and the amount of care that the administrators have put into configuring the program.
...
import cgi
cgi.print_environ()
...
Example 1, the leaked information could imply information about the type of operating system, the applications installed on the system, and the amount of care that the administrators have put into configuring the program.
response = Rack::Response.new
...
stacktrace = caller # Kernel#caller returns an array of the execution stack
...
response.finish do |res|
res.write "There was a problem: #{stacktrace}"
end
Example 1, the search path could imply information about the type of operating system, the applications installed on the system, and the amount of care that the administrators have put into configuring the program.
def doSomething() = Action { request =>
...
Ok(Html(Properties.osName)) as HTML
}
Example 1, the leaked information could imply information about the type of operating system, the applications installed on the system, and the amount of care that the administrators have put into configuring the program.
let deviceName = UIDevice.currentDevice().name
let urlString : String = "http://myserver.com/?dev=\(deviceName)"
let url : NSURL = NSURL(string:urlString)
let request : NSURLRequest = NSURLRequest(URL:url)
var err : NSError?
var response : NSURLResponse?
var data : NSData = NSURLConnection.sendSynchronousRequest(request, returningResponse: &response, error:&err)
Response output stream:
...
If Err.number <>0 then
Response.Write "An Error Has Occurred on this page!<BR>"
Response.Write "The Error Number is: " & Err.number & "<BR>"
Response.Write "The Description given is: " & Err.Description & "<BR>"
End If
...
Example 1, the leaked information could imply information about the type of operating system, the applications installed on the system, and the amount of care that the administrators have put into configuring the program.
...
CALL FUNCTION 'FTP_VERSION'
...
IMPORTING
EXEPATH = p
VERSION = v
WORKING_DIR = dir
RFCPATH = rfcp
RFCVERSION = rfcv
TABLES
FTP_TRACE = FTP_TRACE.
WRITE: 'exepath: ', p, 'version: ', v, 'working_dir: ', dir, 'rfcpath: ', rfcp, 'rfcversion: ', rfcv.
...
try {
...
}
catch(e:Error) {
trace(e.getStackTrace());
}
Example 1, the search path could imply information about the type of operating system, the applications installed on the system, and the amount of care that the administrators have put into configuring the program.
try {
...
} catch (Exception e) {
System.Debug(LoggingLevel.ERROR, e.getMessage());
}
string cs="database=northwind;server=mySQLServer...";
SqlConnection conn=new SqlConnection(cs);
...
Console.Writeline(cs);
Example 1, the leaked information could imply information about the type of operating system, the applications installed on the system, and the amount of care that the administrators have put into configuring the program.
char* path = getenv("PATH");
...
fprintf(stderr, "cannot find exe on path %s\n", path);
Example 1, the search path could imply information about the type of operating system, the applications installed on the system, and the amount of care that the administrators have put into configuring the program.
...
EXEC CICS DUMP TRANSACTION
DUMPCODE('name')
FROM (data-area)
LENGTH (data-value)
END-EXEC.
...
<cfscript>
try {
obj = CreateObject("person");
}
catch(any excpt) {
f = FileOpen("c:\log.txt", "write");
FileWriteLine(f, "#excpt.Message#");
FileClose(f);
}
</cfscript>
final file = await File('example.txt').create();
final raf = await file.open(mode: FileMode.write);
final data = String.fromEnvironment("PASSWORD");
raf.writeString(data);
Example 1, the leaked information could imply information about the type of operating system, the applications installed on the system, and the amount of care that the administrators have put into configuring the program.
path := os.Getenv("PATH")
...
log.Printf("Cannot find exe on path %s\n", path)
Example 1, the search path could imply information about the type of operating system, the applications installed on the system, and the amount of care that the administrators have put into configuring the program.
protected void doPost (HttpServletRequest req, HttpServletResponse res) throws IOException {
...
PrintWriter out = res.getWriter();
try {
...
} catch (Exception e) {
out.println(e.getMessage());
}
}
Example 1, the leaked information could imply information about the type of operating system, the applications installed on the system, and the amount of care that the administrators have put into configuring the program.
...
try {
...
} catch (Exception e) {
String exception = Log.getStackTraceString(e);
Intent i = new Intent();
i.setAction("SEND_EXCEPTION");
i.putExtra("exception", exception);
view.getContext().sendBroadcast(i);
}
...
...
public static final String TAG = "NfcActivity";
private static final String DATA_SPLITTER = "__:DATA:__";
private static final String MIME_TYPE = "application/my.applications.mimetype";
...
TelephonyManager tm = (TelephonyManager)Context.getSystemService(Context.TELEPHONY_SERVICE);
String VERSION = tm.getDeviceSoftwareVersion();
...
NfcAdapter nfcAdapter = NfcAdapter.getDefaultAdapter(this);
if (nfcAdapter == null)
return;
String text = TAG + DATA_SPLITTER + VERSION;
NdefRecord record = new NdefRecord(NdefRecord.TNF_MIME_MEDIA,
MIME_TYPE.getBytes(), new byte[0], text.getBytes());
NdefRecord[] records = { record };
NdefMessage msg = new NdefMessage(records);
nfcAdapter.setNdefPushMessage(msg, this);
...
var http = require('http');
...
http.request(options, function(res){
...
}).on('error', function(e){
console.log('There was a problem with the request: ' + e);
});
...
Example 1, the leaked information could imply information about the type of operating system, the applications installed on the system, and the amount of care that the administrators have put into configuring the program.
try {
...
} catch (e: Exception) {
e.printStackTrace()
}
Example 1, the leaked information could imply information about the type of operating system, the applications installed on the system, and the amount of care that the administrators have put into configuring the program.
...
try {
...
} catch (e: Exception) {
Log.e(TAG, Log.getStackTraceString(e))
}
...
...
NSString* deviceID = [[UIDevice currentDevice] name];
NSLog(@"DeviceID: %@", deviceID);
...
deviceID entry to the list of user defaults, and stores them immediately to a plist file.
...
NSString* deviceID = [[UIDevice currentDevice] name];
[defaults setObject:deviceID forKey:@"deviceID"];
[defaults synchronize];
...
Example 2 stores system information from the mobile device in an unprotected plist file stored on the device. Although many developers trust plist files as a safe storage location for any and all data, it should not be trusted implicitly particularly when system information and privacy are a concern, since plist files could be read by anyone in possession of the device.
<?php
...
echo "Server error! Printing the backtrace";
debug_print_backtrace();
...
?>
Example 1, the leaked information could imply information about the type of operating system, the applications installed on the system, and the amount of care that the administrators have put into configuring the program.
try:
...
except:
print(sys.exc_info()[2])
Example 1, the leaked information could imply information about the type of operating system, the applications installed on the system, and the amount of care that the administrators have put into configuring the program.
...
begin
log = Logger.new(STDERR)
...
rescue Exception
log.info("Exception: " + $!)
...
end
Example 1, the leaked information could imply information about the type of operating system, the applications installed on the system, and the amount of care that the administrators have put into configuring the program. Of course, another problem with Example 1 is rescuing the root Exception instead of a specific type or error/exception, meaning it will catch all exceptions, potentially causing other unconsidered side effects.
...
println(Properties.osName)
...
Example 1, the leaked information could imply information about the type of operating system, the applications installed on the system, and the amount of care that the administrators have put into configuring the program.
let deviceName = UIDevice.currentDevice().name
...
NSLog("Device Identifier: %@", deviceName)
ASPError object to a script debugger, such as the Microsoft Script Debugger:
...
Debug.Write Server.GetLastError()
...
Finalize() method for StreamReader eventually calls Close(), but there is no guarantee as to how long it will take before the Finalize() method is invoked. In fact, there is no guarantee that Finalize() will ever be invoked. In a busy environment, this can result in the VM using up all of its available file handles.Example 2: Under normal conditions the following code executes a database query, processes the results returned by the database, and closes the allocated
private void processFile(string fName) {
StreamWriter sw = new StreamWriter(fName);
string line;
while ((line = sr.ReadLine()) != null)
processLine(line);
}
SqlConnection object. But if an exception occurs while executing the SQL or processing the results, the SqlConnection object will not be closed. If this happens often enough, the database will run out of available cursors and not be able to execute any more SQL queries.
...
SqlConnection conn = new SqlConnection(connString);
SqlCommand cmd = new SqlCommand(queryString);
cmd.Connection = conn;
conn.Open();
SqlDataReader rdr = cmd.ExecuteReader();
HarvestResults(rdr);
conn.Connection.Close();
...
int decodeFile(char* fName)
{
char buf[BUF_SZ];
FILE* f = fopen(fName, "r");
if (!f) {
printf("cannot open %s\n", fName);
return DECODE_FAIL;
} else {
while (fgets(buf, BUF_SZ, f)) {
if (!checkChecksum(buf)) {
return DECODE_FAIL;
} else {
decodeBlock(buf);
}
}
}
fclose(f);
return DECODE_SUCCESS;
}
CALL "CBL_CREATE_FILE"
USING filename
access-mode
deny-mode
device
file-handle
END-CALL
IF return-code NOT = 0
DISPLAY "Error!"
GOBACK
ELSE
PERFORM write-data
IF ws-status-code NOT = 0
DISPLAY "Error!"
GOBACK
ELSE
DISPLAY "Success!"
END-IF
END-IF
CALL "CBL_CLOSE_FILE"
USING file-handle
END-CALL
GOBACK
.
New() function establishes a new connection to the system log daemon. It is part of the log.syslog package. Each write to the returned writer sends a log message with the given priority (a combination of the syslog facility and severity) and prefix tag. In a busy environment, this can result in the system using up all of its sockets.Example 2: In this example, the
func TestNew() {
s, err := New(syslog.LOG_INFO|syslog.LOG_USER, "the_tag")
if err != nil {
if err.Error() == "Unix syslog delivery error" {
fmt.Println("skipping: syslogd not running")
}
fmt.Println("New() failed: %s", err)
}
}
Dial() method of the net/smtp package returns a new client connected to an SMTP server at localhost. The connection resources are allocated but are never released by calling the Close() function.
func testDial() {
client, _ := smtp.Dial("127.0.0.1")
client.Hello("")
}
Arena.ofConfined() is not closed.
...
Arena offHeap = Arena.ofConfined()
MemorySegment str = offHeap.allocateUtf8String("data");
...
//offHeap is never closed
BEGIN
...
F1 := UTL_FILE.FOPEN('user_dir','u12345.tmp','R',256);
UTL_FILE.GET_LINE(F1,V1,32767);
...
END;
performOperationInCriticalSection(), but fails to release the lock if an exception is thrown in that method.
Object synchronizationObject = new Object ();
System.Threading.Monitor.Enter(synchronizationObject);
performOperationInCriticalSection();
System.Threading.Monitor.Exit(synchronizationObject);
int helper(char* fName)
{
int status;
...
pthread_cond_init (&count_threshold_cv, NULL);
pthread_mutex_init(&count_mutex, NULL);
status = perform_operation();
if (status) {
printf("%s", "cannot perform operation");
return OPERATION_FAIL;
}
pthread_mutex_destroy(&count_mutex);
pthread_cond_destroy(&count_threshold_cv);
return OPERATION_SUCCESS;
}
CALL "CBL_GET_RECORD_LOCK"
USING file-handle
record-offset
record-length
reserved
END-CALL
IF return-code NOT = 0
DISPLAY "Error!"
GOBACK
ELSE
PERFORM write-data
IF ws-status-code NOT = 0
DISPLAY "Error!"
GOBACK
ELSE
DISPLAY "Success!"
END-IF
END-IF
CALL "CBL_FREE_RECORD_LOCK"
USING file-handle
record-offset
record-length
reserved
END-CALL
GOBACK
.
performOperationInCriticalSection(), but fails to release the lock if an exception is thrown in that method.
ReentrantLock myLock = new ReentrantLock();
myLock.lock();
performOperationInCriticalSection();
myLock.unlock();
performOperationInCriticalSection() but never releases it.
os_unfair_lock lock1 = OS_UNFAIR_LOCK_INIT;
os_unfair_lock_lock(&lock1);
performOperationInCriticalSection();
performOperationInCriticalSection() but never releases it.
let lock1 = OSAllocatedUnfairLock()
lock1.lock()
performOperationInCriticalSection();